

# Constitutional Reform Survey

## December 2004

Commissioned by Civic Exchange, conducted by the Hong Kong Transition Project

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### I ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY

This survey on issues related to constitutional reform was conducted 11-22 December 2004. The survey was conducted as two linked and overlapping surveys, the first a random sample of 800 permanent residents and then an additional sample, random but focused on functional constituency registrants, of 405 registered FC voters. From these two main surveys, the attitudes of **Five** distinct groups are covered in this analysis.

- 1) The **RANDOM** group, including FC and GC registered voters and non-registered respondents, numbering 800 permanent residents (non-permanent residents, that is, all tourists, immigrants and foreign workers with less than 7 years residency excluded). The **RANDOM** respondents may be taken to represent the views of Hong Kong permanent residents in general. Responses of this group may be used to contrast the general views of the public with more politically participative groups below.
- 2) The **FC ACTIVE** voters includes those registered in an FC and who also indicated they voted in the September 2004 election. This group numbered 365 (405 in total claimed to be registered FC voters). The **FC ACTIVE** respondents may be taken to represent the views of active FC voters. This group may be expected to take the most role in advising FC Legco representatives on their views regarding constitutional reform.
- 3) The **GC ACTIVE** voters, **EXCLUDING FC VOTERS**, so this group is of 353 respondents who were registered voters, voted in September, and are NOT registered FC voters. Since FC voters can have 2 votes and in some cases three (if also designated voters for a corporate body as well as a professional or one of the FCs for business, for example), this group does NOT represent a random sample of all voters in September. It will be used to contrast GC active voter's views with FC active voter's views. The GC Active voters will give the best sense of "grass-roots" sentiment on geographic constituency Legco representatives versus the more elitist effects of FC active voters.
- 4) The **SEPT LEGCO VOTERS** includes 504 of those from the **RANDOM** sample group who were registered GC and FC voters, and who also said they voted in September 2004. This group may be said to represent a random sample of all who voted in the September 2004 elections. This group may be used to examine the overall sentiments of politically active persons in Hong Kong and of voters in the recent elections.
- 5) The strongest contrast to the **SEPT LEGCO VOTERS** are the 296 non-voting and non-registered respondents. Another way of designating this group would be the **POLITICALLY INACTIVE**. This sample group, drawn from the overall 800 **RANDOM**

sample, might be taken as those not involved in formal political processes, at least as voters. This group, 37 percent of the sample of 800 permanent residents, is least likely to act on constitutional reform issues, though its sentiments will affect general surveys that do not distinguish between politically involved and non-involved groups.<sup>1</sup>

It is crucially important in reading the analysis to keep in mind which group's responses are being discussed. The RANDOM sample group was contacted by telephone numbers drawn randomly, then further randomized by random generation of the final four digits and randomized still further in a database of over 20,000 potential telephone numbers. These numbers formed the universe of numbers from which, 20 sample telephone numbers at a time, they were randomly drawn into a CATI survey system station and then sequentially dialed by interviewers. Qualified respondents, that is, permanent residents aged 18 and above, were identified from a Kish table, which randomizes which member of the household is to be interviewed according to ages and number of household members. That person so identified was requested for interview or if not at home, then a time to return call was requested. Up to five callbacks were made to contact the person identified as the randomly selected respondent. Interviews were conducted in Cantonese, Mandarin, English, or Hakka, depending on the interviewees preference. The FC registered voters and active voters were taken from 169 FC registered voters contacted randomly, then supplemented by further random survey dialing of a registered FC voters database compiled from May to September 2004 during a series of previous surveys of FC voters prior to the 2004 Legco elections.

Due to the complex nature of this five-way analysis, the survey will be analyzed question by question, with each group's responses detailed following the question as asked on the survey. Demographic questions and five group data will be found at the end of the survey, and questions in which such data is useful to analyze the responses of one of the 5 groups will be presented with the relevant question. Question numbers refer to the order in which they appeared on the survey, not the order presented in this analysis. All numbers refer to percentages unless otherwise indicated. All numbers are rounded to the nearest whole, following WAPOR and AAPOR guidelines for analysis and reporting of survey data.

## II Reforming the Executive

As an Executive-led system, the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region deposits great powers into the hands of the Chief Executive. Perhaps as a result and likely more than in most regions, the executive in Hong Kong has become a primary focus of debate over constitutional reform. While much of the controversy revolves around the details of the Chief Executive election in 2007 and later elections, the reality behind the disputes over elector numbers, qualifications and voting procedures masks underlying concerns about this overly-powerful executive. The first questions below were designed to examine some of the anxieties or perspectives which drive arguments and conclusions about what sorts of reforms are desirable.

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<sup>1</sup> Please note, this 37 percent is the basis for still all too common assertions that "Hong Kong people" are apathetic about politics. This is by no means a majority, and these people while not registered and not voting, are not by any means uninformed or uninterested about politics. Most give replies indicating an opinion, often based on information and experience, about issues of the day. While our sample over-represents groups which tend to be more politically active and informed, the over-representation is not excessive in terms of demographic features of the sample measured against census data. Political apathy, in the sense of don't know and don't care to know about politics and current issues, is actually prevalent only among a distinct minority.

**Question 6: Would direct election of the Chief Executive make government management more effective or less effective?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Much more effective</b>	12	14	8	13	15
<b>More effective</b>	48	49	46	48	51
<b>Less effective</b>	16	15	20	15	15
<b>Much less effective</b>	2	2	2	1	3
<b>Don't Know</b>	22	21	25	23	17
<b>Sample size (#)<sup>2</sup></b>	800	504	296	353	365

Sixty percent of the random sample of permanent residents see direct election as making government management more effective. Sixty-three percent of Legco voters took a similar view (a number the same as the 62.9 percent of Legco voters who voted for pro-democracy candidates in the September Legco election). The politically inactive least consider direct CE election as improving government, at 54 percent, while FC active voters most consider direct CE election as a means to improve government management, at 66 percent.

**Question 7 Would direct election of CE make government policies fairer or less fair?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Much fairer</b>	17	19	13	18	22
<b>Fairer</b>	46	45	48	45	46
<b>Stay same</b>	9	8	9	7	11
<b>Less fair</b>	9	8	10	9	6
<b>Much less fair</b>	4	3	4	4	1
<b>Don't Know</b>	16	16	17	17	14
<b>Sample size (#)<sup>3</sup></b>	800	504	296	353	365

Question 8 asks about the principle of direct election while the follow-up question asked those who supported the principle of direct elections when they would like to see it applied.

**Question 8 In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of the CE?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	20	23	15	20	23
<b>Support</b>	54	55	52	56	56
<b>Oppose</b>	13	12	16	12	14
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	3	2	3	2	1
<b>Don't Know</b>	10	8	14	10	5
<b>Sample size (#)<sup>4</sup></b>	800	504	296	353	365

<sup>2</sup> The range of error (rounded off) at the 95 percent confidence interval for the above sample sizes is +/-4 for the 800; +/-6 for the 504 sample; and +/-8 for the 296, 353, 365 sized samples. Eg, in Q6, differences in response percentages among the groups are too small to determine a significant difference among the responses except for the 12 point difference between the Politically Inactives (PI) and the FC Actives (FCA) when the responses of much more effective and effective are added together and compared (54% of PI respondents think direct election will make government more effective vs 66% of FCAs, a range well above the +/-8 range of error.)

<sup>3</sup> The range of error (rounded off) at the 95 percent confidence interval for the above sample sizes is +/-4 for the 800; +/-6 for the 504 sample; and +/-8 for the 296, 353, 365 sized samples. That is, for example, in Question 6, that the differences in response percentages among the groups are too small to determine a significant difference among the responses except for the 12 point difference between the Politically Inactives (PI) and the FC Actives (FCA) when the responses of much more effective and effective are added together and compared (54% of PI respondents think direct election of the CE will make government more effective versus 66% of FCAs, a range of 12 points, well above the +/-8 range of error in the sample sizes.)

The follow-up question of the supporters of direct election timing showed nearly half support direct election in 2007. Those who opposed or did not know amounted to about one in five. The vast majority of respondents want direct elections by 2012 or sooner (two thirds).

**Q 8a IF support, then when?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>In 2007</b>	46	49	43	47	46
<b>2012</b>	20	21	17	20	26
<b>2017</b>	2	2	2	2	1
<b>Later election</b>	6	7	5	7	5
<b>Oppose or DK</b>	26	22	33	25	21

Q9 examines what reasons those who oppose or don't know gave for opposing.

**Q 9 IF oppose (or don't know in 8 above), what is your MAIN or MOST IMPORTANT reason for opposing direct elections of the Chief Executive? Open ended responses. (first #:% of Oppose/DK; # in parentheses: % of all respondents in that group)**

	Random	GC active	FC active
<b>Because Beijing objects</b>	4 (1)	2 (0.3)	5 (1)
<b>My interests would be affected</b>	1.4 (0.1)	1 (0.2)	2 (0.3)
<b>Would cause chaos</b>	9 (1)	8 (1)	9 (1)
<b>Would lead to HK independence</b>	2 (0.4)	0	2 (0.3)
<b>Undesirable candidate might be elected</b>	6 (1)	2 (0.3)	12 (2)
<b>HK people not ready for direct election/not mature enough</b>	30 (5)	27 (4)	42 (7)
<b>HK parties not mature enough</b>	10 (2)	16 (2)	18 (3)
<b>Other reasons</b>	28 (4)	27 (4)*	28 (4)*
<b>Sample size (#)<sup>5</sup></b>	126 (800)	85 (353)	73 (365)

\*Percentages in FC Active column do not sum to 100 due to multiple reasons being given; percentages in GC Active amount to less than 100 due to many respondents giving no reasons. Three groups only compared.

The greatest differences, as might be expected, are between those active in the GCs only and those active in the FCs, or the grassroots versus the elites. The grassroots seem less willing to believe Hong Kong people are not ready for direct election than the FC active.

<sup>4</sup> The range of error (rounded off) at the 95 percent confidence interval for the above sample sizes is +/-4 for the 800; +/-6 for the 504 sample; and +/-8 for the 296, 353, 365 sized samples. That is, for example, in Question 6, that the differences in response percentages among the groups are too small to determine a significant difference among the responses except for the 12 point difference between the Politically Inactives (PI) and the FC Actives (FCA) when the responses of much more effective and effective are added together and compared (54% of PI respondents think direct election of the CE will make government more effective versus 66% of FCAs, a range of 12 points, well above the +/-8 range of error in the sample sizes.)


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Question 10 applies open-ended questioning to the issue of when people would prefer to see direct elections for the CE. A considerable proportion, some 12 percent, would like to see direct election of the CE even before 2007. This survey, conducted in late December 2004, was not affected by Tung's early resignation in March. Prospects for an early CE election in December appeared remote or unlikely, so such demands by such a portion can be interpreted as demand for direct election—direct election now, as it were. Some 30 percent had no views or opposed direct election.

**Q 10 If you could decide for yourself, when would you prefer direct election of the Chief Executive to take place? (Random sample)**

Group	Count	%
2004	10	1
2005	77	10
2006	15	2
2007	254	32
2008	32	4
2009	10	1
2010	25	3
2011	4	1
2012	102	13
2014	5	1
2015	2	0.3
2016	2	0.3
2017	15	2
2020	5	1
2024	1	0.1
2040	1	0.1
2047	1	0.1
Don't Know/undecided	113	14
Against direct election	126	16


**Cumulative bar graph of Random Sample open ended responses**



**Q 10 If you could decide for yourself, when would you prefer direct election of the Chief Executive to take place? (FC sample)**

Group	Count	%
2004	1	0.3
2005	47	13
2006	7	2
2007	113	31
2008	10	3
2009	5	1.4
2010	15	4
2011	0	
2012	66	18
2014	1	0.3
2015	3	1
2016	0	0
2017	3	1
2020	0	0
2024	0	0
2030	0	0
2046	1	0.3
2047	1	0.3
Don't Know	35	10
Oppose direct election	57	16

**Cumulative bar graph of FC Active Sample open ended responses**



Perhaps surprisingly, FC Active voters are marginally more supportive of direct election of the Chief Executive by 2012. FC voters have a higher educational level than non-FC voters,

a result not surprising given the prevalence of professionals among FC voters. However, when those who oppose direct election are compared to those who support direct election, those who oppose direct election have a higher proportion with more advanced degrees (45 percent of opponents have university or higher versus 30 percent of supporters at the same level).

**Q8 Table 2 Years of education of supporters versus opponents of direct election of Chief Executive**

N= 789

	Support Dir Elect	Oppose Dir Elect	total
<b>0-1 Primary</b>	7	4	7
<b>2-6 Primary</b>	8	6	8
<b>7-9 (F1-F3)</b>	15	8	14
<b>10-11 (F5/TIF3)</b>	25	24	25
<b>12-13 (F6-7/TCgrad)</b>	14	14	14
<b>14-16 (univ/univ grad)</b>	27	40	29
<b>17-18 (MA/PhD)</b>	3	5	4
<b>total</b>	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 12.01 with 6 df p = 0.0618

There are marginally more managers/administrators and associate professionals among opponents of direct elections than among supporters, and perhaps surprisingly, probably more educators among opponents than among supporters. Also those in elementary occupations, the least educated and least skilled and usually a category associated with pro-Beijing positions, seem more supportive of direct election.

**Q8 Table 3 Occupation of supporters versus opponents of direct election of CE N = 776**

	Support Dir Elect	Oppose Dir Elect	total
<b>Managers &amp; admin</b>	13	18	13
<b>Professionals</b>	8	8	8
<b>Assoc. Professionals</b>	4	8	5
<b>Clerks/Secretaries</b>	11	13	11
<b>Service &amp; sales</b>	7	7	7
<b>Ag &amp; fish</b>	1	1	1
<b>Craft &amp; entertainment</b>	4	3	4
<b>Plant &amp; machine</b>	7	3	6
<b>Elementary occup.</b>	13	6	12
<b>Housewife</b>	14	16	14
<b>Retired</b>	5	3	4
<b>Unemployed</b>	9	10	9
<b>Student</b>	4	3	4
<b>Educators</b>	1	3	2
<b>total</b>	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 15.32 with 13 df p = 0.2880

But the data in Q8 Table 3 becomes yet clearer when the question is probed across work sectors, showing that apparently much of the opposition to direct election of the Chief Executive is not from business related managers and administrators but among civil servants.

**Q 8 Table 4 Support/oppose direct election of CE by work sector N = 787**

	Support Dir Elect	Oppose Dir Elect	total
Civil servant	7	12	8
Privatized public (HA, AA)	4	5	4
Private sector	47	46	47
Non-profit sector	2	3	2
Not in workforce	40	34	39
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 4.970 with 4 df p = 0.2904

There is also association between self-identity and support/opposition to direct election of the CE, with a much larger proportion of those identifying themselves as Chinese opposing direct election. However, were Beijing to change stance, one would expect shifts in opinion among those identifying themselves as Chinese while those identifying themselves as Hong Kong persons would likely not show such a shift. There is also strong evidence that rural new territories residents (Heung Yee Kuk members) more strongly oppose direct election of the CE than support it.<sup>6</sup>

**Q 8 Table 5 Support/oppose direct election of CE by self-identification**

	Support Dir Elect	Oppose Dir Elect	total
Hong Kong Chinese	30	34	30
Chinese	29	38	30
Hong Kong person	34	23	32
Hong Kong British	3	1	3
Overseas Chinese	2	0	1
Other	3	4	3
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 12.42 with 5 df p = 0.0295

Question 11a and b tests reactions to immediate versus long-delayed direct election of CE.

**Q11a If direct election of the CE were implemented in 2007, my reaction would be:**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
No Reaction	21	17	27	20	12
Welcome decision	37	41	31	39	40
Accept the decision	15	14	17	14	18
Protest	1	1	1	1	1
Leave HK for PRC	0.1	0	0.3	0	0
Leave HK for overseas	0.1	0.2	0	0	0.3
Other	22	24	18	22	27
DK	5	4	5	4	3
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

<sup>6</sup> Testing Q 8 by housing and residency abroad shows a very high proportion of villa occupants and those who have lived in UK for a year or more as opposing rather than supporting direct election of the CE. Rural NT residents tend to live in villas and also to have lived in UK for a time, following a large diaspora of NT residents to UK in 1950s and early 1960s.



The 22 percent of the random sample who responded with “other” responses in Q 11a divided roughly one-third welcoming or accepting responses while two-thirds of the 22 percent (15 percent of the overall random sample) were concerned about the decision causing chaos or coming “too fast”. This 15 percent of the sample who are concerned about negative effects of direct election of the CE is consistent throughout the survey.

**Q 11a Reclassification of Other response (Random Sample only) N=174**

<b>Other Reclassified responses</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Feel happy and excited	17	10
It will be a great progress on constitution reform	21	12
Hong Kong will be better	16	9
Basically acceptable, but not feasible to implement in 2007	3	2
The pace will be too fast, year 2007 is inappropriate time for CE direct election	77	44
The society will be chaotic	37	21
Unclassifiable	3	2

**Q11b If direct election of the CE were delayed indefinitely, my reaction would be:**

	<b>Random</b>	<b>Sept voters</b>	<b>Pol inactive</b>	<b>GC active</b>	<b>FC active</b>
No Reaction	25	22	30	27	12
Welcome decision	3	3	4	2	5
Accept the decision	9	7	12	8	7
Protest	15	19	8	18	19
Leave HK for PRC	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	1
Leave HK for overseas	2	3	0	2	3
Other	38	39	37	35	46
DK	8	8	8	7	6
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

The 38 percent of the Random Sample who gave an “Other” response to the indefinite delay of direct election of the CE nearly all indicated opposition to such an indefinite delay. While not willing to protest or leave Hong Kong, the responses below clearly indicate a large portion of respondents who would respond strongly against lengthy delays.

**Q 11b Reclassification of Other response (Random Sample only) N=305**

<b>Other Reclassifications</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
Angry but won't protest	12	4
Oppose the decision, totally unacceptable	59	19
Feel hopeless and frustrated	73	24
Disappointed but not angry	76	25
It will be impossible for government to delay indefinitely	39	13
It will block all kinds of development in the society	23	8
Unclassifiable	23	8

The most significant aspects of Q11b is that so many would protest, that is, take to the streets while a small but depending on their skills, perhaps critical number (approximately 110,000) would leave Hong Kong.

Q 12 examines support/opposition to the principle of increasing the number of members of the CE Election Committee. There is around two-thirds support for enlargement.

**Q 12 In principle, do you support/oppose enlarging the number of members of the CE Election Committee?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	12	13	10	13	12
<b>Support</b>	50	51	48	52	55
<b>Oppose</b>	15	16	15	16	16
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	2	2	1	2	4
<b>DK</b>	21	17	26	18	13
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

Q 13 A-G examines different options for enlargement of the CE committee.

**Q 13 Would you find the following options for reforming the current 800-member CE Election Committee acceptable or unacceptable?**

**A. REPLACE EC WITH DIRECT APPOINTMENT BY BEIJING OFFICIALS:**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Very unacceptable</b>	45	48	39	46	55
<b>Somewhat unacceptable</b>	31	30	32	31	28
<b>Somewhat acceptable</b>	14	13	14	14	10
<b>Very acceptable</b>	2	3	1	2	5
<b>DK</b>	8	6	13	7	3
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

**B. KEEP 800 MEMBERS ELECTED SAME AS NOW**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Very unacceptable</b>	14	17	10	13	22
<b>Somewhat unacceptable</b>	32	36	26	34	43
<b>Somewhat acceptable</b>	43	37	53	41	28
<b>Very acceptable</b>	2	2	1	1	1
<b>DK</b>	9	9	10	10	6
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

**C. EXPAND TO 1,600 MEMBERS**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Very unacceptable</b>	11	11	10	8	13
<b>Somewhat unacceptable</b>	29	29	29	27	35
<b>Somewhat acceptable</b>	46	48	43	50	43
<b>Very acceptable</b>	4	3	6	3	2
<b>DK</b>	11	10	13	11	7
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

#### D. EXPAND TO 5,000 MEMBERS

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Very unacceptable	16	15	17	13	17
Somewhat unacceptable	34	35	34	34	38
Somewhat acceptable	28	29	25	28	30
Very acceptable	10	11	8	12	7
DK	13	11	16	12	8
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

#### E. ADD ALL 400 ELECTED DISTRICT COUNCIL MEMBERS TO EC

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Very unacceptable	6	6	6	4	10
Somewhat unacceptable	15	15	14	15	21
Somewhat acceptable	59	60	57	62	54
Very acceptable	7	8	6	7	9
DK	13	11	18	12	6
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

#### F. EXPAND TO ALL REGISTERED FUNCTIONAL CONSTITUENCY VOTERS

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Very unacceptable	6	5	6	4	7
Somewhat unacceptable	19	21	14	21	24
Somewhat acceptable	54	53	55	54	52
Very acceptable	10	10	9	8	13
DK	13	11	16	14	4
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

#### G. REPLACE WITH UNIVERSAL SUFFRAGE DIRECT ELECTION BY ALL HK VOTERS

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Very unacceptable	6	6	7	5	8
Somewhat unacceptable	14	13	15	13	11
Somewhat acceptable	29	27	32	27	25
Very acceptable	42	47	33	47	50
DK	9	7	13	8	5
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

#### Q 14 Which of the 7 options would you MOST prefer?

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Beijing appointment	3	2	3	3	3
Keep same as now	8	7	10	8	4
Expand to 1,600	6	6	6	7	4
Expand to 5,000	4	4	3	4	5
Add all 400 Dist Council	7	7	8	6	6
Expand to all FC voters	6	6	6	4	10
Direct election all HK	56	59	52	59	63
DK	9	8	11	10	5
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

Clearly responses to Q 13 and Q14 indicate that direct election of the CE was by far the most preferred option. From responses to Q 14, clearly most want to expand the CE Election Committee.

Q 15 seems to indicate that some change to the terms of reference for the Election Committee is also supported, with significant proportions favoring Legco nominators or registered voters as nominators and the EC as the electing body--.

**Q 15 In 2002 the Election Committee members nominated and elected the CE, in the next election would you prefer:**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
No change	9	8	11	8	9
Nominating body only	9	10	6	8	11
Electing body only /Legco nominate	17	18	16	17	18
Electing body only/set # of registered voters to nominate	30	31	29	29	36
DK	35	33	38	37	25
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

Q 16 probes support for change or retention of current practices for the CE and Exco. FC voters seem far more tolerant of party politics and membership than the general public, but the biggest source of opposition to political affiliation comes from the politically inactive group.

**Q 16 Should be following practices be forbidden or allowed?**

**A. CHIEF EXECUTIVE TO BE A MEMBER OF A PARTY**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Should be forbidden	60	58	63	58	52
Should be allowed	26	29	22	27	35
DK	14	14	15	15	13
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

**B. PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS IN EXCO TO BE A MEMBER OF A PARTY**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Should be forbidden	52	51	52	50	48
Should be allowed	32	33	32	33	36
DK	16	16	16	16	15
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

**C. PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS IN EXCO TO BE LEGCO MEMBERS**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Should be forbidden	45	48	40	42	53
Should be allowed	38	37	39	40	34
DK	17	15	21	18	13
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

**D. LEGCO MEMBERS TO BE EXCO MEMBERS (WITHOUT MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY)**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Should be forbidden	50	52	45	46	57
Should be allowed	31	30	33	34	28
DK	19	18	21	20	14
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (504)</b>	<b>100 (296)</b>	<b>100 (353)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

**Q 42h Are you currently worried or not worried about: Constitutional reform disputes causing chaos?**

	Random	FC active
Not worried	43	43
Slightly worried	28	30
Somewhat worried	17	19
Very worried	8	5
DK	5	2
<b>Total % (N=)</b>	<b>100 (800)</b>	<b>100 (365)</b>

While the comparative responses to Q42h indicate FC and random sample have comparatively similar patterns of responses about worry whether constitutional reform disputes will cause chaos, the patterns of relationship of whether their support or opposition to direct election of the CE is associated with their worry about chaos differ significantly, with 30 percent of those strongly opposed to direct election of CE among the Random Sample very worried about chaos and none among the FC Actives.

**Q42h Worry about Constitutional Reform disputes causing chaos by Q8 In principle, support/oppose direct election of the Chief Executive (Random Sample crosstab)**

	Strongly support	Support	Oppose	Strongly oppose	DK	total
Not worried	46	42	47	35	39	43
Slightly worried	24	32	27	15	20	28
Somewhat worried	18	16	14	<b>20</b>	20	17
Very worried	8	6	7	<b>30</b>	11	8
DK	5	4	5	0	11	5
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 33.02 with 16 df p = 0.0073

**Q42h Worry about Constitutional Reform disputes causing chaos by Q8 In principle, support/oppose direct election of the Chief Executive (FC Active crosstab)**

	Strongly support	Support	Oppose	Strongly oppose	DK	total
Not worried	52	44	31	0	35	43
Slightly worried	21	33	31	60	35	30
Somewhat worried	18	17	31	<b>40</b>	10	19
Very worried	6	4	8	<b>0</b>	15	5
DK	2	2	0	0	5	2
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 23.75 with 16 df p = 0.0952

### III Reforming the Legislative Council

While Legco is a considerably less powerful body than the executive, its more representative nature and power over allocation bills gives its some degree of influence. Its role as check and balance to the executive and representative body in the government is reflected in sentiments to various questions raised below. There is also a belief (see Q19 that direct election of all Legco members would increase the influence of Legco over the making of government policies, an increase in influence for this group that the vast majority appear to welcome.

Responses to Q 17 shows there is an overwhelming consensus that direct election of all Legco seats would help make government policies fairer.

#### Question 17: Would direct election of all Legco seats help make government policies fairer or less fair?<sup>7</sup>

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Much fairer</b>	27	30	22	29	32
<b>Fairer</b>	49	48	50	49	45
<b>Stay same</b>	7	5	11	4	8
<b>Less fair</b>	7	6	7	7	5
<b>Much less fair</b>	2	2	1	1	4
<b>Don't Know</b>	9	9	9	9	7
<b>Sample size (#)<sup>8</sup></b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

Q 18 responses indicate that while a majority feel Legco does have a great or fair amount of influence, there are still a substantial proportion, particularly among FC Active respondents, who see its influence as very small to nil. Note also the difference in responses by the FC Active respondents for very small to none (38% combined) and Politically Inactive respondents (30% combined). Some of the political inactivity is no doubt related to the felt efficacy of the act of voting, not to politics or government itself per se.

#### Question 18: How much influence does Legco have on making government policies?

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Great deal</b>	27	30	23	31	27
<b>Fair amount</b>	34	30	39	28	33
<b>Very small</b>	24	25	22	25	32
<b>No influence</b>	8	8	8	9	6
<b>Don't Know</b>	7	7	8	8	2
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

As Q 19 indicates, an overwhelming majority believe that direct election would increase that influence.

<sup>7</sup> All numbers refer to percentages unless otherwise indicated. All numbers are rounded to the nearest whole number, following WAPOR and AAPOR guidelines for analysis and reporting of survey data.

<sup>8</sup> The range of error (rounded off) at the 95 percent confidence interval for the above sample sizes is +/-4 for the 800; +/-6 for the 504 sample; and +/-8 for the 296, 353, 365 sized samples.

**Question 19: If all Legco seats were directly elected, would that influence increase, decrease or stay same?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Greatly increase</b>	19	23	11	21	21
<b>Increase</b>	55	55	53	55	62
<b>Stay same</b>	16	13	22	14	12
<b>Decrease</b>	2	2	3	2	1
<b>Greatly decrease</b>	--	--	1	--	0
<b>Don't Know</b>	8	7	9	8	5
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

Q 20 shows equally overwhelming support, in principle, for direct election of all Legco seats across all five groups. All five groups, however, show consistent levels of opposition to full direct election of all Legco seats, in proportions similar to those seen in questions relating to direct election of the Chief Executive.<sup>9</sup>

**Question 20: In principle, do you support or oppose direct election of all Legco seats?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	21	24	17	23	23
<b>Support</b>	52	51	53	51	54
<b>Oppose</b>	16	15	17	15	15
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	3	3	3	3	2
<b>Don't Know</b>	9	8	11	8	5
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

The first cross tab indicates perceptions of the effect of full direct elections of all Legco members on the fairness of government policies has a strong effect. The small proportion who feel direct election would make government politics less fair (9% of Random sample) overwhelmingly oppose direct election of all members.

**CROSSTAB Q 20 Support/oppose full Legco direct election by Q 17 would full direct election make government policies fairer or less fair? (Random Sample)**

	Much fairer	Fairer	Stay same	Less fair	Much less fair	DK	total
<b>Strongly support</b>	49	15	2	1	0	1	21
<b>Support</b>	43	66	42	25	33	32	52
<b>Oppose</b>	5	12	27	55	33	26	16
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	--	--	7	15	33	5	3
<b>Don't Know</b>	2	7	16	4	0	36	9
<b>total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 399.9 with 20 df  $p \leq 0.0001$ <sup>10</sup>

<sup>9</sup> See “Reforming the Chief Executive Election” report.

<sup>10</sup> Cross tabulations are simple measures of association among variables, with the Chi-square measure indicating the degree of possibility these measures of association could occur by chance. If Chi-square is less or equal to 0.0001, that means there is less than a one in a thousand chance this pattern of association is from chance.

Similarly, but even more profoundly do perceptions of unfairness affect opposition among the 9 percent of FC Active respondents.

**CROSSTAB Q 20 Support/oppose full Legco direct election by Q 17 would full direct election make government policies fairer or less fair? (FC Active Sample)**

	Much fairer	Fairer	Stay same	Less fair	Much less fair	DK	total
<b>Strongly support</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>15</b>	6	0	0	0	23
<b>Support</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>73</b>	39	6	15	46	54
<b>Oppose</b>	3	6	42	<b>83</b>	<b>39</b>	38	15
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	0	0	3	<b>11</b>	<b>39</b>	0	2
<b>Don't Know</b>	2	6	10	0	8	17	5
<b>total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 288.5 with 20 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

These perceptions of unfairness influence a fair proportion of those see direct elections increasing Legco's policy influence who oppose direct election of all Legco members, as seen in the cross tab below.

**CROSSTAB Q 20 Support/oppose full Legco direct election by Q 18 How much influence does Legco have on making government policies (Random sample)**

	Great deal	Fair amount	Very small	No influence	DK	total
<b>Strongly support</b>	24	15	<b>25</b>	<b>34</b>	13	21
<b>Support</b>	47	57	<b>54</b>	<b>48</b>	45	52
<b>Oppose</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>20</b>	14	<b>6</b>	9	16
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>	2	<b>3</b>	2	3
<b>Don't Know</b>	8	7	6	9	32	9
<b>total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 70.21 with 16 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Among the FC Active sample, those who see Legco as having no influence on government policies make no objection to full direct elections of all Legco members.

**CROSSTAB Q 20 Support/oppose full Legco direct election by Q 18 How much influence does Legco have on making government policies (FC Active sample)**

	Great deal	Fair amount	Very small	No influence	DK	total
<b>Strongly support</b>	22	15	<b>33</b>	<b>32</b>	0	23
<b>Support</b>	50	56	<b>54</b>	<b>68</b>	33	54
<b>Oppose</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>21</b>	8	<b>0</b>	33	15
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>1</b>	1	<b>0</b>	0	2
<b>Don't Know</b>	3	7	5	0	33	5
<b>total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 50.32 with 16 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

The cross tab of those who see direct election of all Legco members increasing its influence on government policies with their support/opposition to full direct election shows that of those who see direct election greatly increasing Legco's influence, 86 percent support direct



election. There is strong support for increasing Legco’s influence over government policies, linked to perceptions that full direct elections would increase the fairness of such policies.

**CROSSTAB Q 20 Support/oppose full Legco direct election by Q 19 IF all Legco seats directly elected would influence increase, decrease, stay same? (Random Sample)**

	Greatly increase	Increase	Stay same	Decrease	Greatly decrease	DK	total
<b>Strongly support</b>	60	15	8	11	0	6	21
<b>Support</b>	26	65	50	28	0	35	52
<b>Oppose</b>	9	14	25	<b>50</b>	0	17	16
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	4	2	4	<b>0</b>	0	5	3
<b>Don’t Know</b>	1	5	14	11	100	37	9
<b>total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 311.2 with 20 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

The same cross tab among FC Active sample shows about the same pattern of support for direct election of all members among those who see such election greatly increasing Legco’s influence over government policy.

**CROSSTAB Q 20 Support/oppose full Legco direct election by Q 19 IF all Legco seats directly elected would influence increase, decrease, stay same? (FC Active Sample)**

	Greatly increase	Increase	Stay same	Decrease	Greatly decrease	DK	total
<b>Strongly support</b>	63	16	5	20	•	0	23
<b>Support</b>	27	67	48	0	•	29	54
<b>Oppose</b>	7	12	33	<b>80</b>	•	35	15
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	3	2	5	<b>0</b>	•	0	2
<b>Don’t Know</b>	1	4	10	0	•	35	5
<b>total</b>	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 248.6 with 20 df  $p \leq 0.0001$


The question of when to implement full direct election of all Legco members shows that FC Active respondents tend to support earlier implementation than the overall Random sample.

**Q 20a IF support full direct election, then when to implement?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>In 2008</b>	52	55	47	55	57
<b>2012</b>	13	13	12	11	16
<b>2016</b>	3	2	4	2	2
<b>Later election</b>	5	5	6	5	3
<b>Oppose or DK</b>	27	25	31	26	22

(See comparative chart of Q20a below.)

**Comparative Chart: Q20a, when to implement full direct election of Legco**



These initially sanguine results for those who support full direct election of all Legco members do not, however, hold up when the full meaning of abolishing the FC seats with their special representation is specifically examined, as responses to Q 21 show. A majority support continuing to allow business and professionals special influence in government.

**Q 21 Do you support/oppose continuing practice of allowing business & professional groups special influence in government decision-making via Functional Constituencies?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	4	4	3	5	4
<b>Support</b>	51	50	53	47	56
<b>Oppose</b>	24	23	26	24	23
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	7	8	4	8	7
<b>Don't Know</b>	14	14	14	17	10
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

Many do NOT seem to realize full direct elections means that allowing disproportionate influence to select groups, in a formalized manner as now, would be abolished. But there is strong support for the erection of a separate body from Legco to represent such interests.

**Q 22 Would you support/oppose setting up FC elected representatives into a separate body from GC elected representatives like the Senate in US or House of Lords in UK?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	4	5	3	5	4
<b>Support</b>	43	43	42	44	42
<b>Oppose</b>	19	19	21	19	22
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	3	3	3	2	2
<b>Don't Know</b>	31	31	31	30	30
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

The sense is also apparent among many that there should be some sort of power retained by business and professional groups to stop or delay bills passed by a majority of directly elected members, as responses in Q 23 show. This is particularly the case among FC Actives, who show 56 percent opposing changes to the rule allowing 16 FC (or GC) members to stop bills being amended to a simple majority rule.

**Q 23 Do you support/oppose changing current rules allowing 16 members of either GC or FC to stop a bill into requiring all Legco bills to pass by a simple majority vote of all members?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	2	1	2	1	1
<b>Support</b>	34	34	35	33	31
<b>Oppose</b>	33	34	32	33	41
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	10	12	6	10	15
<b>Don't Know</b>	22	20	24	24	12
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

While there is support for retaining special influence for business and professional groups, there is also clear support for increasing the number of those who have rights to vote in such elections. Among the non-FC voters (the GC Active group) 78 percent support increasing who has a right to vote in FC elections. Among FC Active voters, diluting the power of their vote is a bit less supported, 66 percent, but this is still two-thirds of such voters supporting an increase in the franchise.

**Q 24 Do you support/oppose increasing who has a right to vote in FC elections?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	14	15	11	16	10
<b>Support</b>	64	61	69	62	56
<b>Oppose</b>	12	13	11	9	20
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	2	3	1	3	5
<b>Don't Know</b>	9	9	8	10	8
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

There is similarly very strong support across the board to increase competition in FC elections (or elections to a separate house). An appointed upper house or one with a similarly

restricted franchise as FCs now does not appear well supported. Other studies of FC elections commissioned by Civic Exchange have shown increases to the franchise of FC electorates is a sure method of increasing competition for seats. Currently on average, a third of FC seats are uncontested, with this third being consistently the smallest franchise seats.

**Q 25 Do you support/oppose increasing competition in FC elections?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	11	11	11	12	10
<b>Support</b>	65	65	65	63	63
<b>Oppose</b>	10	9	11	8	13
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	2	3	1	3	2
<b>Don't Know</b>	12	12	13	14	11
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

In terms of regrouping FCs along lines similar to the proportional list system used in the five big GC direct elections, there is a nearly split support/opposition overall, with FC Active respondents preponderantly against raising the effective number of voters by re-grouping seats. A further question, Q 28 below, shows strong support to return to first past the post rules in the GC seats, similar to those used now in the FC seats.

**Q 26 The 30 FCs are elected mostly by the first past the post method from single seat constituencies. Would you support/oppose regrouping FCs into related multi-seat constituencies, for example putting lawyers, accountants and medical seats into one big professionals FC with say 4 seats?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	3	2	3	2	2
<b>Support</b>	38	37	40	42	28
<b>Oppose</b>	30	31	29	27	41
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	4	5	3	4	9
<b>Don't Know</b>	25	24	26	24	20
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

Q 27 shows much stronger support among FC actives to all at once abolition of FC seats than step by step abolition. Despite Basic Law stipulations, more than one in ten oppose abolishing FC seats, with this group actually increasing when those who say step by step end up saying no change or indefinitely postponing the change as seen in 27a tables next page.

**Q 27 The Basic Law says the ultimate aim is to elect all members of Legco by universal suffrage elections (universal suffrage means all adults have right to vote, no further qualification such as being a member of a profession or special group is allowed). The NPC wants Legco to stay half FC/half GC in 2008, but in 2012 we may be allowed to change this ratio. So when should FCs be abolished, and should it be all at once or step by step?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>All at once</b>	16	19	10	17	30
<b>Step by step</b>	60	59	63	60	48
<b>Should not abolish</b>	13	12	15	12	17
<b>Don't Know</b>	11	10	12	12	6
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

Q27a shows among those saying step by step then probed for specific ratios, distinctly different assessments of timing and pace appear among all respondents versus FC Actives.

**Q27a If Step by Step, what should percent of FCs be in 2012? (FC:GC) N = 729  
Random Sample**

FC:GC	Count	%
Abolish 2008	95	13
0	180	25
2:98	1	0.1
4:96	1	0.1
5:95	3	0.4
8:92	2	0.3
10:90	10	1.4
12:88	1	0.1
15:85	1	0.1
17:83	17	2
20:80	46	6
25:75	51	7
30:70	34	5
33:67	29	4
40:60	18	2
42:58	8	1
45:55	2	0.3
50:50	41	6
60:40	2	0.3
65:35	1	0.1
Oppose abolition/DK	187	24
<b>Total</b>	<b>729</b>	<b>99</b>

**Q27a If Step by Step, what should percent of FCs be in 2012? (FC:GC)  
FC Active sample N= 336**

FC:GC	Count	%
Abolish 2008	84	25
0	69	20
4:96	1	0.3
8:92	1	0.3
10:90	5	1.5
15:85	3	1
17:83	5	1.5
20:80	17	5
25:75	23	7
30:70	10	3
33:67	12	4
40:60	8	2
42:58	1	0.3
50:50	9	3
60:40	1	0.3
No abolition/DK	86	25

By 2016 Legco elections, a strong majority support FC abolition (59%) and even more among FC registered voters (69%).

**Q27a If Step by Step, what should percent of FCs be in 2016? (Random sample, FC:GC) N = 771**

<b>FC:GC</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Abolish 2008/2012</b>	130	16
<b>0</b>	334	43
<b>5:95</b>	2	0.3
<b>7:93</b>	1	0.1
<b>8:92</b>	3	0.4
<b>10:90</b>	22	3
<b>12:88</b>	2	0.3
<b>13:87</b>	4	0.5
<b>15:85</b>	4	0.5
<b>17:83</b>	16	2
<b>20:80</b>	21	3
<b>25:75</b>	7	1
<b>30:70</b>	13	2
<b>33:67</b>	11	1
<b>35:65</b>	1	0.1
<b>40:60</b>	6	1
<b>50:50</b>	6	1
<b>65:35</b>	1	0.1
<b>No abolition/DK</b>	187	24
<b>Total</b>	771	100

**Q27a If Step by Step, what should percent of FCs be in 2016? (FC:GC) N = 407 REGISTERED FC voters**

<b>FC:GC</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Abolish 2008</b>	84	21
<b>Abolish 2012</b>	69	17
<b>0</b>	125	31
<b>5:95</b>	1	0.3
<b>8:92</b>	1	0.3
<b>10:90</b>	12	3
<b>15:85</b>	1	0.3
<b>17:83</b>	1	0.3
<b>20:80</b>	8	2
<b>20:90</b>	1	0.3
<b>25:75</b>	4	1
<b>30:70</b>	8	2
<b>33:67</b>	4	1
<b>35:65</b>	1	0.3
<b>50:50</b>	1	0.3
<b>No abolition/DK</b>	86	21

By 2020, 73 percent of all respondents support abolition of FC seats.

**Q27a If Step by Step, what should percent of FCs be in 2020? (FC:GC) N = 791**

FC:GC	Count	%
Abolish 2008/2012	130	16
0	448	57
5:95	1	0.1
8:92	2	0.3
10:90	1	0.1
15:85	2	0.3
17:83	1	0.1
20:80	8	1
25:75	4	0.5
30:70	2	0.3
33:67	1	0.1
35:65	1	0.1
40:60	2	0.3
50:50	1	0.1
No abolition/DK	187	24

While there is marginally more support than opposition for continuing the proportional list systems for GC elections among the overall Random sample (46% support versus 37% opposed), among FC actives more oppose proportional lists for GC elections than support (38% support versus 51% opposed). And when asked whether they would prefer going back to first past the post and adding more geographic districts, 64% of all and 69% of FC actives support this reversion to the pre-1998 system.

**Q 28 Currently all 30GC seats are proportionately elected by lists from 5 GCs. In 1995, 20 GC seats were elected by first past post in 20 GCs. Which do you support or oppose:**

**Proportional by lists as now?**

	Random	FC active
Strongly support	2	2
Support	44	36
Oppose	30	39
Strongly oppose	7	12
Don't Know	16	11
Sample size (#)	100 (800)	100 (365)

**Go back to first past post and add more geographic districts?**

	Random	FC active
Strongly support	15	19
Support	49	50
Oppose	18	17
Strongly oppose	1	1
Don't Know	18	14
Sample size (#)	100 (800)	100 (365)

By late December the issue of electing a pro-democracy majority to Legco (the pan-democrats ran on a platform of full direct elections of all Legco members in 2008 and direct election of the CE in 2007) still resonated among 43 percent of respondents while 32 percent opposed and one in four was uncertain. This proportion more than likely reflects post-election developments and attitudes rather than recollections of early September attitudes. The likelihood is that post-election stances by the pro-democracy bloc have seen a diminution of support from the 62.9% of voters who cast votes for pan-democratic candidates in September 2004. As shown by the somewhat mixed responses to Legco reform options reported in this paper, pan-democrats need to fashion more nuanced approaches to the concerns raised by significant proportions of the electorate who are concerned about the effects of full direct elections on the perceived fairness of government policies.

**Q 29 Did you support or oppose the election of a pro-democracy majority to Legco?**

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Strongly support</b>	7	8	5	8	6
<b>Support</b>	36	38	33	40	38
<b>Oppose</b>	26	23	29	23	21
<b>Strongly oppose</b>	6	6	7	5	5
<b>Don't Know</b>	26	26	26	24	30
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (504)	100 (296)	100 (353)	100 (365)

Responses to the final question in this report, Q 31 on frequency of discussion of political affairs shows, only a very small portion, about one in five to one in four, reply they never talk about political matters. Among FC active respondents, the proportion who never discuss politics virtually disappears, and even among the politically inactive, those not registered to vote and who did not vote though registered, only a third never talk about politics.

**Q31 When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?**

	Random	Pol inactive	FC active
<b>Never talk about</b>	22	33	7
<b>Occasionally</b>	64	59	68
<b>Frequently</b>	14	6	25
<b>Don't Know</b>	1	1	--
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	100 (800)	100 (296)	100 (365)

In this sense of talking with friends about politics even if not voting or registering to vote, nearly all Hong Kong, especially its business and professional classes, have become politicized, discussing even among their friends the sometimes sensitive, often embittering, political issues of the day. This is a population that seeks, even welcomes, political dialog and discussion. The days of colonial-style patrician government by a tiny politically aware elite making policies in isolation on the assumption that the vast majority neither know nor care about the politics behind its policies are clearly past.



## DEMOGRAPHICS

All numbers are percentages unless otherwise designated. All numbers are rounded to the nearest whole number unless otherwise designated. All percentages are percent of column, i.e., percent of each of the five analysis groups distributed in each row. For example, of those voters who only vote in the GCs (**GC ACTIVE**), 62 percent were born in Hong Kong. In contrast, FC active voters show 89 percent born in Hong Kong, a considerable variance in this demographic factor. Totals for each group vary across demographic factors since not all respondents answered all demographic questions, either refusing to give an answer or giving unclassifiable answers.

### BIRTHPLACE

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Hong Kong</b>	67	69	65	62	89
<b>China</b>	29	29	30	35	9
<b>Elsewhere</b>	4	2	5	3	2
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	800	504	296	353	365

### SEX

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>Male</b>	52	53	51	48	59
<b>Female</b>	48	47	49	52	41
<b>Sample size (#)</b>	800	504	296	353	365

### AGE

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
<b>18-19</b>	6	3	11	4	0.3
<b>20-29</b>	14	10	20	12	7
<b>30-39</b>	19	17	22	14	32
<b>40-49</b>	30	36	21	31	43
<b>50-59</b>	17	17	16	19	14
<b>60-69</b>	8	8	8	11	3
<b>70-87</b>	7	8	4	10	1

### EDUCATION (years and grade levels)

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active	FC registered*
<b>None to 1 year</b>	7	7	6	9	1	1
<b>2 to 6 (primary)</b>	8	8	9	11	1	2
<b>7-9 (F1-F3)</b>	14	14	12	17	2	4
<b>10-11 (F5/TIF3)</b>	25	22	31	26	11	15
<b>12-13 (F6-7/TCgrad)</b>	14	12	16	14	8	10
<b>14-16 (univ/univ grad)</b>	29	34	21	22	64	56
<b>17-18 (MA/PhD)</b>	4	4	5	1	14	11
<b>Total number</b>	789	504	285	353	361	498

\*FC registered to vote. 137 did not vote in the September 2004 Legco election.

## OCCUPATION

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Managers & admin	13	14	12	8	25
Professionals	8	10	5	3	32
Assoc. Professionals	5	6	4	2	16
Clerks/Secretaries	11	11	11	13	4
Service & sales	7	5	10	7	2
Ag & fish	0	0	0	0	0
Craft & entertainment	1	1	0	1	0
Plant & machine	4	3	5	5	0.3
Elementary occup.	6	6	8	8	1
Housewife	12	13	10	17	2
Retired	14	16	10	20	4
Unemployed	4	3	7	4	1
Student	9	6	15	9	0
Educators	4	5	2	1	13
Other	2	2	1	2	1
<b>Total</b>	<b>776</b>	<b>488</b>	<b>288</b>	<b>412</b>	<b>360</b>

## WORK SECTOR

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Civil Servant	8	9	7	6	16
Privatized public	4	5	3	1	14
Private	47	46	49	43	52
Non-profit	2	3	1	1	8
Not in work sector*	39	37	41	49	9
<b>Total</b>	<b>787</b>	<b>494</b>	<b>293</b>	<b>417</b>	<b>365</b>

\*Housewives, retirees, unemployed & students from the categories in the Occupation table above

## RELIGION

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
None	54	54	55	52	54
Catholic	6	7	5	5	10
Protestant	15	15	14	13	24
Buddhist	10	10	9	12	5
Taoist	1	0.4	1	0.5	1
Ancestor worship	14	13	15	17	5
Other	1	1	2	0.5	1

## EXPERIENCE LIVING OUTSIDE HONG KONG ONE YEAR OR MORE

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Yes	28	28	27	26	33
No	72	72	73	74	66
<b>Total</b>	<b>797</b>	<b>503</b>	<b>294</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>363</b>

## RIGHT OF ABODE OVERSEAS

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Yes	10	11	8	6	24
No	90	89	92	94	76

## HOUSING TYPE

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Villa/Bungalow	1	1	1	1	2
Private ownership	43	47	36	39	69
Private rental	8	5	12	6	8
Home Ownership Scheme	15	16	14	18	10
Public Housing	28	25	32	33	5
Modern village house	2	2	2	2	2
Traditional village house	1	1	1	1	1
Temporary housing	--	0	--	0	0
Employer provided	1	1	1	--	1
Other	1	2	1	1	2
<b>Total</b>	<b>800</b>	<b>504</b>	<b>296</b>	<b>353</b>	<b>365</b>

## FAMILY MEMBERS WITH ROA OVERSEAS

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Yes	43	45	40	44	47
No	57	55	60	56	53

## MONTHLY FAMILY INCOME

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
None	6	6	6	8	0.5
Less than 5,000	3	4	2	5	0.3
5,000-9,999	6	6	7	8	0.5
10,000-14,999	12	10	14	14	2
15,000-19,999	10	9	10	11	2
20,000-24,999	10	9	11	11	5
25,000-29,999	5	5	5	4	4
30,000-34,999	7	7	7	8	6
35,000-39,999	4	4	3	2	7
40,000-49,999	5	4	6	4	8
50,000-59,999	5	6	3	5	13
60,000-69,999	3	4	1	2	7
70,000-79,999	2	2	2	0.4	5
80,000-89,999	1	1	1	0	5
90,000-99,999	5	6	3	2	20
100,000 +	17	18	16	17	14

## CSSA STATUS\*

	Random	Sept voters	Pol inactive	GC active	FC active
Yes	3	3	3	5	0
No	3	4	3	3	0
NA	94	93	94	92	100

\*Asked of those reporting no family income: Are you receiving any gov't support such as CSSA?