

1982–2007



## The Hong Kong Transition Project

# Winter of Despair

**Confidence and legitimacy in crisis in the Hong Kong SAR**

(December 2001)

A research report from a multi-national, multi-disciplinary, longitudinal research project of academics from Hong Kong University, Hong Kong Baptist University, Academia Sinica and East Asia University of Macau on Hong Kong's transition from British Royal Crown Colony to Special Administrative Region of the Peoples Republic of China and its people's transition from foreign subjects to citizens.

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## Table of Contents

<b>1. A bleak outlook?</b>	<b>2</b>
Table 1 How do you feel currently about HK's future prospects as a part of China?	3
Table 3 Optimism/pessimism by age groups	4
Table 4 Optimism/pessimism by Occupation	5
Table 5 Optimism by Class	7
Table 6 Optimism by religion	
<b>2. Sources of pessimism</b>	<b>7</b>
Table 7. How do you expect your family financial situation to change over the next 12 months?	
Table 8 Collapsed categories of Table 7	8
Table 9 Are you worried or not worried about <b>your employment situation</b>	
Table 10 Worry about employment by occupation	9
Table 11 Worry about employment by Education level	10
Table 12 Education level, proportions worried or not worried about employment	11
Table 13 Worry about employment by age groups	
Table 14 How worried are you about : Personal standard of living?	12
Table 15 Worry about personal standards of living by Age groups	13
Table 15 How worried are you about: Hong Kong's economic prospects?	14
Table 16 How worried are you about: competitiveness of Hong Kong?	15
Table 17 How worried are you about: corruption in HK?	16
Table 18 How worried are you about: Personal freedom in Hong Kong?	17
Table 19 Are you currently worried or not worried about: <b>Free press</b>	
Table 20 Are you currently worried or not worried about: <b>Free speech</b>	
Table 21 Are you currently worried or not worried about: <b>Free assembly</b>	
Table 22 Are you currently worried or not worried about: <b>Religious freedom</b>	
Table 23 Of the worried mentioned, which aspect worries you the most?	18
Table 24 Are you worried or not worried about <b>excessive population</b>	19
Table 25 Are you worried or not worried about <b>air and water pollution</b>	
Table 26 Are you worried or not worried about <b>rule of law in Hong Kong</b>	20
Table 27 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now personally?	
Table 27 A Totals of open ended personal concerns by classification	21
Table 27 B Main economic factors/open ended personal concerns	
<b>3. Dissatisfaction and pessimism</b>	<b>22</b>
Table 28 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's performance on this problem?	

Table 29	Satisfaction with performance on unemployment concerns	
Table 30	Do you think Mr. Tung is making sufficient or insufficient effort to solve this problem, or is this a problem he should not be responsible for?	23
Table 31	Sufficiency of Tung's efforts to solve unemployment by unemployment a concern	23
<b>4.</b>	<b>Dissatisfaction with government</b>	<b>23</b>
Table 32	Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the HK Government?	24
Table 33	Satisfaction with performance of government by Gender	25
Table 34	Satisfaction with performance of government by Age group	
Table 35	Satisfaction with performance of government by Occupation	26
Table 36	Satisfaction with the government by workforce sector	27
Table 37	Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong?	28
Table 38	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>implementing educational reforms?</b>	29
Table 39	Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the current quality and provision of local education?	
Table 40	Do you currently have children in school in HK & if so, what level of school are they attending locally?	
Table 41	Satisfaction with government performance on implementing educational reform by currently having children in school in Hong Kong	30
Table 42	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Reducing pollution in Hong Kong?</b>	
Table 43	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Defending rights of Hong Kongers working and investing on the mainland?</b>	
Table 44	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Improving cross-border travel and cooperation?</b>	
Table 45	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Preparing for making all Legco seats directly elected?</b>	31
Table 46	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Ensuring judicial independence and the rule of law?</b>	
Table 47	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Consulting with the public?</b>	
Table 48	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Improving municipal services?</b>	
Table 49	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Improving medical services?</b>	32
Table 50	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Increasing supply of affordable housing?</b>	
Table 51	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Caring for the elderly?</b>	
Table 52	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Reforming the tax system?</b>	
Table 53	How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: <b>Reducing unemployment?</b>	
Table 54	Average satisfaction with performance of government on: <b>Non-economic issues/ Economic issues</b>	33

<b>5 Satisfaction with government leaders and support/opposition to policies</b>	<b>33</b>
Table 55 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of Chief Executive Tung?	34
Table 56 Dissatisfaction with performance of top 4 HKSAR leaders	35
Table 57 Satisfaction with performance of top 4 HKSAR leaders	36
Table 58 Do you approve or disapprove of: <b>changing principal officials from permanent job security to contract terms?</b>	37
Table 59 Do you approve or disapprove of: <b>allowing the Chief Executive to dismiss principal officials for performance failure?</b>	
Table 60 Do you approve or disapprove of: <b>appointing principal officials from the private sector?</b>	38
Table 61 Do you approve or disapprove of: <b>requiring Legco approval of the Chief Executive's appointees?</b>	
Table 62 Do you approve or disapprove of: <b>limiting principal officials terms in office to the same as the Chief Executive who appointed them?</b>	
Table 63 How do you think the proposed appointment system will affect gov't accountability to the public?	39
Table 64 Do you think the proposed accountability system will lessen or increase civil service political neutrality?	
<b>6. Attitudes toward the Chief Executive and support for a second term</b>	<b>40</b>
Table 65 Would you want to see Tung Chee-hwa running for a second term in 2002?	
Table 66 Want/Not want a second term by self-ascribed class	41
Table 67 Want/Not want a second term by age groups	
Table 68 Want/Not want second term by educational attainment	42
Table 69 Want/Not want a second term by occupation	43
Table 70 <b>Of 18% Wanting second term % of whole sample</b>	44
Table 71 <b>Of 61% Not wanting second term % of whole sample</b>	
Table 72 <b>Of 21% Neutral on second term % of whole sample</b>	45
Table 73 How much do the following influence the decisions of the Chief Executive?	46
Table 74 How much do the following influence the decisions of the Chief Executive? (ranked)	47
Table 75 Satisfaction with performance of government on issues by supporters/opponents of second term	48
Table 76 Support or opposition to policies by supporters and opponents	49
Table 77 Support/opposition to policies relating to political structure, by supporters of a second term	50
Table 78 The SAR government currently accepts 150 mainland migrants into Hong Kong every day. How many per day do you think is acceptable and desirable?	51
Table 79 Satisfied with performance of HK Government by daily quota desirable	
Table 80 Worry about overpopulation by desirable daily quota	
Table 81 Optimism/Pessimism about HK's future as part of China by desirable daily quota	
Table 82 Support/oppose HK-mainland policies by support/oppose a second term	52
Table 83 Policies ranked by overall support	
<b>7 Satisfaction with local parties and their leaders.</b>	<b>53</b>
Table 84. Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with parties and leaders (Apr 2000)	54

Table 85	Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with parties and leaders (July 2001)	55
Table 86	Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with parties and leaders (Nov 2001)	56
Table 87	Differences in Satisfaction with parties between Nov 1999 and Nov 2001	56
Table 88	Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following groups in the last six months?	56
Table 89	Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past 12 months?	56
Table 90	Have you ever participated in a consultation on a government policy proposal by using any of the following forms of input? (July 2001)	57
Table 91	Do you think the government currently consults with interested groups and the public on policy issues too much, too little, or about the right amount? (July 2001)	57
Table 92	How seriously do you think the government takes public views in its consultation exercises? (July 2001)	57
<b>8</b>	<b>Satisfaction with national leaders and policies</b>	<b>57</b>
Table 93	Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong Government (SAR government) in dealing with China?	58
Table 94	Are you currently satisfied/dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC Government in ruling China?	59
Table 95	Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the Chinese president Jiang Zemin?	60
Table 96	Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the Chinese premier Zhu Rongji?	60
Table 97	Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC government in dealing with Hong Kong affairs?	61
Table 98	How does the celebration of 1 <sup>st</sup> October National Day make you feel?	62
Table 99	The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is most appropriate of you?	62
<b>9</b>	<b>Stability and Staying with Hong Kong</b>	<b>62</b>
Table 100	How worried are you about: Hong Kong's political stability?	63
Table 101	Are you worried/not worried about <b>social unrest in Hong Kong?</b>	64
Table 102	Worry about social unrest/collapsed categories	65
Table 103	Would you leave or seek means to leave if changes are unsuitable to you after 1997?	66
Table 104	Have overseas relatives with right of abode by would seek means to leave HK	67
Table 105	Would seek means to leave by Want/Not want a second term	67
<b>10</b>	<b>Demographic profile of survey respondents</b>	<b>68</b>
	<b>Survey Methods</b>	<b>71</b>

Hong Kong has had its share of troubles within living memory. Devastated and occupied in World War II, even up to the present dredgers and building excavators occasionally turn up unexploded ordinance. But it rapidly began to recover both population and prosperity –and its accustomed optimism about the rewards of hard work—shortly after hostilities ceased. Hong Kong’s confidence continued to grow though overwhelmed with waves of mainland refugees in the late 1940s. Then in mid-1950 it found itself all but isolated from newly communist China. Its purpose of existence, as an entrepot trade port to the mainland, came abruptly to a halt with the UN’s embargo of China trade as a consequence of the Korean War. Hong Kong looked finished, and still the waves of refugees came, settling in shantytowns and illegally constructed plywood sheds on rooftops. Yet Hong Kong people adjusted to their situation, identified the advantages of abundant, cheap and desperate to work labor, and turned the city state into one of Asia’s industrializing “little tigers.” Even the riots of 1966 and the bombings and scores of dead in unrest in 1967 failed to dint the industriousness and optimism of Hong Kong’s people. Neither the Vietnam War nor its aftermath of waves of scores of thousands of boat people pouring ashore, nor China’s own military set-to with Vietnam in 1979-80, caused more than momentary anxiety.

Meanwhile, in the 1970s and early 1980s Hong Kong’s leadership embarked on the ambitious projects of building a world class underground railway, rapidly expanding its “new town” building programs, and providing free compulsory education for both boys and girls for nine years. It also undertook an extensive set of governmental reforms, setting up the ICAC, reforming the municipal councils, putting in place a comprehensive, formal consultation system, organizing the Mutual Aid Committee structure, and put in place the first universal suffrage elected representation system in the District Boards.

The beginning of opening up the border with China in the late 1970s which came with the normalizing of relations and China’s opening up under Deng Xiaoping raised hopes of even greater prosperity. While the announcement in 1982 that China would resume sovereignty over Hong Kong in 1997 shocked the market and rocked the currency, stabilizing moves such as pegging the Hong Kong dollar to the US by a currency board system and speedy moves by the mainland to reform and open up sustained a mood of hope and optimism right up to June 4, 1989. While hundreds of thousands emigrated following Tiananmen in 1989, Hong Kong fairly soon recovered its feet and its seemingly boundless optimism. It met 1997 with its people’s usual eye to opportunity. Even the shock of the Asian Crisis in 1998 and the collapse in property values made only one in five pessimistic about Hong Kong’s future. But attitudes in the latter half of 2001 took a sharp turn toward the negative, and this time neither events in China nor the Taiwan straits, and perhaps not even in Asia, appear to be the source.

## **1. A bleak outlook?**

As 2001, the first year of the new millennium, ends and for the first time without a regional war nearby or massive disruption on the mainland, more Hong Kong people appear to have given up hope for Hong Kong’s future than retain it. As Table 1 shows, since July 2001 there has been a deepening despair about the future of Hong Kong, despite the signal accomplishments of China’s joining the WTO and getting the 2008 Olympics over the same six month period. Is something seriously wrong in Hong Kong?


1982–2007 **The Hong Kong Transition Project**

**Table 1** How do you feel about 1997 and Hong Kong’s reunion with China? (Feb and June 1997) Looking back over the first year, how do you feel about HK’s prospects for the future as part of China? (July 98) **How do you feel currently about HK’s future prospects as a part of China? (April 1999 on)**

	Feb 97	June 97	July 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01	June 01	July 01	Nov 01
Very Optimistic	7	6	6	5	5	4	5	3	5	4	3	3	2
Optimistic	55	54	41	37	35	36	37	27	33	26	30	24	22
Neither	30	32	30	33	33	39	33	40	38	41	38	35	31
Pessimistic	6	6	13	15	14	13	15	19	16	19	21	29	30
Very Pessimistic	–	1	4	2	4	4	2	3	4	5	5	7	11
DK	2	1	6	7	9	4	7	8	4	5	4	2	5

**Table 1A Collapsed categories—optimism about Hong Kong**

	Optimistic	Neither/DK	Pessimistic
Feb 97	62	32	6
June 97	60	33	7
July 98	47	36	17
Apr 99	42	40	17
July 99	40	42	18
Nov 99	40	43	17
Apr 00	42	40	17
Aug 00	30	48	22
Nov 00	38	42	20
Apr 01	30	46	24
June 01	33	42	26
July 01	27	37	36
Nov 01	24	36	41




As the chart of Table 1A shows, pessimism rose at the onset of the Asian Economic Crisis in 1998 but held fairly steady until April this year. While Table 2 shows that gender affects optimism, with men considerably more optimistic than women, as Chart A shows, pessimists predominate in both genders.

**Table 2 Optimism about HK's future by Gender**

	Male	Female	total
Optimists	30	21	25
Neutral	30	34	32
Pessimists	40	45	43
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 722  
 Chi-square = 8.487 with 2 df p = 0.0144

**Table 2 Chart A Optimism/pessimism in each gender**



While pessimism predominates in both genders as Chart A shows, men make up the larger proportion of optimists while women prevail in both the neutral and pessimist categories.

**Table 2 Chart B Gender distribution by optimism/pessimism**




Table 3 shows the distribution of optimism, pessimism and neutrality about Hong Kong's future among age groups. Those in their 20s, 40s and 50s are the least optimistic while those in their teens, and 60 and up are the most optimistic age groups.

**Table 3 Optimism/pessimism by age groups**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
Optimists	35	23	25	20	22	37	37	25
Neutrals	35	40	38	27	28	26	21	33
Pessimists	31	37	37	53	49	37	42	43
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 682  
 Chi-square = 24.94 with 12 df p = 0.0151

Table 3 Chart A shows the distribution of views by age groups, clarifying the predominance of pessimism in those in their 40s and 50s, but showing that those in their 70s are less neutral about the future than other groups and hence have a higher level of pessimists than those in the 60s.



**Table 3 Chart A Optimism/pessimism by Age groups**




Table 3 Chart B below shows how pessimism tends to rise with age, or conversely, that those under 40 tend to be more optimistic about the future, with those in their 60s and up having higher levels of pessimism as well as optimism. Optimists outnumber pessimists only among teenagers.

**Table 3 Chart B Optimism/pessimism by Age groups**




Table 4 shows views on Hong Kong's future by occupational categories. Students and educators are more optimistic than other groups. Business people are about 2 to 1 pessimists.


**Table 4 Optimism/pessimism by Occupation**

	Optimists	Neutrals	Pessimists	total
<b>Managers/admin</b>	24	29	47	100
Professionals	30	28	42	100
Assoc. professionals	26	40	33	100
Clerks	32	38	30	100
Service/sales	27	32	41	100
<b>Agricul/fish craft &amp; elementary</b>	11	36	53	100
Machine operators	28	41	31	100
<b>Housewives</b>	13	34	54	100
Retirees	34	25	42	100
<b>Unemployed</b>	14	21	65	100
<b>Students</b>	37	32	32	100
<b>Educators</b>	39	28	33	100
Others	23	33	44	100
total	25	33	42	100


table contents: Percent of Row Total N = 683  
 Chi-square = 42.23 with 24 df p = 0.0122

Table 4 Chart A reorders Table 4 above by degree of pessimism. Unsurprisingly, those who are unemployed show by far the most pessimism about Hong Kong's future as a part of China. But, surprisingly, managers and administrators—overwhelmingly business people—are the second most pessimistic employed category, exceeded in pessimism only by agriculture and fishery, craft and elementary occupations (all of which are populated by less educated, usually lower skilled and older workers). This ranking can be seen more clearly in Table 4 Chart B.

**Table 4 Chart A Optimism/pessimism by Occupation (rank order)**



**Table 4 Chart B Rank Order (by pessimism) of Optimism/pessimism by Occupation**



Optimism about Hong Kong's future tends to rise with self-ascribed class, but the association of class with views is weak, especially given the limited number (38 out of 671) who consider themselves upper-middle class, and the small margin of differences among the working, lower-middle and middle classes. But it appears the upper-middle class are marginally more optimistic.

**Table 5 Optimism by Class**

	Working	Lower-middle	Middle	Upper-middle	total
Optimists	23	21	28	34	25
Neutral	31	31	35	34	32
Pessimists	46	48	38	32	43
total	100	100	100	100	100
Count	(178)	(215)	(240)	(38)	(671)

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 671  
 Chi-square = 8.669 with 6 df p = 0.1930

While class has a weak association with optimism, religion has a stronger effect. Catholics are by far the most pessimistic group while protestants are the most optimistic. Buddhists/Taoists are by far the least optimistic

**Table 6 Optimism by religion**

	No religion	Catholic	Protestant	Buddhist/Taoist	Ancestor worship	total
Optimists	27	26	31	9	22	25
Neutral	31	19	33	41	33	32
Pessimists	41	56	36	50	45	43
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 696  
 Chi-square = 17.07 with 8 df p = 0.0293

## 2. Sources of pessimism

In the search for sources of Hong Kong's deepening pessimism Bobby McFaren's song "Don't worry, be happy" in an irreverent way highlights links between optimism and a lack of worry. Those heavily burdened with concerns usually have a hard time mustering a lot of optimism, and one of the chief sources of concern have to do with one's finances and security of employment. Clearly, as Table 7 and 8 show, concerns about family finances have increased considerably since the spring of 2001.


**Table 7. How do you expect your family financial situation to change over the next 12 months?**

	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01	Nov 01
Improve a lot	1	--	-	--	1	1	--	--	--
Improve somewhat	7	8	10	9	13	12	11	8	5
Stay same	47	57	52	62	58	60	63	60	43
Deteriorate somewhat	31	27	24	20	18	15	15	19	32
Deteriorate a lot	7	8	6	4	5	6	6	7	15
DK	7	4	7	5	5	6	4	5	5

Table 8 below combines improve and deteriorate categories in Table 7 and charts them to show the clear, sharp increase in concern levels, even well above those charted in 1998, the depth of the Asian Economic Crisis. Many appear to have given up hope of improvement in family finances, and even more appear to have increasing fears that their situation will get worse.

**Table 8 Collapsed categories of Table 7**

	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01	Nov 01
Improve	8	8	10	9	14	13	11	8	5
Stay same	47	57	52	62	58	60	63	60	43
Deteriorate	38	35	30	24	23	21	21	26	47



The greatly increased expectations of deterioration in family finances seems directly linked to respondents' fears about their employment, as Table 9 shows.

**Table 9 Are you worried or not worried about your employment situation**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Oct 98	53	17	10	17	3
April 99	54	18	14	13	1
July 99	50	19	13	17	1
Nov 99	52	20	14	14	1
Apr 00	51	20	14	13	2
Aug 00	53	19	12	14	1
Nov 00	48	20	13	18	1
Apr 01	48	20	13	17	3
July 01	47	20	14	18	1
Nov 01	38	20	19	21	2





Chart B of Table 9 shows the increased proportion of the table worried to one degree or another about their employment situation. While combined levels of fairly and very worried reached between 30% and 32% before, in November 2001 the combined level hit 40%, higher than ever.

**Chart B of Table 9 Worry about employment situation**



Men and women are equally worried about employment, but as might be expected, worry levels vary significantly among occupational groups. Surprisingly, 9% of the unemployed are not worried about their employment situation, while 15% of retirees are very worried. One might expect retirees to be the least worried of all about employment, but educators have the highest levels of unconcern by far.

**Table 10 Worry about employment by occupation**


	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	Don't know	total
Managers/admin	40	20	17	23	0	100
Professionals	59	17	15	9	0	100
Assoc. professionals	31	17	17	34	2	100
Clerks	39	27	18	17	0	100
Service/sales	36	31	18	15	0	100
Agricul/fish craft & elementary	26	21	23	28	2	100
Machine operators	28	24	35	13	0	100
Housewives	46	17	10	24	3	100
Retirees	63	5	8	15	8	100
Unemployed	9	16	19	56	0	100
Students	30	25	31	13	2	100
Educators	68	16	11	5	0	100
Others	28	26	28	17	2	100
total	38	20	19	21	2	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total N= 716

Chi-square = 141.8 with 48 df p 0.0001

Occupational association with worry levels about one's employment situation is understandable and clear. Educators can count on having steady, secure jobs, and many have the sorts of job protections and/or unions which provide a high degree of certainty about continued employment. Most retirees no longer work, and so these two categories have high levels of no worry.

**Chart of Table 10 Worry about employment by occupation (rank order)**



The unemployed certainly show the high levels of concern about employment one would expect. And those in manufacturing and sales, and students looking for their first full time job also have high levels of concern, just as would be expected. Also as expected, those with lower levels of education show higher levels of very worried than those more highly educated. For example, as Table 11 shows, nearly a third of those with primary or just Form 1 or 2 educational attainment are very worried about their employment situation. Only 10% of those with a university degree are very worried. (The number of Masters and Ph.D.s is only 11, so the results at that level should be interpreted very cautiously due to small sample size.) Students about to enter the job market, the vast majority of University 1<sup>st</sup> to 3<sup>rd</sup> year, are still in school and are more worried.

**Table 11 Worry about employment by Education level**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	Don't know	total
None	38	16	13	25	9	100
Primary 1-6	38	17	12	30	3	100
F1-F2	27	18	21	32	2	100
F-3	45	13	15	26	1	100
F4/F-5 graduate	35	23	22	20	1	100
F-6/F-7 graduate/TC graduate/1 <sup>st</sup> yr Assoc.	38	25	20	17	0	100
University 1 <sup>st</sup> -3 <sup>rd</sup> year	28	17	28	28	0	100
University graduate	48	22	20	10	0	100
Masters/Ph.D. Degree	44	22	11	22	0	100
total	38	20	19	21	2	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total N= 720

Chi-square = 53.08 with 32 df p = 0.0110

Table 12 show the results of Table 11 distributed according to the proportions of each educational level to the respective category of worried degree. For example, the average level of not worried for the whole sample was 38%, slightly worried 20%, somewhat 19% and so on. Each category is recalculated to a base of 100% in Table 12, and the proportion each educational

group makes up of the 100% of each level of worry is shown. The total column on the far right shows the proportion made up by each group. So those with no education make up 4% of the sample while university graduates make up 17%. Table 12 shows that those with Primary 6 or less education (13% of the sample) make up 18% of the very worried and 27% of the don't know, a much higher proportion than their overall sample proportion. University graduates, at 17% of the sample, make up only 9% of the very worried, much less than their presence overall.

**Table 12 Education level, proportions worried or not worried about employment**

	Not worried	Slightly worried	Somewhat worried	Very worried	Don't know	total
None	4	3	3	5	27	4
Primary 1-6	13	11	8	18	27	13
F1-F2	4	5	7	9	9	6
F-3	13	7	9	14	9	11
F4/F-5 graduate	29	37	37	30	27	32
F-6/F-7 graduate/TC graduate/1 <sup>st</sup> yr Assoc.	11	14	12	9	0	11
University 1 <sup>st</sup> -3 <sup>rd</sup> year	3	3	6	5	0	4
University graduate	21	18	18	9	0	17
Masters/Ph.D. Degree	1	1	1	1	0	1
total	100	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 729  
 Chi-square = 53.08 with 32 df p = 0.0110

Age affects worry, but until the 60s, not as much in terms of lack of worry as might be expected. Those in their 60s seem either unworried or very worried. The very worried level does appear higher for those between 30 and 69, the bulk of the experienced workforce.

**Table 13 Worry about employment by age groups**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
Not worried	35	34	35	37	39	63	61	39
Slightly worried	21	27	24	19	19	2	13	21
Somewhat worried	29	23	17	20	18	4	0	18
Very worried	14	16	22	23	24	25	13	21
Don't know	2	1	1	1	0	6	13	2
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 715  
 Chi-square = 70.40 with 24 df p = 0.0001



Never in the 10 years that this question about personal standards of living has been asked have levels of worry about respondent's personal standards of living been so high.

**Table 14 How worried are you about : Personal standard of living?**


	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Nov 91	56	23	12	5	4
Feb 93	45	21	19	10	5
Aug 93	47	27	14	8	4
Feb 94	51	29	13	5	1
Aug 94	44	38	12	5	1
Feb 95	50	26	15	6	3
Sept 95	48	26	14	9	3
Feb 96	47	29	13	7	4
July 96	44	34	12	7	3
Feb 97	49	36	10	2	2
June 97	47	36	11	5	1
Jan 98	42	30	18	8	1
Apr 98	40	29	19	11	1
June 98	34	28	24	14	1
July 98	49	22	18	10	1
Oct 98	45	27	15	11	1
Apr 99	48	28	15	8	1
July 99	49	23	17	9	1
Nov 99	47	28	14	9	2
Apr 00	46	24	16	12	2
Aug 00	42	27	16	13	2
Nov 00	48	25	14	11	1
Apr 01	41	24	16	17	1
July 01	42	27	15	16	1
Nov 01	28	25	21	25	1



The stacked bar chart below of Table 14 shows the level of various degrees of worry at its highest ever. Combined levels of fairly/very worried, which peaked in June 1998 at 38%, now stand at 46%, considerably higher.



**Bar chart of Table 14 Worry about personal standard of living**



Worry about personal standards of living rises at age 20 and stays at a sustained high level, and while those in their 60s and 70s are less worried than other age groups, they are more worried about their personal standard of living dropping than they were worried about their employment situation (Table 13 reprinted below to make comparison easier). Thus the worry about personal standards of living concerns nearly a third of those in their 70s while only 13%, barely one in ten, were very worried about employment at that age. Thus economic concerns are deeper than just employment, and wider than the workforce.

**Table 15 Worry about personal standards of living by Age groups**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
Not worried	33	29	24	21	30	53	44	28
Slightly worried	35	29	26	27	20	10	17	25
Somewhat worried	27	19	25	20	19	8	4	20
Very worried	6	23	24	32	29	29	30	26
Don't know	0	1	1	1	1	0	4	1
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 715

Chi-square = 54.40 with 24 df p = 0.0004

**Reprinted Table 13 Worry about employment by age groups (for comparison)**


	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
Not worried	35	34	35	37	39	63	61	39
Slightly worried	21	27	24	19	19	2	13	21
Somewhat worried	29	23	17	20	18	4	0	18
Very worried	14	16	22	23	24	25	13	21
Don't know	2	1	1	1	0	6	13	2
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

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
But even the level of worry about personal standards of living pales beside the level of worry about Hong Kong's economic prospects.

**Table 15 How worried are you about: Hong Kong's economic prospects?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Feb 93	37	23	23	10	7
Jul 93	42	24	18	7	9
Jan 94	49	26	13	7	5
Aug 94	40	33	16	8	3
Feb 95	44	26	18	6	6
Sept 95	42	26	16	10	6
Feb 96	39	29	17	8	7
July 96	42	31	15	7	5
Feb 97	52	27	12	5	4
June 97	53	26	13	5	3
Jan 98	28	31	24	13	4
Apr 98	28	27	25	17	4
June 98	20	23	30	27	1
July 98	29	26	23	19	2
Oct 98	30	28	22	16	3
Apr 99	33	27	20	16	3
July 99	30	27	21	19	3
Nov 99	32	28	23	14	3
Apr 00	35	31	18	14	3
Aug 00	31	28	22	15	3
Nov 00	28	29	22	19	3
Apr 01	21	29	26	22	3
July 01	19	24	25	30	1
Nov 01	12	20	27	39	1




**Table 15 Bar chart Worry about Hong Kong's economic prospects**



It may not be an overstatement to conclude that confidence in Hong Kong's economic future has collapsed, or if not completely collapsed, may be near to completely collapsing. Certainly linked to worry about Hong Kong's economic prospects is worry about the competitiveness of Hong Kong, and in the year long period this question has been asked, worry has risen significantly.

**Table 16 How worried are you about: competitiveness of Hong Kong?**


	Not Worried	Slightly worried	Fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
Nov 00	28	28	23	17	4
Apr 01	20	29	26	23	3
July 01	17	28	28	24	3
Nov 01	10	24	34	30	3



One bright spot amidst the prevailing gloom can be found in worry about corruption. While up from July, it is down from April and considerably lower than before the reunification of Hong Kong with the mainland.

**Table 17 How worried are you about: corruption in HK?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
July 96	22	26	23	22	6
Dec 96	11	25	29	31	4
Feb 97	20	31	24	17	7
June 97	20	28	28	21	3
Jan 98	43	25	17	9	6
Apr 98	42	24	16	12	7
June 98	46	24	18	9	4
July 98	52	20	14	9	4
Oct 98	53	23	12	6	6
July 99	54	22	12	6	6
Nov 99	48	21	17	9	6
Apr 00	53	20	13	10	4
Aug 00	46	23	17	9	5
Nov 00	50	24	13	9	4
Apr 01	44	25	13	11	6
July 01	54	19	13	10	3
Nov 01	50	24	10	11	4



Another area of reassurance appears with the level of worry about personal freedom, though there has been a large drop in not worried from three in four not worried to two thirds not worried. Again, as with corruption, the level of worry now is much less than before 1997. But as Tables 19 to 22 show, concerns about various specific freedoms, such as freedom of press and assembly, are higher than level of worry about personal freedoms in general.

**Table 18 How worried are you about: Personal freedom in Hong Kong?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
Nov 91	56	23	11	6	3
Feb 93	44	21	20	10	4
Aug 93	43	28	16	9	4
Feb 94	46	28	16	8	2
Aug 94	37	38	14	9	1
Feb 95	44	26	18	8	4
Sept 95	50	23	12	12	3
Feb 96	43	29	16	9	4
July 96	41	34	15	8	2
Dec 96	42	35	12	7	4
Feb 97	48	31	14	5	2
June 97	45	34	13	7	1
Jan 98	63	21	11	3	2
Apr 98	66	18	11	4	2
June 98	70	15	9	4	1
July 98	74	13	9	4	1
Oct 98	74	16	6	3	2
Apr 99	72	17	7	3	1
July 99	70	15	9	4	2
Nov 99	66	19	9	4	1
Apr 00	62	20	10	5	3
Aug 00	64	19	9	5	3
Nov 00	71	18	7	4	1
Apr 01	70	17	7	5	1
July 01	74	14	6	4	1
Nov 01	66	19	8	7	1

**Table 19 Are you currently worried or not worried about: Free press**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
April 2001	50	25	13	7	5
July 2001	56	21	11	8	3
Nov 2001	53	23	12	8	4

**Table 20 Are you currently worried or not worried about: Free speech**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
April 2001	56	22	11	7	4
July 2001	61	20	11	6	2
Nov 2001	58	21	10	8	3

**Table 21 Are you currently worried or not worried about: Free assembly**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
April 2001	49	25	13	6	8
July 2001	55	24	11	7	3
Nov 2001	49	25	11	9	6

**Table 22 Are you currently worried or not worried about: Religious freedom**


	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
April 2001	61	18	8	6	7
July 2001	69	14	8	5	3
Nov 2001	68	17	7	4	4

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Overall, one must conclude that economically related worries are one main source, but not the sole source, of the tide of pessimism which has swept over Hong Kong people.

**Table 23 Of the worried mentioned, which aspect worries you the most?**

	Living Standard	Security/ Freedom	Family prospect	HK Econ prospects	Political Stability	Corruption in HK	Gov't efficiency	DK
Feb 93	11	28	13	18	27			3
Aug 93	12	29	15	14	26			3
Feb 94	11	28	12	19	24			6
Aug 94	13	27	11	15	24			10
Feb 95	12	25	8	8	23		9	15
Sep 95	17	17	11	10	23		9	12
Feb 96	14	25	9	9	22		9	12
July 96	8	19	5	13	16	22	5	10
Dec 96	7	13	6	14	16	35	4	5
Feb 97	11	17	5	9	15	30	8	7
June 97	11	14	5	8	15	33	7	6
Jan 98	10	7	7	40	9	12	6	9
Apr 98	9	5	6	46	6	13	4	10
June 98	9	4	8	56	5	7	6	6
July 98	8	4	6	50	7	10	4	10
Oct 98	10	4	7	49	7	6	9	10
Apr 99	9	3	6	47	7	11	6	12
July 99	7	3	10	43	6	11	6	15
Nov 99	9	5	7	41	8	11	8	9
Apr 00	11	6	8	40	16	10		9
Aug 00	12	4	9	42	12	11		11
Nov 00	10	4	7	45	14	6		14
Apr 01	10	3	8	48	11	7		12
July 01	7	2	8	57	8	7		12
Nov 01	10	2	10	60	4	4		10




But while economic concerns rank highest among six aspects, and no doubt while economic concerns dominate many if not most, there are other areas of worry which play a part in making

up the extraordinary levels of worry about Hong Kong 's economic prospects and which play their part in fomenting the deep levels of pessimism which this survey uncovered. Some of these contributing worries can be seen in tables 24 to 26. While the level of not worried about excessive population has stayed about the same since July 1999, the chart makes clear that the degree of very worried increased sharply last year, dropped back in April, and shot back up in July and November. Since August 2000 the level of very worried has exceeded all other responses, and the two highest levels of worry consistently record a clear majority of responses.

**Table 24 Are you worried or not worried about excessive population**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
July 99	18	19	28	33	1
Nov 99	19	18	31	30	1
April 00	23	21	28	27	1
Aug 00	20	19	27	33	2
Nov 00	19	18	23	38	2
Apr 01	24	21	24	29	3
July 01	22	20	22	35	1
<b>Nov 01</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>2</b>



The mild objective improvements in air pollution achieved over the past year do show up in slightly lessened degrees of worry about these fundamental elements of survival. The level of worry nonetheless remains at very high levels, though the latest survey reports the lowest level yet (30%) of very worried about air and water pollution, down from a peak of 53% last year.

**Table 25 Are you worried or not worried about air and water pollution**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
July 1999	6	18	34	35	4
Nov 1999	8	18	36	38	1
April 2000	5	14	31	48	1
Aug 2000	7	17	31	44	1
Nov 2000	7	16	25	52	1
Apr 2001	8	20	30	39	3
July 01	16	22	28	34	1
Nov 01	15	23	29	30	2

Another area slightly improved is in worry about rule of law. Nevertheless, a majority are concerned about this basic element of Hong Kong's competitive advantage .

**Table 26 Are you worried or not worried about rule of law in Hong Kong**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
July 1999	55	23	13	5	4
April 2000	56	21	12	7	5
Aug 2000	39	27	18	12	4
Nov 2000	39	23	18	16	4
Apr 2001	37	26	17	13	7
July 01	45	22	18	11	3
Nov 01	44	23	26	12	4

Overall, open ended worries continue to show that economic related issues dominate personal concerns and further, that economic concern levels have returned to 1998 levels overall. However, since July 2001 concerns over unemployment have hit unprecedented degrees, with a majority concerned about this single aspect alone.

**Table 27 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now personally?**


	Jan 98	Apr 98	Oct 98	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01	July 01	Nov 01
Economic growth rate	38	32	20	10	13	16	22	12	7	20
Affordable housing	8	4	2	2	1	1	1	2	1	--
Unemployment	11	27	47	48	31	40	32	40	55	54
Salary cuts, welfare cuts			5	4	6	6	4	4	2	4
Property, stock markets			4	2	3	3	2	3	2	3
Int'l competitiveness			2	3	3	2	2	2	5	2
Other econ.			4					1	1	
<b>Economic Issues total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>83</b>
Education	4	3	4	8	6	9	10	7	12	8
Elderly	5	5	3	2	3	2	2	4	3	2
Crime	6	5	2	4	6	4	2	3	3	2
Medical	2	1	1	1	2	-	2	2	1	1
Pollution/overpopulation	1	1	1	5	10	4	2	4	4	2
<b>Social Issues total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>15</b>
Corruption	1	1	-	1	1	-	--	1	+	+
Political stability	5	4	2	2	4	5	4	2	1	2
Freedom of press	2	2	+	1	2	1	1	1	+	+
Freedom to demonstrate	2	1	+	1	1	+	1	1	+	+
Autonomy of HK	2	1	+	2	2	+		1	1	+
Fair judges/freedom to travel	3	3	+	3	1	2	1	--	+	--
Competence of Tung & civil servants	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	--	+	+
(all with + above)			2+			1+			1+	1+
<b>Political Issues total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>

Table 27A takes the classification totals from Table 27 and charts them to show the increases in economic concerns since July 2001. While Table 27 B shows changes in the two main variables of economic concern—economic growth rates and unemployment.




**Table 27 A Totals of open ended personal concerns by classification**

	Jan 98	Apr 98	Oct 98	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01	July 01	Nov 01
<b>Economic Issues total</b>	57	63	84	69	57	68	63	64	73	83
<b>Social Issues total</b>	18	15	11	20	27	19	18	20	23	15
<b>Political Issues total</b>	15	12	4	11	12	10	8	6	3	3



**Table 27 B Main economic factors/open ended personal concerns**

	Unemployment	Economic growth rate
Jan 98	11	38
Apr 98	27	32
Oct 98	47	20
Nov 99	48	10
Apr 00	31	13
Aug 00	40	16
Nov 00	32	22
Apr 2001	40	12
July 2001	55	7
Nov 2001	54	20



### 3. Dissatisfaction and pessimism

The drop in political issues as an area of personal concern as charted above might lead one to conclude that while economically the SAR is in trouble, politically things seem fine. This couldn't be more mistaken. Levels of dissatisfaction with government and its leaders hit new highs in November. This could mean that dissatisfaction with political leaders hinges greatly on their performance in addressing economic issues and of these, primarily the economic prospects—competitiveness and overall economic direction—of Hong Kong. The connection shows in the follow up questions to the open-ended items of personal concern. After each response we asked respondents if they were satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's performance in the area of their personal concern, or whether the government had any responsibility for it. The overall response pattern on government performance on the areas of greatest personal concern as listed in Table 27 above appears in Table 28. On their respective issue, a third were very dissatisfied and three out of four (78%) dissatisfied. Only 10% were satisfied with government efforts in their personal concern.

**Table 28 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the government's performance on this problem?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	5	1
Satisfied	70	9
<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>348</b>	<b>46</b>
<b>Very dissatisfied</b>	<b>245</b>	<b>32</b>
Don't know	61	8
Not a government problem	30	4

Many items returned too few responses to allow cross tabulation, but of those with 50 or more respondents, only unemployment showed a significant relationship in terms of affecting response patterns differently from the overall averages as shown in Table 28. While 74% of those not concerned specifically with unemployment were dissatisfied, 83% of those concerned with unemployment were dissatisfied with government performance on that issue. This economic issue most strongly affects satisfaction, but, overall, it appears dissatisfaction stems from nearly every issue of personal concern, not just the economic ones. (See more below.)

**Table 29 Satisfaction with performance on unemployment concerns**

	Not concerned unemployment	Concerned unemployment	total
Very satisfied	1	--	--
Satisfied	12	6	9
Dissatisfied	45	47	46
Very dissatisfied	29	36	33
Don't know	10	5	8
Not a government problem	3	5	4
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
Chi-square = 16.36 with 5 df p = 0.0059

The second follow up question we asked was whether respondents felt Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa was making sufficient effort to solve the problem, or whether the problem was one he should be responsible for. The overall pattern of responses appear in Table 30.

**Table 30 Do you think Mr. Tung is making sufficient or insufficient effort to solve this problem, or is this a problem he should not be responsible for?**

Group	Count	%
Very sufficient	13	2
Sufficient	121	16
Insufficient	308	41
Very insufficient	167	22
Don't know	75	10
Not a government problem	75	10

One in five deemed Mr. Tung's efforts on solving their problem very insufficient, and 63% considered his efforts insufficient or very insufficient. However, 18% considered his efforts sufficient versus only 10% who were satisfied with the government's efforts on their problem. And while 63% considered his efforts not enough, that is better than the 78% dissatisfied with the government's performance on their issue. Thus nearly twice as many people consider Mr. Tung to be working harder to solve their problems than the government, which most understand to be the civil service, and fewer are dissatisfied with Tung's efforts than the government's. As Table 31 shows, unemployment is the major, though not the only, contributor to disaffection with Tung's efforts.

**Table 31 Sufficiency of Tung's efforts to solve unemployment by unemployment a concern**

	Not concerned unemployment	Concerned unemployment	total
Very sufficient	3	1	2
Sufficient	17	14	16
Insufficient	40	42	41
Very insufficient	19	25	22
Don't know	12	6	9
Not a government problem	9	11	10
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 17.99 with 5 df p = 0.0030


The question of levels and sources of dissatisfaction with the Chief Executive and with the government is a real one, and levels of disaffection with one cannot be assumed to be the same for the other, nor, perhaps, do these varying levels of dissatisfaction stem from the same causes. Section 4 will examine satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the government, including in terms of performance on a series of issues and by various demographic and occupational groups. Section 5 will examine satisfaction with the Chief Executive and top officials, and examine support or opposition to policies which these top officials have, or may, set. Section 6 will examine attitudes toward the Chief Executive and toward a second term in detail. Section 7 examines satisfaction with parties and their leaders.

#### 4. Dissatisfaction with government

As Table 32 shows, overall levels of dissatisfaction with the government have never been higher. In sharp contrast to the situation in June 1997, just before reunification when two thirds were satisfied with the performance of the outgoing colonial government, today barely one in four are satisfied and two thirds are dissatisfied.

**Table 32 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the HK Government?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 93	60	31	9
Aug 93	57	28	15
Feb 94	58	28	14
Aug 94	56	30	14
Feb 95	43	35	22
Sep 95	46	45	9
Feb 96	60	26	15
July 96	67	21	11
Feb 97	73	20	7
June 97	66	27	7
Jan 98	51	35	4
Apr 98	48	41	12
June 98	37	56	7
July 98	42	49	9
Oct 98	42	48	10
April 99	46	43	11
July 99	40	52	7
Nov 99	41	51	8
Apr 00	39	53	8
Aug 00	30	61	4
Oct 00	31	62	6
Nov 00	35	58	7
Apr 01	32	58	10
June 01	37	55	7
July 01	35	59	5
Nov 01	24	68	7



In contrast to optimism about Hong Kong's future, where men were more optimistic, more men are very dissatisfied with government performance than women, though their overall totals of dissatisfaction are the same (68%). Men appear more satisfied than women, at 26% versus 22%.

**Table 33 Satisfaction with performance of government by Gender**

	Men	Women	total
Very dissatisfied	25	19	22
Somewhat dissatisfied	43	49	46
Somewhat satisfied	24	22	23
Very satisfied	2	--	1
Don't know	6	8	7
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 8.996 with 4 df p = 0.0612


The youngest and oldest age groups have the least dissatisfaction with government, with the 60s showing the least dissatisfaction of all. (Don't knows not shown.)

**Table 34 Satisfaction with performance of government by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
Very dissatisfied	12	22	22	25	26	14	22	22
Somewhat dissatisfied	42	52	49	50	34	33	30	46
Somewhat satisfied	37	19	23	20	27	29	35	24
Very satisfied	0	0	1	1	2	4	0	1
Don't know	10	7	5	4	11	20	13	8
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 715

Chi-square = 50.85 with 24 df p = 0.0011



Neither educational attainment, marital status, nor whether or not they have children makes any significant difference in satisfaction with government performance. Since age and education are closely correlated, this means that the association of age with satisfaction levels stems from generational and occupational, not educational level differences. As might be expected if performance of the government is being evaluated in terms of its effects on one's work and main source of income, occupation makes a difference.

**Table 35 Satisfaction with performance of government by Occupation**


	Very dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat satisfied	Very satisfied	Don't know	total
<b>Managers/admin</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>100</b>
Professionals	25	45	25	2	4	100
Assoc. professionals	36	42	17	0	5	100
Clerks	14	53	17	4	13	100
Service/sales	24	44	29	0	3	100
Agricul/fish craft & elementary	15	60	19	0	6	100
Machine operators	20	44	24	2	11	100
Housewives	20	47	26	0	7	100
Retirees	20	28	35	3	13	100
Unemployed	33	37	19	0	12	100
Students	8	48	38	0	7	100
Educators	26	47	21	0	5	100
Others	32	40	23	0	4	100
<b>total</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Row Total

Chi-square = 75.87 with 48 df p = 0.0063

**Table 35A Collapsed categories of satisfaction with performance of the government, ranked by dissatisfaction in each occupation**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Don't know
<b>Managers/admin</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>
Assoc. professionals	78	17	5
Agricul/fish craft & elementary	75	19	6
Educators	73	21	5
Professionals	70	27	4
Service/sales	68	29	3
Others	68	23	4
Housewives	67	26	7
Clerks	67	21	13
Unemployed	67	19	12
Machine operators	64	26	11
Students	56	38	7
Retirees	48	38	13



Stunningly, for a government run by a businessman, in the interests of business, and largely dominated by functional constituencies which overwhelmingly represent business people, if not companies directly, managers and administrators of business record nearly 9 in 10 dissatisfied with the performance of the government. Professionals, another favored functional group, show 70% dissatisfaction. Only retirees show less than a majority dissatisfied with the government, followed closely by students.

Table 36 shows that difference in degrees of satisfaction with the government are too small between those employed in the public sector (civil servants) and those in the private sector to show statistical significance. This alone is significant, for in 1998, during the Asian Economic Crisis, the civil service and public sector, comprising well over 11% of the workforce, strongly backed the government. Today they manifestly do not. If anything it is possible that public sector workers are more dissatisfied with the government than private sector workers. Note that private sector workers show 67% dissatisfied while public sector workers show 74% dissatisfied, and only 1% don't know versus 8% in the private sector.

**Table 36 Satisfaction with the government by workforce sector**

	Private	Public	total
Very dissatisfied	21	24	21
Somewhat dissatisfied	46	50	46
Somewhat satisfied	24	25	24
Very satisfied	1	0	1
Don't know	8	1	8
total	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 4.869 with 4 df p = 0.3010

While there is an effect on satisfaction with government of general social conditions such as amount of inflation or deflation, economic growth, or war and peace, satisfaction with the performance of the government, and by implication with its leaders, usually stems at least in large part from satisfaction or dissatisfaction with specific policies and specific personalities leading the government. As Table 37 shows, overall satisfaction with life in Hong Kong has NOT deteriorated between July and November, in sharp contrast to large falls in optimism about Hong Kong's future, rises in worry about its economic prospects and worries about personal standards of living and employment, and in contrast to leaps in dissatisfaction with the performance of the government. While there is an increase across all those variables, life in Hong Kong has become no less satisfactory to a steady two thirds of the residents. The location of worry and dissatisfaction about Hong Kong are not in conditions of living, but in government performance, policies, and leaders. And critically for a place built on hope, the future.

Most people have not given up on living in Hong Kong, indeed some argue because Hong Kongers now consider this their home and the government, once colonial and run largely by foreigners, has been taken as theirs as well, that complaints and expectations have risen far beyond what they were before 1997's reunification. If true, the standards of performance have risen even while economic circumstances regionally in 1998, and now globally in 2001, have made good outcomes so much harder for government to achieve and afford.

**Table 37 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Nov 91	84	15	1
Feb 93	85	13	2
Aug 93	88	10	2
Feb 94	88	10	2
Aug 94	87	10	3
Feb 95	86	9	5
Sept 95	80	18	2
Feb 96	85	13	2
July 96	88	10	2
Feb 97	90	9	1
June 97	86	12	2
Jan 98	81	16	3
Apr 98	71	26	3
June 98	68	30	2
July 98	74	25	1
Oct 98	70	27	3
Apr 99	72	24	3
July 99	73	26	1
Nov 99	72	26	2
Apr 00	65	33	2
Aug 00	65	31	4
Nov 00	67	30	3
Apr 01	61	34	5
June 01	71	25	4
July 01	65	32	3
Nov 01	64	33	3



The test of whether economic circumstances beyond the government's control are to blame for dissatisfaction with the performance of the government comes down to satisfaction levels with various government policies, many of which have little to nothing directly to do with economic circumstances, and comparing satisfaction with these non-economic policy areas with economic policy areas. We take first the non-economic policy areas.



The first policy area is educational reform. The government has proposed and begun to implement a sweeping array of reforms and in all but the tertiary sector, increased expenditure greatly since 1997. All sectors, including tertiary, will see further reforms and increases in expenditure over the coming decade according to announced plans. Nevertheless, 62% express dissatisfaction with the government's implementing of educational reforms.

**Table 38 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: implementing educational reforms?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	6	1
Satisfied	105	14
Neutral	116	16
<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Very dissatisfied</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>20</b>
Don't know	49	7

N = 734

Similar proportions are satisfied and dissatisfied with the current quality and provision of education as Table 39 shows. This means that it is not just, or only, the process of implementing educational reforms that provoked the responses in Table 38.

**Table 39 Overall, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the current quality and provision of local education?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	7	1
Satisfied	118	16
Neutral	123	17
<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>307</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Very dissatisfied</b>	<b>151</b>	<b>21</b>
Don't know	28	4

Levels of dissatisfaction vary on whether people have children in school in Hong Kong. Currently, 40% of respondents indicate they have children in school in Hong Kong.

**Table 40 Do you currently have children in school in Hong Kong, and if so, what level of school are they attending locally?**

Group	Count	%
Kindergarten	46	6
Primary school	114	15
Secondary school	119	16
Vocational/tertiary	28	4
<b>No children in school</b>	<b>452</b>	<b>60</b>

People with children are marginally more dissatisfied (65%) than those without children in school (60%), as Table 41 shows. Dissatisfaction does not vary with level of schooling children are attending, so this is sentiment directed toward the educational system in general, not toward the school a child is attending.

**Table 41 Satisfaction with government performance on implementing educational reform by currently having children in school in Hong Kong**

	None in school	Children in school	total
Very satisfied	1	1	1
Satisfied	15	13	14
Neutral	15	17	16
<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>
<b>Very dissatisfied</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>
Don't know	9	4	7
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 9.498 with 5 df p = 0.0908

On the issue of reducing pollution people are somewhat more satisfied than with education, with 30% satisfied and 48% dissatisfied.

**Table 42 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Reducing pollution in Hong Kong?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	9	1
Satisfied	216	29
Neutral	130	18
Dissatisfied	288	39
Very dissatisfied	67	9
Don't know	24	3

But the government did not fare so well with the issue of defending rights of Hong Kongers working and investing on the mainland, with 19% satisfied with the government's performance versus 43% dissatisfied.

**Table 43 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Defending rights of Hong Kongers working and investing on the mainland?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	3	--
Satisfied	139	19
Neutral	146	20
Dissatisfied	251	34
Very dissatisfied	66	9
Don't know	129	18

The government did much better in respondents' assessments in one area it has been long pushing, that of cross-border cooperation. Still even here it gained no majority satisfied.

**Table 44 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Improving cross-border travel and cooperation?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	6	1
Satisfied	340	46
Neutral	145	20
Dissatisfied	160	22
Very dissatisfied	31	4
Don't know	52	7

Government scored fewer satisfied with its preparations for making all Legco seats directly elected than on any other non-economic aspect except education.

**Table 45 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Preparing for making all Legco seats directly elected?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	2	--
Satisfied	176	24
Neutral	149	20
Dissatisfied	216	29
Very dissatisfied	49	7
Don't know	142	19

Government earned an even split on ensuring judicial independence and rule of law, with no majority on either side of the issue.

**Table 46 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Ensuring judicial independence and the rule of law?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	5	1
Satisfied	255	35
Neutral	131	18
Dissatisfied	205	28
Very dissatisfied	45	6
Don't know	93	13

Those dissatisfied with government's efforts to consult the public outnumbered those satisfied 44% to 28%.

**Table 47 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Consulting with the public?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	7	1
Satisfied	197	27
Neutral	145	20
Dissatisfied	265	36
Very dissatisfied	58	8
Don't know	62	8

Satisfaction levels with the performance of the government on these 7 non-economic issues will now be compared with satisfaction levels on 6 economic issues. Many more are satisfied (44%) than dissatisfied (27%) with efforts to improve municipal services.

**Table 48 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Improving municipal services?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	7	1
Satisfied	317	43
Neutral	156	21
Dissatisfied	169	23
Very dissatisfied	26	4
Don't know	59	8

Municipal services improvement, which included abolishing the municipal councils, was done largely in the name of managerial efficiency and saving money and cutting staff numbers. Government performance in improving medical services broke about even.

**Table 49 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Improving medical services?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	13	2
Satisfied	281	38
Neutral	120	16
Dissatisfied	229	31
Very dissatisfied	53	7
Don't know	38	5

Despite the fact that housing is now at its most affordable level in 40 years, with buying a flat now cheaper than renting, only 29% expressed satisfaction while 45% were dissatisfied with government performance on this issue.

**Table 50 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Increasing supply of affordable housing?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	8	1
Satisfied	204	28
Neutral	130	18
Dissatisfied	270	37
Very dissatisfied	61	8
Don't know	61	8

And support is about evenly split on the government's performance on caring for the elderly.

**Table 51 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Caring for the elderly?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	5	1
Satisfied	280	38
Neutral	116	16
Dissatisfied	252	34
Very dissatisfied	57	8
Don't know	24	3

But tax reform efforts get the thumbs down from 39%, and approval from only 23%.

**Table 52 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on: Reforming the tax system?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	6	1
Satisfied	158	22
Neutral	184	25
Dissatisfied	233	32
Very dissatisfied	55	7
Don't know	98	13

On the final economically related issue, reducing unemployment, government performance gets an overwhelming expression of dissatisfaction, 81% versus only 7% satisfied.

**Table 53 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on:  
Reducing unemployment?**

Group	Count	%
Very satisfied	4	1
Satisfied	41	6
Neutral	75	10
<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>359</b>	<b>49</b>
<b>Very dissatisfied</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>32</b>
Don't know	19	3

If people judged their satisfaction with the government as a whole on just the single factor of satisfaction with efforts to reduce unemployment, the percentages satisfied with government performance would be worse than they are. But 24% are satisfied with government performance in general, not just 7% as in Table 53. Obviously, other than economic factors moderate attitudes toward government. Indeed, the summary table, Table 54, shows that satisfaction with government performance in economically related areas is virtually identical to that in non-economic areas, with 30% satisfied with economically related performance versus 29% satisfied with performance in non-economic areas. Dissatisfaction is virtually the same, though marginally higher in economic areas--45% dissatisfied--versus 42% in non-economic. Neither of these two margins of difference are large enough to be outside the range of error.

**Table 54 Average satisfaction with performance of government on:  
Non-economic issues. Economic issues**

Group	%	%
Very satisfied	1	1
Satisfied	28	29
Neutral	19	18
Dissatisfied	33	34
Very dissatisfied	9	11
Don't know	11	7

Conclusion: dissatisfaction with government performance is NOT traceable solely to performance on economic issues nor thus with the economic situation in general. Unemployment is *an* issue, not *the* issue in determining overall levels of dissatisfaction.


## 5 Satisfaction with government leaders and support/opposition to policies

If satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the government are not just determined by unemployment or other economic factors, but seem linked to a more comprehensive evaluation and influence of a number of factors, the question of leadership and of support or opposition to policies proposed or advocated by government leaders needs examining. Section 5 examines satisfaction with Chief Executive and top officials, and examines support for policies which these top officials have, or may, set. In the Hong Kong system, the top four officials have tremendous power to determine policy. In fact, Legco has not only no power to make policy; it cannot propose anything which might have a charging effect on the public purse, and may only

vote up or down proposals put to it after by the top officials. In this “executive-led” system, attitudes toward the executive are crucial for the legitimacy and stability of the whole system.

**Table 55 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of Chief Executive Tung?**


	Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Don't Know
Feb 97	5	19	48	5	23
June 97	5	24	46	4	21
Jan 98	3	26	57	3	11
Apr 98	8	28	48	5	11
June 98	13	34	41	5	7
July 98	12	33	45	4	6
Oct 98	9	33	42	4	12
Apr 99	8	34	47	3	8
July 99	13	33	42	4	8
Nov 99	14	39	36	3	8
Apr 00	17	37	36	2	9
Aug 00	19	37	31	1	12
Oct 00	23	37	31	2	7
Nov 00	16	40	34	3	7
Apr 01	18	39	29	2	12
June 01	14	40	36	1	9
July 01	19	38	34	2	6
Nov 01	25	40	24	1	10



Levels of dissatisfaction with the Chief Executive’s performance (65%) are almost exactly the same as dissatisfaction with the performance of the government (68%), despite differences of satisfaction with performance on personal concerns (see above). Since dissatisfaction with the other top members of the government—Chief Secretary Donald Tsang, Financial Secretary Antony Leung and Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung—are lower, the conclusion is hard to escape that unlike in the earlier years of the SAR, dissatisfaction with government today stems also from dissatisfaction with the Chief Executive as leader of that government. The supposition that in a second term the Chief Executive “having his own people in charge” of the top offices under the proposed accountability system must be carefully examined rather than blindly asserted. (See below for detailed examination of the accountability system.)


**Table 56 Dissatisfaction with performance of top 4 HKSAR leaders**

	Jan 98	Apr 98	June 98	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01	Jun 01	July 01	Nov 01
<b>Tung</b>	29	36	47	42	42	46	53	54	56	56	57	54	57	65
<b>Chan</b>		8	19	16	11	14	23	18	16	15	6			
<b>Tsang</b>		16	38	23	12	14	18	16	11	12	8	10	12	27
<b>A. Leung</b>												7	9	37
<b>E. Leung</b>		41	40	29	58	53	59	49	56	62	59	55	59	57



The area chart below shows the cumulative levels of dissatisfaction have risen sharply since Anson Chan left and Donald Tsang assumed her old office as Chief Secretary

**Area chart of Table 56: cumulative dissatisfaction for top 4 HKSAR leaders**




The flip side of Table 56 is shown in Table 57. Satisfaction with the top four leaders, except for Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung, is low. Satisfaction with the new Financial Secretary, Antony Leung, who took office in April and came, like Mr. Tung and Elsie Leung, from outside the civil service, has not risen out of the range of satisfaction held by those two. The sole remaining civil

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
servant among the top four, Donald Tsang, has a satisfaction with performance rating which has dropped well down from earlier highs, nearly to his level of June 1998 when as Financial Secretary he took a lot of blame. Whether his ratings continue to drop to those of other leaders will be a critical measure of whether dissatisfaction can be improved by making his position like that of the other three, appointees brought into government from outside the civil service.

**Table 57 Satisfaction with performance of top 4 HKSAR leaders**

	Jan 98	Apr 98	June 98	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01	Jun 01	July 01	Nov 01
<b>Tung</b>	60	53	46	46	50	46	39	38	32	35	31	37	36	25
<b>Chan</b>		77	71	70	81	74	67	61	73	76	85			
<b>Tsang</b>		71	54	64	80	72	70	65	78	79	83	62	63	57
<b>A. Leung</b>												21	29	32
<b>E. Leung</b>		31	39	35	24	28	25	28	28	23	22	27	27	25



**Area chart Table 57 cumulative satisfaction levels**





The area chart above shows the effect on satisfaction with leadership the removal of Anson Chan has had on satisfaction levels with the top four leaders. The question of the effects of the new accountability system whereby the Chief Executive will have the power to dismiss top officials who will be contract appointees and not civil servants becomes very important, since the collapse of satisfaction with the top leaders seems to be approaching a level of criticality given the increasingly difficult economic circumstances of Hong Kong.

The survey began this aspect by asking a question to separate informed from non-informed opinion. When asked, "Have you heard of the Chief Executive's proposal to improve principal officials accountability?" 61% replied yes, 33% no and 6% didn't know. On the six follow up questions, we divide informed opinion (Have heard) from non-informed (Not heard). As Table 58 shows, while being informed has little affect on disapproval (36% not heard versus 35% of heard) finding out about the proposals has a dramatic effect on approval, rising from 45% among the uninformed up to 57% of those who have heard about it. Since the total level of support is, at best, a bare majority of 51%, better informing the public about this proposal is vital to winning public support and passage through the Legislative Council.

**Table 58 Do you approve or disapprove of: changing principal officials from permanent job security to contract terms?**

	Not heard	Have heard	total
<b>Greatly approve</b>	7	11	9
<b>Approve</b>	38	46	43
Disapprove	29	25	27
Greatly disapprove	7	10	9
Don't know	19	8	12
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 23.23 with 4 df p = 0.0001

The second proposal, which is actually contingent on the first proposal being successfully implemented (civil service term officials cannot be dismissed for political reasons and are also hard to transfer at the very top levels, despite obvious performance failures), gains overwhelming support from informed and uninformed. The connection in the public mind of the first to this second proposal needs to be made.

**Table 59 Do you approve or disapprove of: allowing the Chief Executive to dismiss principal officials for performance failure?**

	Not heard	Have heard	total
<b>Greatly approve</b>	13	21	18
<b>Approve</b>	66	63	64
Disapprove	9	11	10
Greatly disapprove	1	--	1
Don't know	10	5	7
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 15.51 with 4 df p = 0.0037

The third proposal of appointing principal officials from the private sector gains majority support only among those who have heard, and the majority is small overall (52%).

**Table 60 Do you approve or disapprove of: appointing principal officials from the private sector?**

	Not heard	Have heard	total
Greatly approve	3	6	5
Approve	42	51	47
Disapprove	27	28	28
Greatly disapprove	7	7	7
Don't know	21	8	13
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 26.31 with 4 df p = 0.0001

The fourth proposal is one put forward by Legco, not by the Chief Executive. Nevertheless, it has strong support among both those who have heard and not heard about the accountability proposals, with 77% support by both the uninformed and informed. Those who have heard of the accountability proposals more strongly approve of Legco approval of appointments, and they more strongly disapprove of the idea (10% not heard versus 17% who have heard).

**Table 61 Do you approve or disapprove of: requiring Legco approval of the Chief Executive's appointees?**

	Not heard	Have heard	total
Greatly approve	9	15	13
Approve	68	62	64
Disapprove	9	15	13
Greatly disapprove	1	2	2
Don't know	13	6	8
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 22.66 with 4 df p = 0.0001

The final aspect of the proposed system, to limit terms of officials to the same as the appointing Chief Executive, gains majority support among both groups, but slightly stronger opposition among the informed.

**Table 62 Do you approve or disapprove of: limiting principal officials terms in office to the same as the Chief Executive who appointed them?**

	Not heard	Have heard	total
Greatly approve	4	8	6
Approve	56	54	55
Disapprove	17	24	21
Greatly disapprove	2	2	2
Don't know	21	12	15
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 18.73 with 4 df p = 0.0009

The final aspect of the proposed accountability system which we surveyed was to ask respondents about the effectiveness of the changes in producing improved accountability. As Table 63 demonstrates dramatically, those informed about the proposals are overwhelmingly

more convinced they will improve accountability of the government to the public (15% uninformed versus 39% informed). Nevertheless, perhaps less than a third of the public believe they will make a real difference. That fewer than one in ten believes the changes will lessen accountability means that most of the public are skeptical or won't hazard a view.

**Table 63 How do you think the proposed appointment system will affect government accountability to the public?**

	Not heard	Have heard	total
Make government less accountable	8	8	8
Make government more accountable	15	39	30
No change	28	25	26
Don't know	48	28	36
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 54.85 with 3 df p 0.0001

Things are different among the civil servants randomly contacted by the survey (6% of respondents in the workforce—we did not ask these questions of the 9% of respondents in the workforce in privatized public facilities like the MTR, KCR and Airport Authority). We had a series of branching questions for these civil servants related to the proposed system, since it most concerns them directly. Since the political neutrality of the civil service is a key component of a professional bureaucracy in all advanced countries, and a major concern in Hong Kong before and after the change of sovereignty in 1997, we asked civil servants:

**Table 64 Do you think the proposed accountability system will lessen or increase civil service political neutrality?**

46%	<b>Lessen</b>
18%	<b>Increase</b>
36%	<b>Don't know</b>

Currently, only 21% of civil servants rated morale in their departments as good, 50% as bad and 25% as very bad with 4% not knowing about their departmental morale. Only 7% thought morale would get better under the accountability system while 46% thought it would get worse and 11% much worse, with 36% not knowing its effect.


The crucial element for the accountability system, and also for satisfaction of the public with the government and its leaders, apparently focuses very much on the top official in this executive led system. The public has made critical judgments about his appointees, the system he works with and the changes he has proposed, and the government he leads. The question now must be addressed as to whether they wish to see him run for a second term, whether they support or oppose his policies (both those in effect and those proposed), and whether they would like to see other policies and system structure changes, such as directly electing the Chief Executive, which Mr. Tung has so far strongly resisted even discussing. To this we now turn.

## 6. Attitudes toward the Chief Executive and support for a second term


While 25% of those surveyed are satisfied with Tung Chee-hwa's performance that does not mean they would like to see him run for a second term. And in fact, they do not. Only 16% of respondents asked the first week of November want him to run for second term. This is down significantly from a steady level of around 1 in 5 since November 2000. Those who definitely would NOT want to see him run is at a record high. A clear majority (56%) oppose another term.

**Table 65 Would you want to see Tung Chee-hwa running for a second term in 2002?**

	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	April 01	June 01	July 01	Nov 01
<b>Definitely not want</b>	20	21	22	20	15	21	28
<b>Would not</b>	32	29	23	27	28	23	28
Neutral/DK	28	32	31	32	35	34	29
<b>Would Want</b>	16	15	19	19	19	19	14
<b>Definitely would want</b>	2	3	5	2	3	3	2



**Bar chart of Table 65**



While a clear majority of all respondents oppose a second term, support and opposition varies according to demographic factors. For example, while the tiny number of upper-middle class respondents and the virtually identical responses of all other classes means there is no significant association between class and opposition or support for a second term, there is clearly stronger support for the Chief Executive among the top echelons of society. But even there, only about one in four support a second term.

**Table 66 Want/Not want a second term by self-ascribed class\*<sup>1</sup>**

	Working	Lower-middle	Middle	Upper-middle	total
Not want	62	62	62	49	61
Neutral	20	20	23	23	21
Would want	18	17	15	28	18
total	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 657  
 Chi-square = 5.098 with 6 df p = 0.5313

While gender makes no difference in levels of support or opposition, age certainly does, with older groups more supportive, and high levels of neutrality as well as support among those in their 60s.

**Table 67 Want/Not want a second term by age groups**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-83	total
<b>Not want</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>61</b>
Neutral	20	18	18	29	15	33	11	21
Want	18	14	15	12	28	38	42	18
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 657  
 Chi-square = 47.29 with 12 df p = 0.0001




<sup>1</sup> Those who answered don't know have been dropped from the analysis which follows, so both levels of support and opposition are higher in the tables below than for the overall sample as indicated in Table 65.

Students currently in school (university first to third year) show higher support for a second term than any other group. (The number of Masters and Ph.D. sampled, 11, is simply too few to be reliable.) University graduates and Form 4 and 5 graduates, the bulk of the sample (17% and 32% respectively) show the highest levels of opposition to a second term.

**Table 68 Want/Not want second term by educational attainment**

	Not want	Neutral	Want	total
None	46	25	29	100
Primary 1-6	58	18	25	100
F1-F2	60	28	13	100
F-3	47	31	23	100
F4/F-5 graduate	69	15	16	100
F-6/F-7 graduate/TC graduate/1 <sup>st</sup> yr Assoc.	59	30	11	100
University 1 <sup>st</sup> -3 <sup>rd</sup> year	48	21	31	100
University graduate	67	21	13	100
Masters/Ph.D. Degree	33	33	33	100
total	61	21	18	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total N = 668 (don't knows out)  
 Chi-square = 32.85 with 16 df p = 0.0077




In the all-important occupational groups, especially the managers and administrators who are the bulk of business people, only 9% want a second term while 64% oppose. A majority of all occupations, except that of retirees, oppose a second term.

**Table 69 Want/Not want a second term by occupation**

	Not want	Neutral	Want	Total
<b>Managers/admin</b>	<b>64</b>	27	9	100
<b>Professionals</b>	<b>55</b>	31	14	100
<b>Assoc. professionals</b>	<b>68</b>	16	16	100
<b>Clerks</b>	<b>66</b>	19	16	100
<b>Service/sales</b>	<b>63</b>	27	10	100
<b>Agricul/fish craft &amp; elementary</b>	<b>55</b>	30	15	100
<b>Machine operators</b>	<b>51</b>	23	26	100
<b>Housewives</b>	<b>69</b>	16	15	100
Retirees	35	26	39	100
<b>Unemployed</b>	<b>67</b>	13	21	100
<b>Students</b>	<b>59</b>	19	22	100
<b>Educators</b>	<b>56</b>	22	22	100
<b>Others</b>	<b>69</b>	19	12	100
total	<b>61</b>	21	18	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total

Chi-square = 39.77 with 24 df p = 0.0226



Now that we know who does want and does not want to see Mr. Tung run for a second term, the question arises as to why people feel as they do about a second term for the Chief Executive. The survey asked follow up questions to those not wanting, wanting, and neutral on a second term (don't know's skipped the follow up question). The respective positions were queried as to

agreement or disagreement to a list of commonly given reasons for support or opposition or neutrality to a second term. First, those who would like to see Mr. Tung run for a second term, in rank order of agreement. The first set of responses, on the left side, are percentages of the 18% of the whole sample wanting to see a second term. Thus 84% of the 18% wanting to see a second term agree that Tung has Beijing's trust and that is one reason they want to see him run again. The second, right hand side of the table shows the percentage of the whole sample (extrapolatable to the whole population within range of error) these responses represent. Thus 14% of everyone queried wants to see a second term because Tung Chee-hwa has Beijing's trust.

**Table 70** **Of 18% Wanting second term** **% of whole sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No difference	DK	Agree	Disagree	No difference	DK
Tung has Beijing's trust	84	6	7	3	14	1	1	--
Tung is sincere	84	8	3	4	14	1	1	1
T increases integration of mainland & HK	83	8	5	4	14	1	1	1
Many current problems not T's fault	78	12	3	6	13	2	1	1
Tung is patriotic	78	12	6	3	13	2	1	--
T defends HK's autonomy	62	21	6	11	10	3	1	1
T will do better second term	59	17	3	21	10	3	1	3
T has done a good job	56	29	10	4	9	5	2	1
Tung is politically conservative	54	22	10	13	9	4	2	2
Tung cares for people like me	47	36	8	9	8	6	1	2

So the main reasons for supporting a second term for Tung Chee-hwa are because he has Beijing's trust, is sincere, and increases integration of Hong Kong and the mainland. And, after all, many of the problems are not his fault and he is patriotic. A small majority of supporters believe he will do better in a second term. But even those who support Tung Chee-hwa for a second term do not believe he cares for people like them. Table 71 shows opponents' views.

**Table 71** **Of 61% Not wanting second term** **% of whole sample**

	Agree	Disagree	No difference	DK	Agree	Disagree	No difference	DK
Tung is not charismatic	84	7	2	7	46	4	1	4
Tung is too politically conservative	79	10	3	8	43	7	3	1
T has done a poor job	79	13	6	3	40	8	3	4
T benefits some business interests	78	13	3	7	42	7	2	4
T fails to defend HK's autonomy	73	15	5	7	43	7	3	1
T will do worse in a second term	63	18	6	13	33	18	1	3
T cares only for rich	61	28	4	7	32	13	7	3
Tung is pro-Beijing	60	23	12	5	32	15	3	4
Many current problems in HK are Tung's fault	58	34	3	5	31	10	3	7



The main reason for opposition to a second term is not, repeat, NOT that Tung is pro-Beijing. It ranks next to last on the list. Nor do those who oppose a second term overwhelmingly blame Tung for Hong Kong’s troubles. The strongest reasons for opposing a second term stems from his poor job of leadership, which comes from being uncharismatic and too conservative. There is also resentment for his tendency to favor some business interests over others and for failing to defend Hong Kong’s autonomy. A majority of those not wanting a second term believe he will do worse, and like many of his supporters, they believe he doesn’t care for people like them.

Those who declare themselves neutral on the issue of a second term were asked a series of questions drawn from the types of responses Hong Kong Transition Project research has elicited from informants queried about their lack of voting registration, voting, and other politically related activities. These were raised in pursuit of reasons for Hong Kong’s supposedly famed problem of political “apathy.” As with our Legco, District Council and municipal council election related research, we found out and out apathy—both ignorance and lack of concern about politics—was characteristic of a tiny minority, as Table 72 amply demonstrates. When asked: “What explains your neutral choice on a second term?” the following answers were given, in ranked order:

**Table 72** **Of 21% Neutral on second term** **% of whole sample**

	Of 21% Neutral on second term				% of whole sample			
	Agree	Disagree	No difference	DK	Agree	Disagree	No difference	DK
Satisfied with things as they are	67	14	7	11	13	3	1	2
My views will make no difference	64	21	9	5	13	4	2	1
Don’t know enough about politics or gov.	58	30	7	4	11	6	1	1
Business people & Beijing will run HK affairs regardless of who is Chief Executive	54	30	9	7	11	6	2	1
Makes no difference who is Chief Executive	53	38	6	4	10	7	1	1
Beijing would not accept a Chief Exec. I would want	43	25	16	15	9	5	3	3
No choice better than Tung available	37	42	9	12	7	8	2	2
Politics doesn’t affect me	30	59	9	1	6	12	2	--

The primary reason for neutrality, agreed by 13% of the whole sample, was that they were satisfied with things as they are. Given that 18% wanted Tung to have a second term (dropping the don’t knows out), it is possible and reasonable to conclude that actually about a third—31%--support or accept a second term tacitly. This is very close to the 25% satisfied with Tung’s performance plus 6 percentage points of the 10% saying they don’t know about his performance. This division of don’t knows in support of the government—at about 60% of don’t knows leaning toward support or satisfaction with the government or toward support of a policy or proposition--has been established in previous surveys by the Hong Kong Transition Project.


The second most chosen reply: “my views will make no difference,” is not an expression of apathy, but of powerlessness. Nor is the frank confession of not knowing enough about politics and the government indicative of apathy. Apathy means one doesn’t know, and doesn’t care to

know. Further against apathy as an explanation for neutrality, by two to one respondents rejected the answer that “politics doesn’t affect me.” Respondents also reject the assertion that no choice better than Tung is available. (Indicating they have ideas about who that might be.) But many do feel that business people and Beijing will run Hong Kong regardless of who is Chief Executive, and thus it makes no difference who is Chief Executive. About one in ten of the sample think Beijing would not accept a Chief Executive they would want. So there is a sense of alienation and disempowerment, not apathy. This is an important distinction, especially when it comes to assessing potential for civil unrest. (See below.)

The general tenor of these responses, even the favorable ones, indicate a strong sense that plutocratic elitism and pro-business favoritism and nationalist politics and interests rather than local best interest dominates Hong Kong’s highest office. The survey tested these inferences with a direct series of questions on who influences the Chief Executive.

**Table 73 How much do the following influence the decisions of the Chief Executive?** (ranked by too much influence category)

	<b>Too much</b>	<b>Reasonable amount</b>	<b>Small amount</b>	<b>None</b>	<b>DK</b>
<b>Beijing leaders</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Local big business leaders</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Top civil servants</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Public opinion</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Pro-gov parties like DAB &amp; HK Progressive Alliance</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>Foreign big business leaders</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Pro-business parties like Liberal Party</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>Critical of gov parties like Democratic party and Frontier</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>15</b>



Only Beijing leaders elicited a majority consensus of too much influence on the Chief Executive, but about a third considered Beijing’s influence either reasonable, small or none. Local big business leaders show a plurality consider their influence too much, but a majority (53%) rated their influence reasonable, small or none, though the none category of 4% was by far the smallest of all eight groups asked.

Table 74 presents the results of Table 73, with these results tested for significant differences between responses of those who would like Tung to run for a second term (supporters) against

those who would not like him to run for a second term or indifferent (opponents/neutrals). In four categories, influence of Beijing, local big business leaders, public opinion and critical of government parties supporters and opponents/neutrals and opponents (neutrals dropped) differed significantly in their responses. A far larger proportion of opponents (67%) think Beijing influences the Chief Executive too much than supporters (42%). But what is also significant is that even this 42% of supporters for a second term is very large. There are also big gaps in supporters assessments of influence by local big business leaders (23% too much) versus opponents (47% too much). Supporters of a second term are much more satisfied with the influence of public opinion, with 26% considering it a reasonable amount and only 17% giving none as a response versus 14% of opponents/neutrals and 13% of opponents to a second term thinking the influence of public opinion on the Chief Executive was a reasonable amount, and 31% of opponents/neutrals and 37% of opponents thinking public opinion had no influence at all. Opponents/neutrals were also in disagreement with supporters of a second term in their assessments of the influence of parties like the Democrats and Frontier on the Chief Executive's decisions, with only 26% of supporters thinking it had no effect versus 39% of opponents/neutrals who thought it had no effect and 43% of opponents feeling ignored.

**Table 74 How much do the following influence the decisions of the Chief Executive? (ranked) by supporters or opponents/neutrals and by opponents of a second term**

	Too much	Reasonable amount	Small amount	None	DK	Chi-square
<b>Beijing leaders (all)</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>	
Second term supporters	42	20	13	16	10	p ≤ 0.0001
Second term opponents/neutrals	62	18	7	5	8	
Opponents only	67	16	8	7	4	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Local big business leaders (all)</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	
Second term supporters	23	38	23	8	8	p = 0.0007
Second term opponents/neutrals	42	30	18	3	8	
Opponents only	47	29	16	2	5	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Top civil servants</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>9</b>	No difference
<b>Public opinion (all)</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>7</b>	
Second term supporters	13	26	35	17	9	p = 0.0012
Second term opponents/neutrals	10	14	38	31	7	
Opponents only	11	13	35	37	4	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Pro-gov parties like DAB &amp; HKPA</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	No difference
<b>Foreign big business leaders</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>17</b>	No difference
<b>Pro-business parties like Liberal Party</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>17</b>	No difference
<b>Critical of gov parties like Democratic party and Frontier (all)</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>15</b>	
Second term supporters	7	16	36	26	16	p = 0.0718
Second term opponents/neutrals	5	12	29	39	15	
Opponents only	4	13	29	43	11	p = 0.0008

Table 74 reveals large gaps in perception, if not actual polarization, in the assessments of influence on the Chief Executive by key groups. Table 75 shows first, the views of the whole sample in terms of satisfaction with the performance of the government on 13 issues. Then it shows the different responses of supporters of a second term for Tung Chee-hwa versus responses of opponents (opponents only, neutrals are not included) of a second term. The Chi-square column is a measure of the strength of the association, that is, the closer the number

approaches zero, the less likely it is that the differences can be due to chance. Table 75 shows that the gap between supporters and opponents revealed in Table 74 extends to issues and to satisfaction levels with government performance. For example, 46% of supporters are satisfied with government's consulting with the public while only 23% of opponents are satisfied. But on this issue about one in four supporters are dissatisfied along with a majority of opponents.

**Table 75 Satisfaction with performance of government on issues by supporters/opponents of second term**

	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Chi-square*
<b>Implementing education reforms</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>62</b>	
Supporters of second term	30	18	43	p ≤ 0.0001
Opponents of second term	12	12	72	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Reducing pollution in HK</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>48</b>	
Supporters	44	16	37	p = 0.0050
Opponents	27	18	53	p = 0.0053
<b>Reducing unemployment</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>81</b>	
Supporters	14	22	60	p ≤ 0.0001
Opponents	4	6	89	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Reforming tax system</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>39</b>	
Supporters	22	27	27	p = 0.0071
Opponents	18	24	46	p = 0.0001
<b>Defending rights of Hkers on mainland</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>43</b>	
Supporters	28	22	28	p = 0.0049
Opponents	18	17	52	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Improving cross-border travel &amp; cooperation</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>26</b>	
Supporters	59	18	15	p = 0.0409
Opponents	46	19	31	p = 0.0013
<b>Caring for the elderly</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>42</b>	
Supporters	60	15	22	p ≤ 0.0001
Opponents	33	14	51	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Preparing to make all Legco seats directly elected</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>36</b>	
Supporters	35	28	20	p = 0.0005
Opponents	22	18	44	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Increasing supply of affordable housing</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>45</b>	
Supporters	42	20	29	p = 0.0023
Opponents	24	17	54	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Improving medical services</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>38</b>	
Supporters	55	17	22	p = 0.0018
Opponents	36	16	45	p = 0.0002
<b>Ensuring judicial independence &amp; rule of law</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>34</b>	
Supporters	60	12	15	p ≤ 0.0001
Opponents	29	18	45	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Consulting with the public</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>44</b>	
Supporters	46	20	26	p ≤ 0.0001
Opponents	23	19	53	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Improving municipal services</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>27</b>	
Supporters	60	18	14	p = 0.0013
Opponents	43	22	31	p = 0.0009

\*indicates significant difference by opponents or supporters of a second term from the average of the whole sample

Table 76 presents the proportions of support or opposition by supporters and opponents of a second term to various policies proposed either by Tung Chee-hwa or Legco.

**Table 76 Support or opposition to policies by supporters and opponents**

	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Chi-square
<b>Set a minimum wage</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>32</b>	
Supporters of second term	44	11	37	p = 0.3125**
Opponents of second term	54	10	32	p = 0.0023
<b>Create 30,000 short term public sector jobs</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	
Supporters	78	6	8	p = 0.3500**
Opponents	76	10	12	p = 0.0080
<b>Allow property prices to fall</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>22</b>	
Supporters	60	11	18	p = 0.1033**
Opponents	53	17	24	p = 0.0967
<b>Allow property prices to rise</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>48</b>	
Supporters	23	18	48	p = 0.4710**
Opponents	19	22	52	p = 0.1090**
<b>Allow wages to fall further</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>64</b>	
Supporters	18	17	59	p = 0.8656**
Opponents	15	13	69	p = 0.0112
<b>Cut civil service salaries</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>37</b>	
Supporters	47	12	37	p = 0.7284**
Opponents	46	15	38	p = 0.1242**
<b>Bring public sector paycales in line with private sector</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>29</b>	
Supporters	46	13	32	p = 0.9563**
Opponents	50	12	31	p = 0.0598
<b>Sell government assets to public (e.g. MTRC)</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>24</b>	
Supporters	49	15	22	p = 0.5597**
Opponents	46	20	24	p = 0.2124**
<b>Privatize government services</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>46</b>	
Supporters	45	13	35	p = 0.0463
Opponents	34	13	49	p = 0.0201
<b>Intervene more in the economy</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>51</b>	
Supporters	22	16	47	p = 0.7940**
Opponents	23	14	56	p = 0.0010
<b>Intervene less in the economy</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>22</b>	
Supporters	47	19	20	p = 0.9506**
Opponents	50	17	24	p = 0.0076
<b>Provide relief to negative equity homeowners</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>48</b>	
Supporters	32	9	52	p = 0.1922**
Opponents	36	16	46	p = 0.0101
<b>Change to a 4 year university system</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>11</b>	
Supporters	73	12	7	p = 0.0619
Opponents	63	17	14	p = 0.0031
<b>Provide same amt. of tuition subsidy to 4<sup>th</sup> year of university as government provides presently</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	
Supporters	84	3	4	p = 0.1410**
Opponents	77	9	9	p = 0.0757
<b>Change secondary education from 5+2 to 3+3</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>22</b>	
Supporters	59	14	20	p = 0.4531**
Opponents	54	15	25	p = 0.0097
<b>Legalize soccer betting in Hong Kong</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>43</b>	
Supporters	43	10	43	p = 0.5677**
Opponents	40	13	45	p = 0.1047**

\*\*indicates very weak or marginal differences from overall responses

And Table 77 presents support for policies relating to changes in the political structure such as direct election of the Chief Executive and of all Legco members. Clearly, both supporters and opponents of a second term for Tung Chee-hwa desire changes in the political structure, with opponents wanting the changes more strongly than supporters. For example, supporters of a second term would like to see the Chief Executive directly elected by a majority of 67% or two thirds while opponents of second term would like to see the C.E. directly elected by 74%, or three out of four. Surprisingly, about as many supporters as opponents of a second term oppose direct elections, 19% for supporters, 13% for opponents.

**Table 77 Support or opposition to policies relating to political structure, by supporters and opponents of a second term**

	Strongly support	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Strongly oppose	Don't know	Chi-square
<b>Directly elect Chief Executive</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	
Supporters of second term	9	58	12	14	3	5	p = 0.0017
Opponents of second term	32	42	6	14	5	1	p ≤ 0.0001
<b>Make all Legco seats directly elected</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>9</b>	
Supporters of second term	7	48	12	21	2	11	p = 0.0066
Opponents of second term	11	66	7	10	--	6	p ≤ 0.0001

A critical policy both for the Chief Executive and for Hong Kong at this time concerns cooperation and integration with the mainland. Mr. Tung has made such cooperation, especially in the Pearl River Delta on such issues as pollution, crime, and regional development, major parts of his claim of success deserving a second term. Support for such policies, including immigration from the mainland, 24-hour border opening and so on are thus crucial to analyze.

Table 78 looks first at mainland immigration, an issue which has troubled the SAR and this Chief Executive since his first day in office. Table 78 shows that the mean desired immigration from the mainland per day has dropped from 96 per day in July 2001 to 85 per day in November 2001. The proportion wanting to stop all immigration has risen from 10% of the sample to 17%, and those wanting 50 a day or under, a drastic cut from the present 150 per day, from 40% in July to 48% in November. Support for the present quota slipped from about a third to about a fourth.

**Table 78 The SAR government currently accepts 150 mainland migrants into Hong Kong every day. How many per day do you think is acceptable and desirable?**

	Mean	median	0	<50	50	51-99	100	101-150	150+	No opinion*
July 01	96	100	10	10	20	6	15	36	3	29
Nov 01	85	75	17	13	18	9	15	24	5	29

\* Percentages from 0 to 150+ are of those who gave a response. Those with no opinion excluded.

Table 79 takes this scale of desirable quota for November 2001 and runs it against satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the government. Those who want much more immigration and those wanting much less tend to be more dissatisfied. But those wanting much less make up considerably more of the Hong Kong population than those wanting an increase.

**Table 79 Satisfied with performance of HK Government by daily quota desirable**

	0	1-49	50	51-99	100	101-150	200-2000	total
Very dissatisfied	40	35	22	13	15	12	35	23
Somewhat dissatisfied	40	51	50	56	50	48	35	48
Somewhat satisfied	11	13	23	24	32	31	23	23
Very satisfied	2	0	0	0	0	2	0	1
Don't know	7	1	4	7	4	7	8	5
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 524 (those who gave a number in Table )  
 Chi-square = 54.48 with 24 df p = 0.0004

Those who are more worried about overpopulation and crowding are, logically, in favor of reduced quotas. Or conversely, those who want higher daily quotas are much less concerned with overcrowding. However, 80% are worried to one degree or another about overcrowding and overpopulation, with 4 in 10 of the sample very worried about it.

**Table 80 Worry about overpopulation by desirable daily quota**

	0	1-49	50	51-99	100	101-150	200-2000	total
Not worried	8	17	11	9	26	32	39	20
Slightly worried	10	10	11	11	20	14	27	14
Somewhat worried	17	25	31	27	25	27	15	25
Very worried	65	46	46	53	28	25	19	41
Don't know	0	1	2	0	1	2	0	1
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 72.71 with 24 df p = 0.0001

Immigration numbers also hit optimism about Hong Kong's future as part of China, but in rather different ways. Those wanting no immigration and those wanting greatly increased immigration are more pessimistic about the future than those accepting about the daily quota now.

**Table 81 Optimism/Pessimism about HK's future as part of China by desirable daily quota**

	0	1-49	50	51-99	100	101-150	200-2000	total
Very optimistic	2	1	1	0	1	2	4	2
Optimistic	9	15	23	20	25	31	23	22
Neutral	22	30	34	44	29	32	23	31
Pessimistic	36	45	33	16	34	23	27	31
Very pessimistic	30	7	7	11	7	9	23	12
Don't know	1	1	1	9	4	3	0	3
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 73.75 with 30 df p = 0.0001

65% of Hong Kongers report having relatives living on the mainland while 34% do not, and 11% of Hong Kongers have relatives commuting from Shenzhen or Guangdong to school or work on a regular basis. Thus, understandably, policies relating to Hong Kong mainland infrastructure and transport ties gain either a great deal of support, or considerable opposition. For example, as Table 82 shows, encouraging mainland professionals to move to Hong Kong gets more opposition than support, as does 24 hour border opening, while smart card entry permits and high speed rail to Guangzhou get massive support.

Table 82 Support/oppose HK-mainland policies by support/oppose a second term


	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Chi-square
<b>24-hour border opening</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>41</b>	
Supporters of second term	40	23	37	p = 0.6920**
Opponents of second term	34	20	44	p = 0.0172
<b>Connect HK-Shenzhen MTR/light rail</b>	<b>75</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	No difference
<b>Build high-speed train to Guangzhou</b>	<b>77</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	
Supporters of second term	86	8	6	p = 0.1850**
Opponents of second term	76	12	10	p = 0.5859**
<b>Introduce smart card visa/permit inspection</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	No difference
<b>Provide HK education/healthcare to HK residents in some Guangdong cities</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>27</b>	
Supporters of second term	65	10	21	p = 0.2044**
Opponents of second term	54	14	30	p = 0.0141
<b>Provide legal assistance to HK residents on mainland</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>18</b>	
Supporters of second term	69	10	19	p = 0.8233**
Opponents of second term	72	9	18	p = 0.0287
<b>Provide scholarships to best mainland students &amp; allow to stay in Hong Kong</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>31</b>	
Supporters of second term	65	8	23	p = 0.0553
Opponents of second term	48	14	38	p = 0.0002
<b>Encourage mainland professionals to move to HK</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>43</b>	
Supporters of second term	49	17	31	p = 0.0147
Opponents of second term	35	15	50	p ≤ 0.0001

Table 83 Policies ranked by overall support

Policy	Support	Neutral	Oppose
Introduce smart card visa/permit inspection	84	6	7
Build high-speed train to Guangzhou	77	12	8
Create 30,000 short term public sector jobs	77	9	10
Provide same amt. of tuition subsidy to 4 <sup>th</sup> year of university as government provides presently	76	9	7
Connect HK-Shenzhen MTR/light rail	75	11	12
Directly elect Chief Executive	71	9	17
Provide legal assistance to HK residents on mainland	70	9	18
Make all Legco seats directly elected	68	10	13
Change to a 4 year university system	62	19	11
Provide HK education/healthcare to HK residents in some Guangdong cities	56	14	27
Provide scholarships to best mainland students & allow to stay in Hong Kong	53	14	31
Change secondary education from 5+2 to 3+3	52	16	22
Allow property prices to fall	52	17	22
Set a minimum wage	51	11	32
Sell government assets to public (e.g. MTRC)	47	20	24
Bring public sector pay scales in line with private sector	47	14	29
Intervene less in the economy	46	20	22
Cut civil service salaries	46	15	37
Legalize soccer betting in Hong Kong	39	14	43
Encourage mainland professionals to move to HK	37	17	43
24-hour border opening	35	22	41
Privatize government services	33	14	46
Provide relief to negative equity homeowners	32	14	48
<b>Intervene more in the economy</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>51</b>
Allow property prices to rise	18	23	48
<b>Allow wages to fall further</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>64</b>



**Chart of Table 83 Policies ranked by overall support or opposition**



Two policies garner majority opposition, intervening more in the economy and allowing wages to fall further. Since cutting the daily quota is also supported by a majority, and cutting the daily quota of immigrants from the mainland would slow if not stop the fall in salaries, the intervention of raising the quota in 1995 from 75 per day might be worth reconsidering, especially if Mr. Tung wants to boost his support for a second term. He could also push any or all of the policies supported by majorities in Table 83.

## 7 Satisfaction with local parties and their leaders.

Hong Kong's 10 listed parties or their precursors have been in existence since elections started in the 1980s. Some like the FTU (Federation of Trade Unions) have been in existence for much longer. (The communist party or the PRC is not officially listed in Hong Kong, nor is the Guomindong or KMT party of Nationalist Taiwan, but each party has followers in the SAR.) The parties conducted their last contest in the Legco elections of September 2000 and will contest again in District Council elections in 2003 and the Legco elections in 2004 which will see half the seats in the 60 member Legco directly elected and half functionally elected (currently 24 are directly elected and 6 returned by election committee). The parties will also play their role in the Chief Executive election of 2002 since hundreds of the 800 members of the Chief Executive Election Committee which votes on 24 March 2002 are party members, including members of the unofficial communist party.

The effect of public support or dissatisfaction with a party has been seen frequently, with election scandals and poor strategies costing parties at the polls. The battle for public opinion waged by the parties has, just as they, an indirect but important role in the formulation and legislative passage of bills implementing policies. Tables 84 to 86 show, in the extreme right column, the proportion of the public indicating an opinion about the respective party. This has fluctuated with elections. (November 1999 was a District Board election.) The Dissatisfied and Satisfied columns represent the views of those who indicated knowledge of the party, and are redistributed proportions with the non-informed being dropped. The columns indicating plus or

minus are the difference positive (if more satisfied than dissatisfied) or negative (if more dissatisfied than satisfied).

**Table 84. Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with parties and leaders (Apr 2000)**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Difference +/- April 2000	Difference +/- NOV 1999	% who know about party
Democratic Party led by Martin Lee	57	43	-14	+4	75
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	51	49	-2	-6	66
LP led by James Tien	56	44	-12	-20	59
Frontier led by Emily Lau	44	56	+12	+30	66
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	30	70	+40	+42	64
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	39	61	+22	+24	54
HKPA led by Ambrose Lau	65	35	-30	-34	35
Citizens Party led by Christine Loh	31	69	+38	+44	56
HKADPL led by Fredrick Fung	27	73	+46	+42	52
New Century Forum led by Ng Ching-fai	62	38	-24	Not asked	19

**Table 85 Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with parties and leaders (July 2001)**

	Dissat- -sified	Satis- -fied	Difference +/- July 2001	Difference +/- April 2001	Difference +/- April 2000	% who know about party
Dem. Party led by Martin Lee	58	42	-16	-18	-14	76
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	52	48	-4	0	-2	70
LP led by James Tien	54	46	-8	-14	-12	62
Frontier led by Emily Lau	49	51	+2	+6	+12	69
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	30	70	+40	+44	+40	68
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	40	60	+20	+32	+22	57
HKPA led by Ambrose Lau	63	37	-26	-24	-30	37
Citizens led by Alex Chan	49	51	+2	+12	+38	34
HKADPL led by F. Fung	21	79	+58	+58	+46	59
New Century Forum led by Ng Chingfai	50	50	0	-6	-24	25

**Table 86 Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with parties and leaders (Nov 2001)**


	Dissat- -sified	Satis- -fied	Difference +/- Nov 2001	Difference +/- July 2001	Difference +/- Apr 2001	% who know about party
Dem. Party led by Martin Lee	55	45	-10	-16	-18	69
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	52	48	-4	-4	0	64
LP led by James Tien	59	41	-19	-8	-14	62
Frontier led by Emily Lau	48	52	+4	+2	+6	65
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	31	69	+38	+40	+44	65
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	40	60	+20	+20	+32	59
HKPA led by Ambrose Lau	62	38	-24	-26	-24	40
Citizens led by Alex Chan	48	52	+4	+2	+12	26
HKADPL led by F. Fung	26	74	+48	+58	+58	57
New Century Forum led by Ng Chingfai	50	50	0	0	-6	30

Table 87 presents the summed results of the tables above, and charts the results in the line chart below. The Democratic Party has yet to recover fully from its disastrous year 2000. The Frontier has dropped as well from its 1999 peaks but still stays in positive territory. Since Ms Christine Loh stepped down from Legco and from chairing the Citizens Party, this small but

innovative group has sunk in esteem and fallen well down in the proportions knowing about the group. Most pro-government groups score in the negative, except for the FTU.

**Table 87 Differences in Satisfaction with parties between Nov 1999 and Nov 2001**

	Difference +/- Nov 2001	Difference +/- July 2001	Difference +/- Apr 2001	Difference +/- April 2000	Difference +/-Nov 99
Dem. Party led by Martin Lee	-10	-16	-18	-14	+4
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	-4	-4	0	-2	-6
LP led by James Tien	-19	-8	-14	-12	-20
Frontier led by Emily Lau	+4	+2	+6	+12	+30
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	+38	+40	+44	+40	+42
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	+20	+20	+32	+22	+24
HKPA led by Ambrose Lau	-24	-26	-24	-30	-34
Citizens led by Alex Chan	+4	+2	+12	+38	+44
HKADPL led by F. Fung	+48	+58	+58	+46	+42
New Century Forum led Ng Chingfai	0	0	-6	-24	--



Satisfaction or dissatisfaction levels with the pro-government DAB, HKPA, Liberal and FTU parties are associated with support or opposition to a second term for Tung Chee-hwa, with supporters of a second term more satisfied with these parties than with the anti-government Democratic, Frontier, and CTU parties.

Participation in groups with political representation or which work with government to provide social services continues largely unchanged, except that the drop in MAC participation appears confirmed by similar levels over the past year which are down significantly from 1998 levels.

**Table 88 Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following groups in the last six months? (Percentage reporting membership/attendance/doesn't add to 100)**

	1/ 98	4/ 98	7/ 98	10/ 98	7/ 99	11/ 99	4/ 00	8/ 00	11/ 00	4/ 01	11/ 01
Trade Union	6	5	8	5	5	6	8	5	6	4	5
Professional association	8	6	5	5	6	6	10	6	6	5	6
Kaifong	7	5	5	8	6	5	5	5	5	5	4
Mutual Aid Committee	15	13	11	10	8	8	9	9	6	7	6
Clan Association	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2	2
Political/pressure group	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2	2
Charitable Association	17	12	15	16	13	16	18	18	16	11	15
Recreational & cultural group	6	4	4	5	4	7	6	7	7	5	5
Religious group or church	20	18	18	20	15	16	21	17	19	17	19
Owner's corporation				12	11	12	14	12	14	13	11
Environmental group				5	3	4	5	5	5	4	5

However, while MAC activity appears down, other contact with governing structures and activities appears fairly steady, with a new question on District Council/District Officer contact indicating a fair amount of contact at the most basic levels, and donations to political parties appears steady at around 14%. While Hong Kongers appear despairing about the future and negative toward the government and its leaders, they do not appear to have given up on membership in and contact with various government and NGO bodies with political and social responsibilities.

**Table 89 Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past 12 months? (% Yes responses only)**

	7/ 96	2/ 97	6/ 97	1/ 98	4/ 98	10/ 98	4/ 99	7/ 99	11/ 99	4/ 00	8/ 00	11/ 00	4/ 01	11/ 01
Contact Government Dept.	8	10	10	13	10	12	13	10	12	17	14	12	11	11
Contact Direct Elected Legco rep. ("Ex-Legco representative" 1997)	7	6	6	3	3	5	6	6	4	5	4	6	6	4
Contact Legco Functional Repres.	1	2	1	--	--	1	4	2	3	3	2	3	3	1
Contact District Council/Dist officer														6
Contact Xinhua/China Adviser, NPC delegate	-	1	1	-	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	--	1	1
Contact Mass Media	5	6	5	6	5	6	6	5	6	6	4	5	3	3
Contact MAC/Kaifong/Unions	6	6	7	8	6	11	10	8	10	10	9	3	2	3
Contact pressure/pol. group	2	3	2	2	3	3	4	3	3	5	1	1	2	1
Demonstrate/protest	8	8	7	5	4	4	4	6	5	5	6	4	3	3
Signature Campaign	44	47	43	41	40	52	47	45	51	49	41	47	36	37
Opinion survey (exclude this)	32	29	33	37	37	48	44	40	47	46	41	46	39	37
Donate to pol. party	11	14	16	18	16	20	16	15	17	17	14	12	15	14

A question asked in the July 2001 specifically about consultation process indicated that 39% were dissatisfied with the government's current consultation process on policy issues, 31% were neutral, 24% satisfied and 7% didn't know about consultation processes.

**Table 90 Have you ever participated in a consultation on a government policy proposal by using any of the following forms of input? (July 2001)**

%	Response type
5	Wrote a response letter or fax on an issue
2	Member of a group which met with government officials
7	Telephoned / Sent an email on an issue
7	Contacted an elected member of LegCo or District Council about an issue
4	Contacted a political party or concern/pressure group about an issue
50	Signed a petition on a consultation issue
8	Joined a protest/demonstration about an issue
5	Wrote a letter to the Editor on an issue
5	Called Phone-in program on an issue

**Table 91 Do you think the government currently consults with interested groups and the public on policy issues too much, too little, or about the right amount? (July 2001)**

%	Group
-	Far too much
19	too much
18	right amount
44	too little
9	Far too little
11	DK

**Table 92 How seriously do you think the government takes public views in its consultation exercises? (July 2001)**

%	Group
1	Very serious consideration
22	Serious consideration
56	Not very serious consideration
10	No consideration at all
11	DK

Overall, the consultation process appears supported by about one in four, with about one in five feeling that too much consultation takes place while more than half (53%) feel too little consultation takes place. Two in three think that their views are given little weight.


## 8 Satisfaction with national leaders and policies

Besides the local leaders and parties in Hong Kong which have been considered above and will be examined more below, the question of national leaders and attitudes toward the national state of affairs and the conduct of the central government in Hong Kong affairs enters naturally into any examination of satisfaction with leaders, policies and parties. This is certainly the case more and more in Hong Kong since it has reunified with the mainland in mid-1997. Its citizens might be expected increasingly to assume greater interest in national affairs. As China's richest city and source of much investment on the mainland, the state of opinion toward the performance of the central government and of its leaders matters locally, nationally, and internationally. Since many Hong Kongers consider their Chief Executive to be heavily influenced by the central government leaders, their attitudes toward the local leader and toward the national leaders might

be expected to be linked in some manner. This appears clearly in Table 93, with a sharp drop in satisfaction with the SAR government in dealing with China during the “spy plane” incident in April. Respondents may have felt that the SAR took too little action to dampen the rampant nationalism from the mainland. But overall, the SAR government has scored poor marks in representing the SAR’s interests to the mainland over 2001.

**Table 93 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong Government (SAR government) in dealing with China?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 95	21	46	33
Sept 95	23	48	29
Feb 96	30	41	29
July 96	37	38	25
June 97	44	41	15
Jan 98	44	32	24
July 98	61	25	14
Oct 98	57	26	17
July 99	43	42	15
Nov 99	39	46	15
Apr 00	42	43	15
Aug 00	42	45	13
Nov 00	44	43	13
Apr 01	32	51	17
July 01	45	42	13
Nov 01	36	49	16




On the other hand, Hong Kongers are clearly more pleased with the way the central government rules the mainland.

**Table 94 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC Government in ruling China?**

Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
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1982-2007 **The Hong Kong Transition Project**

Feb 93	35	49	16
Aug 93	26	55	19
Feb 94	29	53	18
Aug 94	24	64	12
Feb 95	22	62	16
Sept 95	15	62	24
Feb 96	30	49	22
July 96	28	56	16
Feb 97	38	45	17
June 97	34	51	15
Jan 98	37	39	24
Apr 98	43	34	23
June 98	44	34	22
July 98	52	24	24
Oct 98	53	24	23
Apr 99	49	31	20
July 99	44	28	27
Nov 99	49	31	20
Apr 00	38	37	24
Aug 00	47	31	22
Nov 00	47	29	24
Apr 01	41	33	26
July 01	53	28	19
Nov 01	57	20	24




And Hong Kongers are far more satisfied with both President Jiang Zemin and Premier Zhu Rongji than any Hong Kong leader or party.

**Table 95. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the Chinese president Jiang Zemin?**

Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat	Somewhat	Very Satisfied	Don't
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1982-2007 **The Hong Kong Transition Project**

		dissatisfied	Satisfied		Know
July 98	2	6	70	9	14
Oct 98	--	10	66	7	16
Apr 99	2	9	61	7	21
July 99	1	10	57	9	23
Nov 99	2	11	63	7	18
Apr 00	3	11	62	5	18
Aug 00	3	9	58	5	24
Nov 00	7	19	53	6	15
Apr 01	4	16	53	5	23
July 01	2	14	62	6	15
Nov 01	2	14	61	7	15



Zhu Rongji's very satisfied levels are nearly as high as total satisfaction for Tung Chee-hwa. The problem with government in Hong Kong is not due to negative linkage with Central leaders.

**Table 96. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the Chinese premier Zhu Rongji?**

	Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Don't Know
July 98	1	5	62	18	14
Oct 98	--	4	53	24	18
Apr 99	1	5	49	33	13
July 99	1	5	55	27	13
Nov 99	1	4	61	21	13
Apr 00	1	7	56	21	14
Aug 00	2	5	57	20	17
Nov 00	1	6	58	25	10
Apr 01	1	6	56	22	15
July 01	1	4	58	26	11
Nov 01	1	5	53	30	11



**Table 97 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC government in dealing with Hong Kong affairs?**

Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
-----------	--------------	------------



1982-2007 **The Hong Kong Transition Project**

Aug 93	25	54	22
Feb 93	23	56	21
Aug 94	21	63	16
Feb 95	20	60	20
Sept 95	17	62	22
Feb 96	31	49	20
July 96	27	58	15
June 97	45	41	14
Jan 98	61	22	18
Apr 98	67	17	16
June 98	68	17	15
July 98	74	11	15
Oct 98	67	15	17
Apr 99	65	19	16
July 99	60	25	16
Nov 99	57	26	17
Apr 00	55	31	13
Aug 00	56	27	15
Nov 00	50	36	14
Apr 01	46	34	21
July 01	57	29	14
Nov 01	55	26	19



But while sentiments toward the central government and its leadership have improved, this has had little to no effect in changing fundamental feelings of Hong Kong people about National Day and about how they identify themselves, as Tables 98 and 99 show.

**Table 98 How does the celebration of 1<sup>st</sup> October National Day make you feel?**

	July 98	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Nov 00	Apr 01	Nov 01
Indifferent	70	62	54	58	52	51	53	55

Proud	7	8	10	12	12	9	11	12
Excited	8	7	10	7	12	8	8	7
Another public holiday	11	21	24	20	21	30	25	23
Uneasy/Unhappy	2	1	2	1	3	2	2	2
Refuse/DK	1	1	1	2	1	-	1	1

**Table 99. The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most appropriate description of you?**

	Chinese	HK Chinese	HK people	HK British	Overseas Chinese	Others
Feb 93	19	36	37	7		1
Aug 93	20	34	35	10		1
Feb 94	21	40	28	8		1
Aug 94	19	38	32	10		1
Feb 95	20	32	35	11		1
Aug 95	22	32	36	8		1
Feb 96	30	28	35	5		2
July 96	30	20	45	3		2
Feb 97	30	28	35	3	3	1
June 97	25	24	44	4	2	1
Jan 98	27	27	39	3	2	2
Apr 98	30	24	41	2	2	2
July 98	22	27	44	4	1	1
Oct 98	25	27	43	4	1	1
Apr 99	20	28	45	3	1	2
July 99	21	27	46	4	1	1
Nov 99	23	27	44	3	1	2
Apr 00	24	30	39	4	1	2
Aug 00	22	27	45	4	2	1
Nov 00	24	28	42	3	2	2
Apr 01	28	24	42	3	2	2
July 01	26	26	43	3	1	2
Nov 01	22	26	45	4	1	2

What may have been a slight rise in patriotic identity as Chinese in April 2001 with the spy plane incident with the US has clearly run its course. Hong Kong's identity, and Hong Konger's disaffections with their government and its leaders, stems primarily from internal factors, not external factors. If problems primarily arise from within, however, one must ask just how committed Hong Kongers are to stay here, given their historic propensity to leave Hong Kong for greater opportunity elsewhere, if and when greater opportunities elsewhere arose, or when Hong Kong's own situation turned unstable. Given the opinion climate, Hong Konger's assessments of Hong Kong's fundamental stability and their willingness to remain here are key.

## 9 Stability and Staying with Hong Kong

While there is some rise in concern about Hong Kong's political stability, and those very worried has hit an all time peak, overall levels are not as bad as they have been prior to reunification in 1997. However, as Chart B shows, the pattern of deterioration is clear.

**Table 100 How worried are you about: Hong Kong's political stability?**

	Not Worried	Slightly worried	Fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
--	-------------	------------------	----------------	--------------	----

1982-2007 **The Hong Kong Transition Project**

Nov 91	43	22	14	8	13
Feb 93	28	22	23	12	15
Aug 93	35	22	17	12	14
Feb 94	34	28	18	9	11
Aug 94	30	33	20	11	6
Feb 95	32	25	25	7	12
Sept 95	31	30	16	11	12
Feb 96	30	29	18	10	13
July 96	28	34	18	10	10
Dec 96	26	38	22	9	5
Feb 97	42	33	13	5	6
June 97	35	35	16	7	7
Jan 98	44	25	17	3	10
April 98	43	23	15	7	13
June 98	45	22	20	5	8
July 98	51	21	13	7	7
Oct 98	48	23	12	5	12
Apr 99	45	25	14	6	11
July 99	37	25	17	7	13
Nov 99	39	25	18	6	12
Apr 00	43	23	15	7	12
Aug 00	41	26	16	8	8
Nov 00	38	25	17	10	10
Apr 01	37	25	18	9	10
July 01	44	23	16	11	6
Nov 01	40	25	17	13	5

**Table 100 Chart A Worried about Hong Kong's political stability**





Chart B combines fairly/very worried levels and applies a bit of “chart theory” from financial research, to ask whether the levels of change in worries about political stability are beginning to set troubling patterns.

**Table 100 Chart B Worried about Hong Kong's political stability**



As Table 101 shows, fears about social unrest peaked in October 1998 when about 3 out of 4 were worried to one degree or another about the possibility of social unrest in Hong Kong, with 1 in 5 very worried. Since then worry about social unrest fluctuated, but the degree of very worried never regained the same 1 in 5 peak until the survey in November 2001. The overall degree of worry is still less than in October 1998, when 76% worried to one degree or another, to 67% today, but worry in the two highest categories, fairly/very worried, is up from 33% in July to 44% in November, a substantial increase.

**Table 101 Are you worried/not worried about social unrest in Hong Kong?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Oct 1998	21	27	30	19	3
April 1999	29	32	23	13	2
July 1999	35	29	22	10	3
Nov 1999	25	31	29	12	3
Apr 2000	41	29	19	11	1
Aug 2000	31	31	21	15	1
Nov 2000	41	28	17	14	1
Apr 2001	35	29	19	13	3
July 2001	39	25	20	13	2
<b>Nov 2001</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>1</b>

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**Table 101 Chart A Worry about social unrest in Hong Kong**





Table 101 shows that combined levels of worry are still less than in October 1998.

**Table 102 Worry about social unrest/collapsed categories (don't know dropped)**

	Not Worried	Worried
Oct 1998	21	76
April 1999	29	68
July 1999	35	61
Nov 1999	25	72
Apr 2000	41	59
Aug 2000	31	67
Nov 2000	41	59
Apr 2001	35	61
July 2001	39	58
<b>Nov 2001</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>67</b>



The objective possibility of social unrest must be assessed not just from public fears of its outbreak, but from overall contextual trends. Given the substantial increases in dissatisfaction with the Hong Kong government and its leaders as detailed above, dissatisfaction levels which exceed those experienced in October 1998 in many aspects, the potential for unrest must be considered higher today than even during the depth of the Asian Economic Crisis in 1998. This is particularly the case as Hong Kong enters an “election” process which contrasts poorly with either Taiwan or Singapore, both of which held elections during this Asia-wide sharp economic reversal. Singapore’s substantially greater efforts to reverse and moderate the effects of the economic downturn elicited considerable support at the polls, while Taiwan’s elections saw the KMT, which had opposed DPP reform efforts, lose its status as the largest party in the legislature for the first time ever. In Hong Kong, a manifestly highly dissatisfactory leader to the majority looks set to be returned with an overwhelming vote in the very unrepresentative 800 member Election Committee. Unlike the elections in Singapore and Taiwan, there will be neither a conferral of public approval nor legitimation by the voting exercise on the 24<sup>th</sup> of March 2001.

This leaves us with the question of how committed Hong Kongers are to stay here in the face of political frustration and economic troubles.

**Table 103 Would you leave or seek means to leave if changes are unsuitable to you after 1997? (Excludes those planning to leave.) Phrasing from Jan 1998: If HK is no longer suitable for you, would you seek means to leave HK?**

	Yes	No	Like to but can't	Don't know
Feb 93	50	35	8	7
Aug 93	43	38	9	10
Feb 94	45	42	6	7
Aug 94	40	44	10	6
Feb 95	41	37	7	8
Sept 95	48	34	8	8
Feb 96	40	40	8	12
July 96	44	39	8	9
Feb 97	45	42	8	5
June 97	41	44	9	6
Jan 98	38	53	4	5
July 98	43	49	3	6
Oct 98	42	46	4	8
July 99	40	48	5	7
Nov 99	44	43	8	4
Apr 00	58	26	9	7
Nov 00	46	40	10	4
Apr 01	43	44	9	4
July 01	46	47	4	3
<b>Nov 01</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>

Those willing to leave if unsuitable changes occur remains at about 4 in 10. We do not yet see a rise in willingness to leave, even though 48% of the November 2001 sample indicated they have family members and close relatives living abroad with right of abode, and even though 11% claimed they themselves had right of abode in another country. As Table 104 shows clearly, those with relatives abroad are more willing to leave than those without such contacts.

**Table 104 Have overseas relatives with right of abode by would seek means to leave HK**

	Have overseas ROA Relatives	Not have ROA Relatives	total
Would leave	49	35	42
Like to but can't	6	7	7
Not leave	41	53	47
DK	3	5	4
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 730  
 Chi-square = 15.94 with 3 df p = 0.0012

But clearly another factor has entered people's calculations, and that is whether Hong Kong's system is producing the goods and providing hope of improvement and opportunity as well as stability and great freedoms within the rule of law. As Table 105 shows, two thirds of those who did not want Tung Chee-hwa to have a second term are willing to leave, above the 61% total of the sample not wanting a second term.

**Table 105 Would seek means to leave by Want/Not want a second term**

	Not want	Neutral	Want	total
Would leave	66	19	15	100
Like to but can't	85	11	4	100
Not leave	52	25	23	100
Don't know	55	24	21	100
total	61	22	18	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total  
 Chi-square = 26.66 with 6 df p = 0.0002

But the like to but can't most strongly oppose a second term and least support a second term. These are also those who are likely to be most frustrated by a second term. This highly volatile group is about 55% women, and predominately in the 30s, 40s and 50s age groups, but does include a significant number of younger males, most with Form 3 or Form 4-5 educational levels. Those who would like to leave but can't also make up 8% of the working class and 7% of the lower-middle class, but only 2% of the middle class and none of the upper-middle class. These lower class, less educated young men cannot be expected just to leave quietly nor to stay trapped in increasingly difficult circumstances.

If the economic prospects and fortunes of Hong Kong fail to improve for these trapped, frustrated, less educated men, Hong Kong may very well see rises in social unrest, just as so many citizens fear. This is Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's greatest challenge, not to placate the communist denizens of Beijing, but to provide the educational and economic framework and the inspiring vision for those who feel increasingly left out of the decision making and increasingly left out of the money making. To date, as these survey results amply demonstrate, the elderly Chief Executive has failed to communicate and inspire the majority. He faces a second term with the great danger of having reduced credibility and legitimacy after an "uncontested election" just when internal and external circumstances pose their greatest challenge to the still in transition Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.

## Demographic profile of survey respondents

For survey methods see below. Some tables in this demographic profile of respondents include comparison with March 2001 census “Summary Results” (currently available). These census results are given so respondents can be compared with the whole community. The telephone survey was focused on those aged 18 and above who are members of a household (excludes domestic workers). While 99% of Hong Kongers have at least one land line telephone (about 80% have mobile phones as well), those who do not are poor. Elderly residents tend to be poor, live in shared premises with one common phone or one controlled by management, and have lower education levels; all factors which affect inclusion in the telephone survey. These older, poorer residents are underrepresented in the results, as may be seen in Table 4 below.

### 1. Are you a Permanent Resident of Hong Kong?

Group	Count	%
Yes	734	97
No	25	3

### 2. Were you born in Hong Kong?

All surveyed	Count	%	Permanent residents	Count	%
HK	520	69	HK	519	71
China	207	27	China	187	25
Elsewhere	32	4	Elsewhere	28	4

N=759

N=734

### \*Birthplace /Hong Kong Census:

Hong Kong	China	Elsewhere
59.7	32.5	7.8

\*Includes all ages and all persons normally resident in Hong Kong. The telephone survey excluded all below age 18 and excluded domestic workers. Adjusting the census sample to exclude resident domestic servants and the higher number of children born in China which have been admitted recently to Hong Kong puts HK born at about 65%, China born at about 30% (this is a rough adjustment, a better estimate can only be made when the full census reports released.)

### 3. Sex

Group	Count	%	HK 2001 Census
Male	375	49	49
Female	384	51	51

### 4. Age (for census comparative purposes)

Group	Count	%	*HK 2001 Census
18-24	121	16	12
25-34	141	19	21
35-44	243	33	26
45-54	137	18	18
55-64	47	7	9
65+	50	7	12

N=739 \*HK census figures adjusted to those aged 18 and above

The survey over-represents those 18-44 and under-represents those 55 and above. This is common in random sample telephone surveys in Hong Kong. Most of the 65+ are women with very low education levels since compulsory education for male and female was not required until 1971 and took several years to phase in. The 2001 census median (includes all ages) is 36. Median age of the sample is 39. The age table used in cross-tabs is calculated according to decades (those in their teens, those in their twenties, thirties, etc.). This is common sociological practice and facilitates life cycle comparisons. University students normally matriculate in local



universities between 19 and 25. Most enter the job market between ages 18 to 23. Age of first marriage averages from 27 to 29, depending on gender. First births for married women is in their thirties. Normal Hong Kong retirement age is 60. Analysis by decades rather than by census divisions makes more sense in the Hong Kong context and is closer to group age-experience norms.

**5. Age (for sociological analysis purposes) N=739**

Group	Count	%
18-19	54	7
20-29	131	18
30-39	196	27
40-49	196	27
50-59	89	12
60-69	50	7
70-87	23	3

**6. Marital Status N=759**

Group	Count	%	HK census
Not married	256	34	32
Married	486	64	59
Widowed	6	1	6
Divorced/separated	9	1	3

**7. Educational Attainment N=754**

Years of schooling	Count	%
None	35	5
Primary 1-6	96	13
F1-F2	48	6
F-3	86	11
F4/F-5 graduate	239	32
F-6/F-7 graduate/TC graduate/1 <sup>st</sup> yr Assoc.	81	11
University 1 <sup>st</sup> -3 <sup>rd</sup> year	29	4
University graduate	129	17
Masters/Ph.D. Degree	11	1

**8. Occupation N=740**

Group	Count	%
Managers & admin	42	6
Professionals	61	8
Assoc. Professionals	63	9
Clerks/Secretaries	90	12
Service & shop sales	76	10
Agriculture & fish	7	1
Craft workers	21	3
Plant & machine operators	52	7
Elementary occupations	34	5
Housewife	96	13
Retired	60	8
Unemployed	43	6
Student	65	9
Teachers	20	3
Other	10	1

**9. Employed (by sector)** N=459

Group	Count	%
Civil servant	28	6
Privatized public	40	9
Private sector	367	80
Non-profit	24	5

65% of the sample are employed in gainful employment.

**10. Type of living quarters** N = 696

Group	Count	%
Villa/Bungalow	4	1
Private residential block (own)	257	37
Private residential block (rent)	47	7
Home Ownership Scheme	108	16
Public Housing	224	32
Modern village house	9	1
Traditional village house	16	2
Temporary housing/hut	8	1
Employer provided quarters	16	2
Other	7	1

**11 Religious affiliation** N=759

Group	Count	%
None	368	48
Catholic	27	4
Protestant	111	15
Buddhist	71	9
Taoist	5	1
Ancestor worship	174	23
Other	3	--

**12 Self-ascribed social class** N= 723

Group	Count	%
Working	196	27
Lower-middle	230	32
Middle	254	35
Upper-middle	41	6
Upper	2	--

**11 Experience living outside HK 1 year or more** N=158

Group	Count	%
UK	22	14
US	8	5
Aust	15	9
Can	18	11
NZ	2	1
Singapore	5	3
PRC	64	41
Taiwan	10	6
Macao	5	3
Other	9	6

## Survey Methods

Those surveyed in November 2001 numbered 734 permanent residents and 25 residents without permanent residency rights aged 18 and up. Interviews were conducted by telephone in Cantonese, Mandarin, English, Hakka and Fujianese. Respondents were selected by random generation of final 4 digits of number dialed after random selection of initial exchange digits (first four digits) from latest directories. After determining number of people resident at the number aged 18 and up, respondent chosen to interview was made by use of Kish table in which final digit of number dialed and total number resident in the household embedded in a matrix of randomly generated possibilities. The Kish table below is the table used.

No. of people in the household

The last digit of the telephone number

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	0
1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2	1	1	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	2
3	3	2	2	1	2	2	3	1	1	3
4	1	4	2	3	3	2	1	4	2	4
5	5	2	1	1	3	2	4	3	5	4
6	1	6	2	6	4	5	3	2	4	5
7	2	3	5	5	7	4	6	6	1	7
8	7	2	3	4	8	6	5	7	8	1
9	6	7	4	2	1	9	8	5	3	9
10	4	5	8	7	9	3	2	1	6	10

Phone calls were made from 6 pm to 10:30-10:45 pm over weeknights, and from 2 pm to 10:30 pm on Saturday and Sunday, with scheduled callbacks for those who requested such. Up to 5 attempts were made per number or until a respondent was identified, nature of the number determined (fax, answer machines, business numbers discarded), or interview was refused. Completion rate of interviews once a respondent has been identified (in other words, we have attempted to reach the specific person indicated by the Kish table at a particular number) was 23% lower than the government's bimonthly survey completion rate in the low 40s, but still acceptable in terms of comparison with the comprehensive census data of March 2001.

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The latest survey was carried out by telephone interviews using the Hong Kong Baptist University CATI (Computer Aided Telephone Interviewing) lab. Details of the sampling methods may be found on the project website. The results of a survey of April's sample size, 830, can be assumed with 95% confidence to be subject to a sampling error of not more than plus or minus 3.7 % (rounded off to +/-4). The registered and non registered voter sample of 1487 is plus or minus 2.9. (usually only 1059 likely registrants used, with a plus or minus 3 rate). The June 1997

 **1982-2007 The Hong Kong Transition Project**

rate was +/-3%, July 1996 error rate is +/- 3.2% and the December 1996 rate is 5%. Following World Association of Public Opinion Research guidelines, all survey results are rounded off to the nearest whole number to avoid the impression of overprecision. Other surveys by the Hong Kong Transition project in this series used the same methods, with varying contact and completion rates.

N=	Nov	91	902										
	Feb	93	615	Aug	93	609							
	Feb	94	636	Aug	94	640							
	Feb	95	647	Aug	95	645							
	Feb	96	627	July	96	928							
	Dec	96	326										
	Feb	97	546	June	97	1,129							
	Jan	98	700	April	98	852	June 98	625	July 98	647	Oct 98	811	
	Apr	99	838	July	99	815	Nov 99	813					
	Apr	00	704	Aug	00	625;	Aug 00	1059	Oct 00	721	Nov 00	801	
	Apr	01	830	June	01	808	July (media )	831	July (party)	1029	Nov 01	759	

All Figures are in percentages unless otherwise stated All references should be to the Hong Kong Transition Project, which has project members at Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong University, and Academia Sinica. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via a competitive grant from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government and is a participating research project with the David C. Lam Institute of East-West Studies. None of the institutions mentioned above is responsible for any of the views expressed herein.

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All media releases, project briefings, current publication list, and occasional updates and special articles are put on the website. Public, media, and government (consulate) briefings are conducted at no charge.