

1982—2007



# The Hong Kong Transition Project

## Becoming China:

The public state of mind on Hong Kong's integration with the mainland

(April 2001)

A research report from a multi-national, multi-disciplinary, longitudinal research project of academics from Hong Kong University, Hong Kong Baptist University, Academia Sinica and East Asia University of Macau on Hong Kong's transition from British Royal Crown Colony to Special Administrative Region of the Peoples Republic of China and its people's transition from foreign subjects to citizens.

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Project Office: Hong Kong Baptist University, Government & International Studies

Tel: (852) 2339-5640, 2339-5644 /Fax: 2602-8206

{WebSite} <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp>

Members: Michael E. DeGolyer, Director (HKBU); Lo Shiu Hing (HKU); Janet Lee Scott (HKBU); Alfred Hu Ko Wei (Academia Sinica); Kenneth Chan Ka-Lok (HKBU); Newman M.K. Lam (EAU, Macau); Eilo Yu Wing-yat (HKU); Research Assistant: Cheung Pui Ki (HKBU)

Conflict between the United States and China over surveillance flights serves to underline the flip side of Hong Kong's advantages as China's richest, most internationalized, most successful

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trading entity. The advantages are numerous and often adduced. Hong Kong is already a WTO member, has a well-regulated stock-market and enjoys a highly advanced communications infrastructure. Many travel frequently abroad. A fairly high percentage speak English and/or mandarin as well as the local Cantonese. Hong Kong has some of the world's richest people. Hong Kong's businesses pursue commerce regionwide as well as globally. Most international firms have offices here. Its airport tops the world league for air cargo and ranks well up on passengers. The port is number one or two for container shipments. Trade from this tiny, thousand square kilometer base powers an economy larger than most countries. With an export/import trade over 500 billion USD per year, and a GDP of more than 170 billion USD, it holds over 100 billion USD in foreign reserves. Hong Kong's just under seven million people generate wealth equivalent to about a fifth of the rest of China put together; it equals roughly what 270 million mainland Chinese (a population the size of the US) produce.

The disadvantages of Hong Kong's nature and location have become more apparent since the 1 April incident. The disputed surveillance flights, made all along the China coast, take place in airspace over seaborne trade routes vital to Hong Kong's prosperity, if not survival. Besides pecuniary interests which involve the mainland and the US being Hong Kong's number one and number two import/export markets, there are considerable personal and family interests involved in any US-China conflict. Nearly half of Hong Kong people have close relatives with right of abode overseas, the lion's share in Canada and the US. About two thirds have mainland relatives and 15% relatives in Taiwan. Ten percent have overseas right of abode themselves. Much of Hong Kong's tourism involves mainlanders, Taiwanese and Americans. The US community living here is the largest non-military concentration outside US borders. US investment in and through Hong Kong to the rest of China amounts to scores of billions of US dollars. US warships, which regularly traverse the South China Sea, make Hong Kong a frequent port of call.

The recent events made one thing clear to every Hong Konger and any business person with interests affected by the China-US dispute: conflict curtailing the heavily used sea or air routes into and out of Hong Kong would have a catastrophic economic effect. Any dispute causing a breakdown in trade relations between the US and China would have severe economic and personal consequences for Hong Kongers. While a scattering of local people demonstrated outside the US consulate, the vast majority of Hong Kongers, despite being Chinese citizens, displayed very little of the emotions evident in the rest of China. One would expect that Hong Kong's recent return to the motherland after more than 150 years of colonialism would have witnessed a burst of patriotism. That did not happen.

The latest survey covered in this briefing began on the evening of 28 March, four days before the incident began, and concluded on the 4<sup>th</sup> of April, four days after it started but before the release of the American crew on 12 April. The survey in early November took place just after the vote of thanks on the Policy Address. The bump upward of optimism from August's record lows, just before the 2000 Legco election, has dissipated. Levels of optimism about Hong Kong's future stayed fairly steady through much of the economic downturn after an initial fall in 1998, but levels have dropped significantly since mid-2000, despite economic rebound.

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
**Table 1 How do you feel about 1997 and Hong Kong's reunion with China? (Feb and June 1997) Looking back over the first year of reunion, how do you feel about HK's prospects for the future as part of China? (July 98)**

**How do you feel currently about HK's future prospects as a part of China? (April 1999 on)**

	Feb 97	June 97	July 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01
Very Optimistic	7	6	6	5	5	4	5	3	5	4
Optimistic	55	54	41	37	35	36	37	27	33	26
Neither	30	32	30	33	33	39	33	40	38	41
Pessimistic	6	6	13	15	14	13	15	19	16	19
Very Pessimistic	–	1	4	2	4	4	2	3	4	5
DK	2	1	6	7	9	4	7	8	4	5

**Table 2 Collapsed categories—optimism about Hong Kong**

	Optimistic	Neither/DK	Pessimistic
Feb 97	62	32	6
June 97	60	33	7
July 98	47	36	17
Apr 99	42	40	17
July 99	40	42	18
Nov 99	40	43	17
Apr 00	42	40	17
Aug 00	30	48	22
Nov 00	38	42	20
Apr 01	30	46	24



While men consistently appear more optimistic about Hong Kong's future as a part of China than women, pessimism prevails equally between the sexes. And while optimism fell among both genders, its dropped more from November among men (10 percentage points) than among women (8 percentage points).

**Table 3 Hong Kong's future prospects by Sex (Apr 2001)**

	Male	Female	Total
Optimistic	35	23	30
Neutral/DK	40	53	47
Pessimistic	24	24	24
Total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 20.18 with 5 df p = 0.0012

**Table 4 Hong Kong's future prospects by Sex (Nov 2000)**

	Male	Female	Total
Optimistic	45	31	38
Neutral/DK	35	49	42
Pessimistic	20	20	20
Total	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 18.38 with 2 df p = 0.0001

Public opinion in April 2000 hit a post-handover low in satisfaction with the performance of the PRC government in ruling China following a good bit of sabre-rattling about the election of DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan in March. The heightened tensions with the US in April 2001 seem to have played a role in driving down satisfaction rates again after recovery in August and November 2000. But other reasons, closer to home, played a more important part.

**Table 5. Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC Government in ruling China?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 93	35	49	16
Aug 93	26	55	19
Feb 94	29	53	18
Aug 94	24	64	12
Feb 95	22	62	16
Sept 95	15	62	24
Feb 96	30	49	22
July 96	28	56	16
Feb 97	38	45	17
June 97	34	51	15
Jan 98	37	39	24
Apr 98	43	34	23
June 98	44	34	22
July 98	52	24	24
Oct 98	53	24	23
Apr 99	49	31	20
July 99	44	28	27
Nov 99	49	31	20
Apr 00	38	37	24
Aug 00	47	31	22
Nov 00	47	29	24
Apr 01	41	33	26

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
The reasons closer to home can be seen in the variations of the satisfaction rates of President Jiang. Dissatisfaction hit a peak in November, following the summoning of the Chief Secretary for Administration Anson Chan to Beijing for a very public dressing down (Chan’s performance ratings hit record heights in April 2001, see below), and the apparent deal-making over a second term for the mostly disliked Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa. That Beijing and ultimately President Jiang may have approved Ms Chan’s resignation may have also affected Jiang’s ratings. Nevertheless, President Jiang has a far higher approval rating than Chief Executive Tung. These local political events seem a more likely source for the drop in satisfaction with President Jiang than events in the South China Sea, as the satisfaction ratings for China’s handling of Hong Kong affairs will show below.

**Table 6. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the Chinese president Jiang Zemin?**

	Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Don't Know
July 98	2	6	70	9	14
Oct 98	--	10	66	7	16
Apr 99	2	9	61	7	21
July 99	1	10	57	9	23
Nov 99	2	11	63	7	18
Apr 00	3	11	62	5	18
Aug 00	3	9	58	5	24
Nov 00	7	19	53	6	15
<b>Apr 01</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>23</b>

**Table 7 Collapsed categories, Satisfaction with President Jiang**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	DK
July 98	8	79	14
Oct 98	10	73	16
Apr 99	11	68	21
July 99	11	68	21
Nov 99	13	70	18
Apr 00	14	67	18
Aug 00	12	63	24
Nov 00	26	59	15
<b>Apr 01</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>23</b>



Premier Zhu Rongji, on the other hand, has maintained his high ratings right along. His concentration on economic affairs such as WTO accession and in opening up China earn him ongoing accolades. Nevertheless, his more nationalistic-sounding comments of late, and perhaps his recently voiced support of a second term for Tung Chee-hwa, have cost him 5 percentage points in the satisfaction ratings since November (Jiang's did not drop since November).

**Table 8. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the Chinese premier Zhu Rongji?**


	Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Don't Know
July 98	1	5	62	18	14
Oct 98	--	4	53	24	18
Apr 99	1	5	49	33	13
July 99	1	5	55	27	13
Nov 99	1	4	61	21	13
Apr 00	1	7	56	21	14
Aug 00	2	5	57	20	17
Nov 00	1	6	58	25	10
<b>Apr 01</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>15</b>

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Proof that reasons for rising levels of dissatisfaction with President Jiang and the Chinese government lies closer to home rests in Table 9. Interference after August (Anson Chan's October chiding in Beijing, Jiang's November comments about Hong Kong journalists and rumours about deals for a second Tung term) sparked a 10 percentage point drop, below majority approval for the first time since the handover.

**Table 9 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRC government in dealing with Hong Kong affairs?**


	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Aug 93	25	54	22
Feb 93	23	56	21
Aug 94	21	63	16
Feb 95	20	60	20
Sept 95	17	62	22
Feb 96	31	49	20
July 96	27	58	15
June 97	45	41	14
Jan 98	61	22	18
Apr 98	67	17	16
June 98	68	17	15
July 98	74	11	15
Oct 98	67	15	17
Apr 99	65	19	16
July 99	60	25	16
Nov 99	57	26	17
Apr 00	55	31	13
Aug 00	56	27	15
Nov 00	50	36	14
Apr 01	46	34	21



The impact on Hong Konger's feelings about patriotism as expressed in attitudes toward China's National Day has been to see feelings of patriotism freeze at about the same level over the past three years after an initial rise. While those self-described as proud or excited in October 1998 stood at 15%, and rose to 24% in November 1999, it dropped back to 17% in November 2000 and fluctuated to 19% in April 2001 (samples of around 800 have a range of error of plus or minus 4 percentage points, thus more than four points change are needed to indicate a possible change in sentiments). There was no patriotic surge during the China-US confrontation.

**Table 10 How does the celebration of 1<sup>st</sup> October National Day make you feel?**

	July 98	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Nov 00	Apr 01
Indifferent	70	62	54	58	52	51	53
Proud	7	8	10	12	12	9	11
Excited	8	7	10	7	12	8	8
Another public holiday	11	21	24	20	21	30	25
Uneasy/Unhappy	2	1	2	1	3	2	2
Refuse/DK	1	1	1	2	1	-	1




The lower level of satisfaction with the central government seems to stem less from its own performance toward Hong Kong, per se, than with its support for and association with the Tung administration. So far, the appointment of Donald Tsang and Antony Leung have not helped the Tung administration recover public support (see satisfaction with government performance below, and with their respective appointments, below). While satisfaction with the performance of the central government in handling Hong Kong affairs dropped four points, (at the edge of statistical significance) satisfaction with the Hong Kong government's relations with the central government fell 12 points over the same time. And, for the first time since the handover, a possible majority said they were dissatisfied with the Hong Kong government's handling of mainland relations.



**Table 11 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the Hong Kong Government (SAR government) in dealing with China?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 95	21	46	33
Sept 95	23	48	29
Feb 96	30	41	29
July 96	37	38	25
June 97	44	41	15
Jan 98	44	32	24
July 98	61	25	14
Oct 98	57	26	17
July 99	43	42	15
Nov 99	39	46	15
Apr 00	42	43	15
Aug 00	42	45	13
Nov 00	44	43	13
Apr 01	32	51	17



### The complexity of Hong Kong-Mainland relations

Relations between Hong Kong and the mainland are more than just local-central government relations, of course. And while just under 90% of Hong Kongers are ethnically Chinese, fully a third do not have relatives on the mainland and a fifth of Hong Kongers say they have not crossed into the Chinese mainland in the previous two years. On the other hand, about 10% indicate they have relatives who commute from Macau, Shenzhen or Guangdong to Hong Kong for school or work on a regular basis. Some 17-21% (Nov. 2000 and April 2001) have traveled to China more than 10 times in the past two years.

When it comes to various measures to increase Hong Kong-mainland connections, support and opposition varies widely. Perhaps the most sensitive, and controversial, concerns the daily quota of mainlanders allowed into Hong Kong for settlement purposes. Currently, this quota is set at

150, up from the 75 per day allowed until shortly before the handover, and increased then only to handle the buildup of children and spouses of Hong Kong residents who were forced to live outside Hong Kong because they lacked right of abode in the SAR. The Right of Abode controversy over the children of SAR residents led to the first, very controversial reversal by the National Peoples Congress Standing Committee of the Court of Final Appeal in June 1999.

In early October 2000, in a post-election survey of 721 people, we asked: “The SAR government currently accepts 150 mainland migrants into HK every day. How many per day do you think is acceptable and desirable?” The average response was 72, about half the current quota. The range varied from 0 to 2,000 per day.

**Table 12 “The SAR government currently accepts 150 mainland migrants into HK every day. How many per day do you think is acceptable and desirable?” (Oct 2000) N=721**

0	10 or less	15-40	50	70 or less	75	100	150	200	250 to 2000
33	5	2	14	1	3	15	22	2	1

In sum, the responses show: Support for a number under present quota: 73%  
 Support for present quota: 22%  
 Support for more than present quota: 3%

By about 3 to 1 Hong Kongers prefer the present quota reduced, with a third wanting it eliminated. This result in early October led to further questions in November 2000 in a Post-Policy Address survey conducted just after debate and voting on the traditional Legco motion of thanks for the address by the Chief Executive. We classified those who paid a great deal and fair amount of attention to the address and debates as high, some attention as medium, and little to none as low. This degree of attention to Mr. Tung’s address, which included a number of statements about cross-border relations, was cross-tabbed with satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government’s performance in improving cross-border relations and travel.

**Table 13 Attention paid to Policy Address by satisfaction with performance of government on improving cross-border travel & cooperation (Nov 00)**

	High	Medium	Low	total
Very Satisfied	6	2	3	3
Satisfied	53	56	49	53
Neutral	11	16	12	14
Dissatisfied	19	17	16	17
Very Dissatisfied	7	2	6	4
Don’t Know	4	7	14	8
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


table contents: Percent of Column Total N=792  
 Chi-square = 32.38 with 10 df p = 0.0003

While 59% of those who paid a high level of attention to the Policy Address expressed satisfaction with cross-border efforts of the government, only 52% of those paying little to none expressed satisfaction, and while 26% of the high attention givers were dissatisfied, 22% of the

low attention givers felt the same. This showed a polarization among all groups, but particularly among those paying closer attention. After the extended proposals made by Financial Secretary Donald Tsang in his final Budget Address in March concerning expanding cross-border ties, we developed a question which explored Hong Kong-mainland relations in much more detail than ever before. The overall responses are reported below, in order of degree of support. Most of the proposals have majority support, except the one proposal the government has put first on its priority list, that which would encourage mainland professionals to move to Hong Kong.

**Table 14 Would you support or oppose the following steps to increase Hong Kong-mainland connections? (Apr 2001)**

	Support	Neutral	Oppose	DK
<b>Build hi-speed train to Guangzhou</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Introduce smart card visa/permit inspection</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Connect HK-Shenzhen MTR/Light rail lines</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Provide legal assistance to HK residents on mainland</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Provide HK education/healthcare to HK residents in some cities in Guangdong</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Open border 24 hours</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Provide scholarships to best mainland students &amp; allow to stay in Hong Kong</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Encourage mainland professionals to move to Hong Kong</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>4</b>



And perhaps nothing better illustrates the complexity of relations across the mainland-Hong Kong border than the crosstab below between responses to the question whether respondents had a relative who regularly commuted for work or school across the border (11% in April 2001) and their support for 24 hour border opening. While not surprisingly, 60% of those with commuting relatives wanted the borders open 24 hours, versus only 47% of those with no relatives in China, 30% of those with commuting relatives opposed 24 hour borders, significantly above the 25% of those with no relatives in China. Perhaps a good portion of those with relatives just across the border don't want to risk being subjected to visits from their mainland relations day and night.

**Table 15 Relatives commuting by support for: 24 hour border opening**

	Relatives commute	Relatives, not commute	No relatives	total
Strongly support	15	10	5	9
Support	45	39	42	41
Neutral	10	21	24	21
Oppose	23	19	19	20
Strongly oppose	7	7	6	7
Don't Know	0	3	3	3
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


table contents: Percent of Column Total N=825  
 Chi-square = 17.97 with 10 df p = 0.0556

The complexity of feelings and associations with the rest of China spills over into more personal self descriptions. Overall, there has been no real change in the level of those who describe themselves as simply Chinese since about 1996. This description has always been chosen by those who see themselves as more patriotic, and this descriptor is significantly correlated with a variety of measures of support for the central government and for the current Chief Executive. The choice of Hong Kong British, once chosen by about 10% of the survey sample, has now dropped to a consistent 3 to 4% of the respondents. Most of these are Chinese ethnics, not Caucasian expats from the UK. These number less than 20,000.

**Table 16. The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most appropriate description of you?**

	Chinese	HK Chinese	HK people	HK British	Overseas Chinese	Others
Feb 93	19	36	37	7		1
Aug 93	20	34	35	10		1
Feb 94	21	40	28	8		1
Aug 94	19	38	32	10		1
Feb 95	20	32	35	11		1
Aug 95	22	32	36	8		1
Feb 96	30	28	35	5		2
July 96	30	20	45	3		2
Feb 97	30	28	35	3	3	1
June 97	25	24	44	4	2	1
Jan 98	27	27	39	3	2	2
Apr 98	30	24	41	2	2	2
July 98	22	27	44	4	1	1
Oct 98	25	27	43	4	1	1
Apr 99	20	28	45	3	1	2
July 99	21	27	46	4	1	1
Nov 99	23	27	44	3	1	2
Apr 00	24	30	39	4	1	2
Aug 00	22	27	45	4	2	1
Nov 00	24	28	42	3	2	2
Apr 01	28	24	42	3	2	2

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But the apparent reality that only a distinct minority find association with China satisfying and stimulative of patriotism does not translate into stronger localism focused on the SAR government. About the same proportion, one in five, finds pride and excitement in the establishment of the SAR as in China's National Day.

**Table 17. How does the celebration of 1<sup>st</sup> July SAR Establishment Day make you feel?**


	July 98	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Nov 00	Apr 01
Indifferent	56	58	49	54	55	54	54
Proud	10	12	11	10	9	9	11
Excited	13	11	14	10	11	10	11
Another public holiday	12	16	21	22	20	24	20
Uneasy/unhappy	9	3	3	3	4	2	3
Refuse/DK	1	1	2	1	2	--	1

Hong Kong people, as dominantly either refugees themselves or the children of refugees, seem very instrumental in their attitudes toward life and government. While many people in other countries have in common the “what have you done for me lately” attitude toward government and parties, few have that attitude when it comes to their national loyalties and personal identities. But many Hong Kongers do seem to regard their affiliation with Hong Kong as optional, as something which could and should be changed if they become unsatisfied with life here. This provisional, temporary state of residency and local affiliation has been remarked on as part of the Hong Kong ethos during its colonial era. It shows little sign of change now, post-handover, even when Hong Kong's identity and national status have been fixed and its residents regarded as Chinese nationals, at least, officially if not always by themselves.

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**Table 18. Would you leave or seek means to leave if changes are unsuitable to you after 1997? (Excludes those planning to leave.) Phrasing from Jan 1998: If HK is no longer suitable for you, would you seek means to leave HK?**

	Yes	No	Like to but can't	Don't know
Feb 93	50	35	8	7
Aug 93	43	38	9	10
Feb 94	45	42	6	7
Aug 94	40	44	10	6
Feb 95	41	37	7	8
Sept 95	48	34	8	8
Feb 96	40	40	8	12
July 96	44	39	8	9
Feb 97	45	42	8	5
June 97	41	44	9	6
Jan 98	38	53	4	5
July 98	43	49	3	6
Oct 98	42	46	4	8
July 99	40	48	5	7
Nov 99	44	43	8	4
Apr 00	58	26	9	7
Nov 00	46	40	10	4
<b>Apr 01</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>4</b>




The remarkable rise in yes responses in April 2000 above was directly related to the prospect of violence across the Taiwan straits after the election of DPP President Chen in March 2000. The China-US conflict over the surveillance flights did not seem to shake people's determination to stay in Hong Kong nearly as much as possible Taiwan conflict did. Nevertheless, a remarkably high proportion of Hong Kong people report themselves ready to leave if circumstances change in some unsuitable manner. Increasingly, those reasons appear economic in nature, not political as pre-1997. Given Hong Kong's continuing economic malaise, at least as felt by the people themselves, such readiness to depart cannot be reassuring.

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**Table 19. What is the MAJOR change which you would find so unsuitable as to make you seek to leave? (of those responding Yes to question above)**

	Aug 93	Feb 94	Aug 94	Feb 95	Sept 95	Feb 96	Jul 96	Feb 97	June 97	Jan 98	Jul 98	Oct 98	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Nov 00	Apr 01
Pers standard/living	25	24	21	21	11	11	13	17	16	13	21	13	21	16	17	15	15
The way of Life (Freedom)	32	37	31	27	21	29	30	21	22	22	11	18	10	8	9	11	8
Family prospects	3	6	9	5	11	10	12	8	9	7	5	6	7	9	8	13	8
HK econ. prospect	6	7	7	5	17	21	18	21	18	22	21	21	25	26	23	23	32
HK pol stability	25	19	28	35	24	23	16	28	27	23	27	27	16	23	18	27	19
Corruption							5	3	4	5	1	2	1	2	2	2	1
Excessive pop. pollution													6	4	5	3	3
Other	6	5	2	0	5	2	2	2	3	4	8	5	2	2	3	2	3
Don't know	3	2	3	7	7	4	3	0	2	5	5	8	6	6	4	2	6




There appears to be a connection between feelings of overall optimism or pessimism about Hong Kong's future as a part of China, feelings on China's National Day and the SAR's Founding Day, and satisfaction with life in Hong Kong. And so the importance of people's satisfaction with life here, and with various aspects of the government takes on added importance, above and beyond that assumed in other countries. Significantly, never has satisfaction with life in Hong Kong been lower than in April 2001. The decrease in the proportion of those willing to leave from April 2000 directly relates to a lessening of prospects of war over Taiwan, not to an increase in commitment to Hong Kong or greater satisfaction with life and government here.

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**Table 20 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Nov 91	84	15	1
Feb 93	85	13	2
Aug 93	88	10	2
Feb 94	88	10	2
Aug 94	87	10	3
Feb 95	86	9	5
Sept 95	80	18	2
Feb 96	85	13	2
July 96	88	10	2
Feb 97	90	9	1
June 97	86	12	2
Jan 98	81	16	3
Apr 98	71	26	3
June 98	68	30	2
July 98	74	25	1
Oct 98	70	27	3
Apr 99	72	24	3
July 99	73	26	1
Nov 99	72	26	2
Apr 00	65	33	2
Aug 00	65	31	4
Nov 00	67	30	3
Apr 01	61	34	5



### Sources of dissatisfaction

Reasons for dissatisfaction with life in Hong Kong, as anywhere, are complex and multi-layered. As with anyplace, local government performance and leadership play some role in how people feel about where they live; in the case of Hong Kong, this plays perhaps a greater than normal




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role. The expectation promoted by the Hong Kong government is that satisfaction with its performance fell with the Asian economic crisis, and therefore it would rise as the economy recovers. There is, as yet, no support for this expectation, despite the economic rebound.

**Table 21 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the HK Government?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 93	60	31	9
Aug 93	57	28	15
Feb 94	58	28	14
Aug 94	56	30	14
Feb 95	43	35	22
Sep 95	46	45	9
Feb 96	60	26	15
July 96	67	21	11
Feb 97	73	20	7
June 97	66	27	7
Jan 98	51	35	4
Apr 98	48	41	12
June 98	37	56	7
July 98	42	49	9
Oct 98	42	48	10
April 99	46	43	11
July 99	40	52	7
Nov 99	41	51	8
Apr 00	39	53	8
Aug 00	30	61	4
Oct 00	31	62	6
Nov 00	35	58	7
Apr 01	32	58	10



The bases for dissatisfaction with government vary widely, but in order to get some idea about which issues are having the greatest effect on the ongoing disgruntlement with the government,

we asked for levels of satisfaction or dissatisfaction on a matrix of 15 issues. The issues are ranked below from most dissatisfied to least dissatisfied. Those who answer neutral usually have no preference either way or feel unaffected by the issue. Those answering don't know usually give this answer when unfamiliar with the issue. While three issues return clear majorities of dissatisfied, not a single issue of the fifteen mentioned returns a majority of satisfied.


**Table 22 How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the performance of the government on the following issues?**

	Very satisfied	Satisfied	Neutral	Dissatisfied	Very dissatisfied	DK
Reducing unemployment	2	10	16	43	30	4
Implementing education reforms	2	19	15	34	21	9
Reducing pollution in Hong Kong	2	25	12	39	16	5
Increasing supply of affordable housing	1	29	15	32	13	10
Improving medical services	3	33	13	33	12	6
Consulting with the public	1	27	18	33	9	12
Defending rights of Hkers on mainland	1	20	17	29	11	23
Caring for the elderly	3	40	14	29	10	4
Ensuring judicial independ & rule of law	2	29	17	26	10	16
Implementing civil service reform	2	29	19	24	8	18
Improving municipal services	2	38	21	25	6	9
Preparing to make all Legco seats directly elected	1	28	19	22	7	23
Considering tax reforms	1	28	25	21	6	19
Protecting human rights	2	40	23	20	5	11
Improving cross-border travel & cooperation	2	47	20	16	3	11

**Table 23 Collapsed categories (neutral and don't know removed)**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied
Reducing unemployment	12	73
Implementing education reforms	21	55
Reducing pollution in Hong Kong	27	55
Increasing supply of affordable housing	30	45
Improving medical services	36	45
Consulting with the public	28	42
Defending rights of Hkers on mainland	21	40
Caring for the elderly	43	39
Ensuring judicial independence & rule of law	31	36
Implementing civil service reform	31	32
Improving municipal services	40	31
Preparing to make all Legco seats directly elected	29	29
Considering tax reforms	29	27
Protecting human rights	42	25
Improving cross-border travel & cooperation	49	19

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


(Don't Knows and Neutrals removed; ranked by dissatisfaction)

These issues also translate into satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Chief Executive.

**Table 24 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of Chief Executive Tung?**

	Very Dissatisfied	Somewhat dissatisfied	Somewhat Satisfied	Very Satisfied	Don't Know
Feb 97	5	19	48	5	23
June 97	5	24	46	4	21
Jan 98	3	26	57	3	11
Apr 98	8	28	48	5	11
June 98	13	34	41	5	7
July 98	12	33	45	4	6
Oct 98	9	33	42	4	12
Apr 99	8	34	47	3	8
July 99	13	33	42	4	8
Nov 99	14	39	36	3	8
Apr 00	17	37	36	2	9
Aug 00	19	37	31	1	12
Oct 00	23	37	31	2	7
Nov 00	16	40	34	3	7
Apr 01	18	39	29	2	12



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The early resignation of Anson Chan as Chief Secretary for Administration and the appointment of Donald Tsang as her replacement, and of Antony Leung as Mr. Tsang's replacement as Financial Secretary rendered the following patterns of satisfaction and dissatisfaction.


**Table 25 Were you satisfied or dissatisfied with:**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Neutral	Satisfied	Very Satisfied	DK
<b>Early resignation of Anson Chan</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>
<b>Donald Tsang apt. as CS Admin</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Antony Leung apt. as Fin Sec</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>23</b>

While Donald Tsang's appointment garnered majority approval, it failed to help the overall levels of dissatisfaction with Tung Chee-hwa, which continues with a majority disapproving of his performance. Anson Chan's and Tsang's disapproval ratings dropped significantly.

**Table 26 Dissatisfaction with performance of top 4 HKSAR leaders**

	Jan 98	Apr 98	June 98	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01
<b>Tung</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>57</b>
<b>Chan</b>		<b>8</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>Tsang</b>		<b>16</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Leung</b>		<b>41</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>59</b>




And in terms of satisfaction with performance, both Tung Chee-hwa and Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung hit an all time low, while both Anson Chan and Donald Tsang hit all time highs. The conclusion must be drawn that dissatisfaction with the government stems from, and focuses

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on, the Chief Executive and the one person to date appointed to government from outside the civil service. The jury remains out on Antony Leung's contribution toward strengthening or weakening the administration.

**Table 27 Satisfaction with performance of top 4 HKSAR leaders**

	Jan 98	Apr 98	June 98	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01
<b>Tung</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>31</b>
<b>Chan</b>		77	71	70	81	74	67	61	73	76	85
<b>Tsang</b>		71	54	64	80	72	70	65	78	79	83
<b>Leung</b>		31	39	35	24	28	25	28	28	23	22



Bottom line, the problems with leadership in the government have resulted in strong support for making the Chief Executive directly elected. Those opposing direct elections are largely older males and those born in China.

**Table 28 Do you support or oppose direct election of the Chief Executive?**

	Strongly support	Support	Neutral	Oppose	Strongly oppose	DK
<b>April 2000</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Aug 00**</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>43</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Nov 00</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>April 01</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>

\*\*All registered voters surveyed in the August survey

And support for Tung Chee-hwa's bid for a second term remains weak, ranging between 18-24% over the past year. Not surprisingly, support rose shortly after the Policy Address in October (24%), but dropped back to 21% in April 2001.

**Table 29 Would you want to see Tung Chee-hwa running for a second term in 2002?**

	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	April 01
<b>Definitely not want</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>20</b>
<b>Would not</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>27</b>
<b>Neutral/DK</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>32</b>
<b>Would Want</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>19</b>
<b>Definitely would want</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>2</b>

In order to gauge whether people had clear ideas about who they might prefer over Mr. Tung, we asked a follow up question in April, with the following results ranked by preference.

**Table 30 Who would you prefer to stand for election in 2002 for Chief Executive?**

Choice	% All	HK born	China/other born
Don't Know	42	43	41
Tung Chee-hwa	22	17	29
Anson Chan	20	23	16
Donald Tsang	6	7	4
Other	4	4	4
Leung Chun-ying	1	--	1
Rita Fan	1	1	-
Peter Woo	1	1	1
Martin Lee	1	1	1
Christine Loh	1	1	2
Allen Lee Peng-fei	1	1	1

Despite Ms Chan's adamant insistence that she would not run for Chief Executive, and despite four years of being Chief Executive, statistically the two top officials come out in a dead heat. Those born in Hong Kong clearly prefer Ms Chan, those in China, Mr. Tung. Tung's support is mainly among those 60 and up. The clear winner, however, is Don't Know. And perhaps the contrast between the strong support for direct elections and the weak preferences shown above points up as little else the source of the disaffection with life in Hong Kong and with the government of Hong Kong.

## Worry and other states of mind


Concern for Hong Kong's economic future rose dramatically with the Asian economic crisis, and despite double-digit growth in 2000 and continued growth in 2001, worry for Hong Kong's economic future continues at a high level.

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The level of worry in April 2001 approaches that registered in April to June 1998, with a marked deterioration since November 2000. Neither Chinese New Year nor the budget delivered in March apparently gave many much hope for improvement.

**Table 31 How worried are you about: Hong Kong's economic prospects?**


	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Feb 93	37	23	23	10	7
Jul 93	42	24	18	7	9
Jan 94	49	26	13	7	5
Aug 94	40	33	16	8	3
Feb 95	44	26	18	6	6
Sept 95	42	26	16	10	6
Feb 96	39	29	17	8	7
July 96	42	31	15	7	5
Feb 97	52	27	12	5	4
June 97	53	26	13	5	3
Jan 98	28	31	24	13	4
Apr 98	28	27	25	17	4
June 98	20	23	30	27	1
July 98	29	26	23	19	2
Oct 98	30	28	22	16	3
Apr 99	33	27	20	16	3
July 99	30	27	21	19	3
Nov 99	32	28	23	14	3
Apr 00	35	31	18	14	3
Aug 00	31	28	22	15	3
Nov 00	28	29	22	19	3
Apr 01	21	29	26	22	3



There is usually a gap between worry about Hong Kong's economic prospects and worry about personal standards of living. The gap continues to the present. However, the level of concern about personal standard of living is about what it was in the depths of the Asian economic crisis in 1998.

**Table 32. How worried are you about : Personal standard of living?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Nov 91	56	23	12	5	4
Feb 93	45	21	19	10	5
Aug 93	47	27	14	8	4
Feb 94	51	29	13	5	1
Aug 94	44	38	12	5	1
Feb 95	50	26	15	6	3
Sept 95	48	26	14	9	3
Feb 96	47	29	13	7	4
July 96	44	34	12	7	3
Feb 97	49	36	10	2	2
June 97	47	36	11	5	1
Jan 98	42	30	18	8	1
Apr 98	40	29	19	11	1
June 98	34	28	24	14	1
July 98	49	22	18	10	1
Oct 98	45	27	15	11	1
Apr 99	48	28	15	8	1
July 99	49	23	17	9	1
Nov 99	47	28	14	9	2
Apr 00	46	24	16	12	2
Aug 00	42	27	16	13	2
Nov 00	48	25	14	11	1
Apr 01	41	24	16	17	1




The level of those worried about their employment situation has, if anything, gotten a bit worse than in 1998-1999, the worst of the recession. The distribution of concerns about jobs concentrates among those in their 40s, 50s and 60s, as Table 34 shows.



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**Table 33 Are you worried or not worried about your employment situation**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Oct 98	53	17	10	17	3
April 99	54	18	14	13	1
July 99	50	19	13	17	1
Nov 99	52	20	14	14	1
Apr 00	51	20	14	13	2
Aug 00	53	19	12	14	1
Nov 00	48	20	13	18	1
<b>Apr 01</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>3</b>



**Table 34 Age by Worry about employment situation**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Not worry	47	56	48	35	41	59	76	48
Slightly worried	20	24	26	24	14	4	2	20
Somewhat worried	16	13	12	15	19	4	2	13
Very worried	9	7	14	24	25	23	6	17
DK	9	0	1	2	1	9	14	3
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 818

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
Those in their 40s and 50s are also usually the age group which faces some of the heaviest economic burdens, with aged parents on the one hand and children in secondary school or seeking post-secondary education on the other. Many of these people also had much less access to education than today's younger people, and as a consequence are less well prepared to adjust to the economic disruptions ahead as Hong Kong adjusts its economy to the new post-handover, post-WTO China entry era.

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The bottom line in terms of family finances over the next year also shows deterioration from expectations in November. At that point, 74% expected improvement or to stay the same. In April 2001, 68% had the same expectations, and those anticipating deterioration rose from 21% in November to 26% in April 2001. This is not as bad as the 38% who expected worse times ahead in October 1998, but it marks the first reversal of expected improvement since then.

**Table 35. How do you expect your family financial situation to change over the next 12 months?**

	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01
Improve a lot	1	--	-	--	1	1	--	--
Improve somewhat	7	8	10	9	13	12	11	8
Stay same	47	57	52	62	58	60	63	60
Deteriorate somewhat	31	27	24	20	18	15	15	19
Deteriorate a lot	7	8	6	4	5	6	6	7
DK	7	4	7	5	5	6	4	5



The vast majority are worried, and nearly one in four very worried, about Hong Kong's competitiveness. Despite Donald Tsang's comments about improving Hong Kong's competitiveness, or perhaps because of them, concern has risen steeply, from 40% fairly/very worried in November to 49% fairly/very worried in April.

**Table 36 How worried are you about: competitiveness of Hong Kong?**


	Not Worried	Slightly worried	Fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
Nov 00	28	28	23	17	4
Apr 01	20	29	26	23	3

The concerns about the economy and Hong Kong's leadership, as well as about interference from Beijing or unintended damage by Beijing show up in the rising levels of concern about Hong Kong's political stability.

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**Table 37 How worried are you about: Hong Kong's political stability?**

	Not Worried	Slightly worried	Fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
Nov 91	43	22	14	8	13
Feb 93	28	22	23	12	15
Aug 93	35	22	17	12	14
Feb 94	34	28	18	9	11
Aug 94	30	33	20	11	6
Feb 95	32	25	25	7	12
Sept 95	31	30	16	11	12
Feb 96	30	29	18	10	13
July 96	28	34	18	10	10
Dec 96	26	38	22	9	5
Feb 97	42	33	13	5	6
June 97	35	35	16	7	7
Jan 98	44	25	17	3	10
April 98	43	23	15	7	13
June 98	45	22	20	5	8
July 98	51	21	13	7	7
Oct 98	48	23	12	5	12
Apr 99	45	25	14	6	11
July 99	37	25	17	7	13
Nov 99	39	25	18	6	12
Apr 00	43	23	15	7	12
Aug 00	41	26	16	8	8
Nov 00	38	25	17	10	10
Apr 01	37	25	18	9	10




Even one of the real post-handover success stories, control of what most had feared would be a wave of corruption coming in from China, has taken a hit due to the extended downturn and a

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number of recent stories about corruption in the civil service, in business, and even of Legco and District Council members.

**Table 38 How worried are you about: corruption in HK?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
July 96	22	26	23	22	6
Dec 96	11	25	29	31	4
Feb 97	20	31	24	17	7
June 97	20	28	28	21	3
Jan 98	43	25	17	9	6
Apr 98	42	24	16	12	7
June 98	46	24	18	9	4
July 98	52	20	14	9	4
Oct 98	53	23	12	6	6
July 99	54	22	12	6	6
Nov 99	48	21	17	9	6
Apr 00	53	20	13	10	4
Aug 00	46	23	17	9	5
Nov 00	50	24	13	9	4
Apr 01	44	25	13	11	6




In all the bad news about people's feelings which the results of this survey reflect, the one clear area of post-handover success has been the great lessening of worry people had pre-handover about threats to their personal freedoms. Despite the Falun Gong controversy and various comments by President Jiang about press freedoms in Hong Kong, and despite concerns about the rule of law (see below), the conviction remains that most personal freedoms continue unthreatened. However, as will be seen below, this general feeling that personal freedoms are secure is NOT reflected in certain specific freedoms such as freedom of press and speech.

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**Table 39 How worried are you about: Personal freedom in Hong Kong?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
Nov 91	56	23	11	6	3
Feb 93	44	21	20	10	4
Aug 93	43	28	16	9	4
Feb 94	46	28	16	8	2
Aug 94	37	38	14	9	1
Feb 95	44	26	18	8	4
Sept 95	50	23	12	12	3
Feb 96	43	29	16	9	4
July 96	41	34	15	8	2
Dec 96	42	35	12	7	4
Feb 97	48	31	14	5	2
June 97	45	34	13	7	1
Jan 98	63	21	11	3	2
Apr 98	66	18	11	4	2
June 98	70	15	9	4	1
July 98	74	13	9	4	1
Oct 98	74	16	6	3	2
Apr 99	72	17	7	3	1
July 99	70	15	9	4	2
Nov 99	66	19	9	4	1
Apr 00	62	20	10	5	3
Aug 00	64	19	9	5	3
Nov 00	71	18	7	4	1
Apr 01	70	17	7	5	1




When asked to rank their worry among six aspects, the economic aspect took number one, as its has since January 1998. This aspect is also up considerably from a year ago though its dominance is less than it was during the depths of the economic recession in mid-1998.

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**Table 40 Of the worried mentioned, which aspect worries you the most?**

	Living Standard	Security/ Freedom	Family prospect	HK Econ prospects	Political Stability	Corruption in HK	Gov't efficiency	DK
Feb 93	11	28	13	18	27			3
Aug 93	12	29	15	14	26			3
Feb 94	11	28	12	19	24			6
Aug 94	13	27	11	15	24			10
Feb 95	12	25	8	8	23		9	15
Sep 95	17	17	11	10	23		9	12
Feb 96	14	25	9	9	22		9	12
July 96	8	19	5	13	16	22	5	10
Dec 96	7	13	6	14	16	35	4	5
Feb 97	11	17	5	9	15	30	8	7
June 97	11	14	5	8	15	33	7	6
Jan 98	10	7	7	40	9	12	6	9
Apr 98	9	5	6	46	6	13	4	10
June 98	9	4	8	56	5	7	6	6
July 98	8	4	6	50	7	10	4	10
Oct 98	10	4	7	49	7	6	9	10
Apr 99	9	3	6	47	7	11	6	12
July 99	7	3	10	43	6	11	6	15
Nov 99	9	5	7	41	8	11	8	9
Apr 00	11	6	8	40	16	10		9
Aug 00	12	4	9	42	12	11		11
Nov 00	10	4	7	45	14	6		14
Apr 01	10	3	8	48	11	7		12



In order to get a better assessment of concerns about various types of freedoms we introduced a new matrix question in April 2001.

**Table 41 Are you currently worried or not worried about:**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	DK
<b>Free press</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Free speech</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>Free assembly</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Religious freedom</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>

The response patterns vary considerably from that given for worry about personal freedoms, showing that these issues are not always understood as related to personal freedoms. And there are important variations of concern within each aspect, as Table 42 on worry about religious freedom by religious affiliation shows. Protestants are much more likely to show concern about religious freedom than other groups, though about an equal portion of Buddhists and Protestants describe themselves as very worried about religious freedom. The Buddhist group seems to be a direct response to recent crackdowns on Falun Gong and other Buddhist sects.

**Table 42 Religion by worry about religious freedom**

	None	Catholic	Protestant	Buddhist	Taoist	Ancestor worship	Other	total
% of total sample	50	5	10	9	1	23	1	
Not worried	<b>63</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>61</b>
Slightly worried	<b>18</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>18</b>
Somewhat worried	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>8</b>
Very worried	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>22*</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>6</b>
DK	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 830 \*sample too small for reliable assessment  
Chi-square = 44.05 with 24 df p = 0.0075

Due to the Falun Gong controversy, we asked questions directly about the group, first about whether this is an issue to which people have paid much attention.

**Table 43 How much attention have you paid to the Falun Gong controversy?**

	A great deal	Some	Little	None	DK
<b>April 2001</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>4</b>

Most have paid little or no attention to the controversy, despite a great deal of press and governmental discussion. We then asked:

**Table 44 What steps, if any, should the Hong Kong government take toward Falun Gong?**

<b>No need to take steps</b>	<b>34</b>
<b>Observe and collect info on activities</b>	<b>35</b>
<b>Warn members only</b>	<b>3</b>
<b>Restrict public activities</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>Arrest/Jail members</b>	<b>--</b>
<b>DK/refuse to answer</b>	<b>15</b>

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Very few even wanted to restrict Falun Gong members' public activities and almost none would go so far as to arrest or jail members. Most saw no need to take steps or only supported collecting information on activities.

Concern about rule of law, which rose in August 2000, continued at the same level.

**Table 45 Are you worried or not worried about rule of law in Hong Kong**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
July 1999	55	23	13	5	4
April 2000	56	21	12	7	5
Aug 2000	39	27	18	12	4
Nov 2000	39	23	18	16	4
Apr 2001	37	26	17	13	7

Consistently with other responses, worry about social unrest, which had risen sharply during the election campaigning, then eased strongly in November 2000, rose again as concerns about the economy grew.

**Table 46 Are you worried/not worried about social unrest in Hong Kong?**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
Oct 1998	21	27	30	19	3
April 1999	29	32	23	13	2
July 1999	35	29	22	10	3
Nov 1999	25	31	29	12	3
Apr 2000	41	29	19	11	1
Aug 2000	31	31	21	15	1
Nov 2000	41	28	17	14	1
<b>Apr 2001</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>3</b>

Continuing very high, but easing somewhat, are worries about over-population.

**Table 47 Are you worried or not worried about excessive population**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
July 99	18	19	28	33	1
Nov 99	19	18	31	30	1
April 00	23	21	28	27	1
Aug 00	20	19	27	33	2
Nov 00	19	18	23	38	2
<b>Apr 01</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>3</b>

And concerns about pollution also continue very high, with 69% either fairly or very worried, though the highest level dropped from 52% very worried in November to 39% very worried in April. This is the one issue which consistently shows the highest degree of concern, and the least amount of satisfaction.



**Table 48 Are you worried or not worried about air and water pollution**

	Not Worried	slightly worried	fairly worried	Very Worried	Don't know
July 1999	6	18	34	35	4
Nov 1999	8	18	36	38	1
April 2000	5	14	31	48	1
Aug 2000	7	17	31	44	1
Nov 2000	7	16	25	52	1
Apr 2001	8	20	30	39	3

Overall, open ended worries continued to show that economic related issues dominate personal concerns.

**Table 49 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now personally?**

	Jan 98	Apr 98	Oct 98	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Nov 00	Apr 01
Economic growth rate	38	32	20	10	13	16	22	12
Affordable housing	8	4	2	2	1	1	1	2
Unemployment	11	27	47	48	31	40	32	40
Salary cuts, welfare cuts			5	4	6	6	4	4
Property, stock markets			4	2	3	3	2	3
Int'l competitiveness			2	3	3	2	2	2
Other econ.			4					1
<b>Economic Issues total</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>64</b>
Education	4	3	4	8	6	9	10	7
Elderly	5	5	3	2	3	2	2	4
Crime	6	5	2	4	6	4	2	3
Medical	2	1	1	1	2	-	2	2
Pollution/overpopulation	1	1	1	5	10	4	2	4
<b>Social Issues total</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>
Corruption	1	1	-	1	1	-	--	1
Political stability	5	4	2	2	4	5	4	2
Freedom of press	2	2	+	1	2	1	1	1
Freedom to demonstrate	2	1	+	1	1	+	1	1
Autonomy of HK	2	1	+	2	2	+		1
Fair judges/freedom to travel	3	3	+	3	1	2	1	--
Competence of Tung & civil servants	-	-	-	1	1	1	1	--
(all with + above)			2+			1+		
<b>Political Issues total</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>

Bottom line, unemployment and salary cuts which worried 46% in August dropped to 36% in November, but rose to 44% in April. As the poet said, perhaps April is the cruellest month.

## Measures of political mindsets and participation

One of the distinguishing characteristics of Hong Kong's system from that on the mainland is the existence of an incipient pluralistic party system. Tables 50 and 51 below show levels of knowledge about and satisfaction with the 10 parties which currently are active in Hong Kong political life. The furthest right column indicates the proportion which did NOT answer don't know (in other words, all those who had an opinion about a party. That means that the best known party, the Democratic Party, sparked an opinion among 75% of the respondents, while the New Century Forum was unknown by 81% of respondents. The don't knows were dropped and then those satisfied and unsatisfied were recalculated so that every party's results sum to 100%, though the portion of respondents differs considerably. The difference between those satisfied and dissatisfied, with dissatisfied majorities indicated with a negative sign ( - ), appear in the central columns. Table 50 compares results with November 1999 and April 2000. Table 51 between April 2000 and April 2001.

**Table 50. Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with parties and leaders (Apr 2000)**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Difference +/- April 2000	Difference +/- NOV 1999	% who know about party
Democratic Party led by Martin Lee	57	43	-14	+4	75
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	51	49	-2	-6	66
LP led by James Tien	56	44	-12	-20	59
Frontier led by Emily Lau	44	56	+12	+30	66
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	30	70	+40	+42	64
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	39	61	+22	+24	54
HKPA led by Ambrose Lau	65	35	-30	-34	35
Citizens Party led by Christine Loh	31	69	+38	+44	56
HKADPL led by Fredrick Fung	27	73	+46	+42	52
New Century Forum led by Ng Ching-fai	62	38	-24	Not asked	19

**Table 51. Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with parties and leaders (Apr 2001)**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	Difference +/- April 2001	Difference +/- April 2000	% who know about party
Democratic Party led by Martin Lee	59	41	-18	-14	71
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	50	50	0	-2	66
LP led by James Tien	57	43	-14	-12	58
Frontier led by Emily Lau	47	53	+6	+12	63
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	28	72	+44	+40	63
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	34	66	+32	+22	52
HKPA led by Ambrose Lau	62	38	-24	-30	36
Citizens Party led by Alex Chan	45	57	+12	+38	35
HKADPL led by Fredrick Fung	21	79	+58	+46	47
New Century Forum led by Ng Ching-fai	53	47	-6	-24	23

Table 51 indicates that the Democratic Party still suffers from the strongly negative image which saw a stunning plummet in its vote proportion in the September 2000 Legco elections. Meanwhile, the DAB has continued that slow growth in support which now leaves it with the largest positive gap between its support and that of the Democrats yet recorded. Frontier has also dropped considerably, to +6 in April 2001 from +30 in November 1999. The ADPL has risen considerably over the same time, showing that a strong political focus on economic and

social as well as local neighborhood issues meet the approval of many people. The New Century Forum has seen a rise in its profile and approval, though it still polls more negative than positive.

Table 52 shows the results of questions on what types of political dispute respondents find acceptable or not acceptable. Elections tend to raise levels of acceptance of the first five aspects listed, but to little affect the bottom four. The June 1998 results followed the May Legco elections by about two weeks while the April 2000 survey preceded the September 2000 elections by about five months. The April 2001 survey came about seven months since the September 2000 Legco elections and well before any upcoming elections in 2003. Familiarity breeds acceptance while lack of an election lessens support for pluralistic practices. Pluralism depends on building a proper political structure, and while Hong Kong has support for such structures and practices, their current incomplete state leaves them weakened.

**Table 52 Acceptability of political disputes**

	Acceptable June 1998	Acceptable Apr 2000	Acceptable Apr 2001
Multiparty competition in elections	85	78	73
Party debates in Legco	83	77	73
Disagreements between Exco & Legco	76	75	73
Arguments btwn party leaders on tv/radio	73	72	67
Street demonstrations & protests	72	67	63
Exco veto of Legco proposals	50	51	47
Lawmaker's use of harsh words in debate	50	52	49
Business group veto of grassroot proposals	34	39	40
Protests in Legco by non-Legco protestors	25	26	24

Participation in civil society organizations continues strong, as Table 53 shows.

**Table 53 Have you attended any meetings or activities of one of the following groups in the last six months? (Percentage reporting membership/attendance/doesn't add to 100)**

	1/98	4/98	7/98	10/98	7/99	11/99	4/00	8/00	11/00	4/01
Trade Union	6	5	8	5	5	6	8	5	6	4
Professional association	8	6	5	5	6	6	10	6	6	5
Kaifong	7	5	5	8	6	5	5	5	5	5
Mutual Aid Committee	15	13	11	10	8	8	9	9	6	7
Clan Association	3	2	3	3	2	2	2	3	2	2
Political/pressure group	1	1	2	1	1	1	2	1	2	2
Charitable Association	17	12	15	16	13	16	18	18	16	11
Recreational & cultural group	6	4	4	5	4	7	6	7	7	5
Religious group or church	20	18	18	20	15	16	21	17	19	17
Owner's corporation				12	11	12	14	12	14	13
Environmental group				5	3	4	5	5	5	4

And participation in terms of representative and participative structures, as listed below, continues strong, though the lack of electioneering shows up in the lower rates of activity for signature campaigns and opinion surveys. Nearly as many people contact Legco members for assistance as contact Government departments in November 2000 and April 2001. Donations to political parties remain strong.

**Table 54 Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past 12 months? (% Yes responses only)**

	7/ 96	2/ 97	6/ 97	1/ 98	4/ 98	10/ 98	4/ 99	7/ 99	11/ 99	4/ 00	8/ 00	11/0 0	4/ 01
Contact Government Dept.	8	10	10	13	10	12	13	10	12	17	14	12	11
Contact Direct Elected Legco rep. (“Ex-Legco representative” in 1997)	7	6	6	3	3	5	6	6	4	5	4	6	6
Contact Legco Functional Representative	1	2	1	--	--	1	4	2	3	3	2	3	3
Contact Prov. Legco member	--	1	1	1	2								
Contact Xinhua/China Adviser, NPC delegate	-	1	1	-	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	--	1
Contact Mass Media	5	6	5	6	5	6	6	5	6	6	4	5	3
Contact MAC/Kaifong/Unions	6	6	7	8	6	11	10	8	10	10	9	3	2
Contact pressure/pol. group	2	3	2	2	3	3	4	3	3	5	1	1	2
Demonstrate/protest	8	8	7	5	4	4	4	6	5	5	6	4	3
Signature Campaign	44	47	43	41	40	52	47	45	51	49	41	47	36
Opinion survey (exclude this)	32	29	33	37	37	48	44	40	47	46	41	46	39
Donate to pol. party	11	14	16	18	16	20	16	15	17	17	14	12	15

Hong Kongers, despite repeated descriptions as being politically apathetic, give the lie to such descriptions by the amount of time they spend watching or listening to news and current affairs programs, with fully a fourth qualifying as “news junkies” by spending more than 10 hours a week on such past times. An informed citizenry is basic to a healthy civil society.

**Table 55. How often do you listen to or watch any news and current affairs programs on radio and TV?**

	April 98	July 98	Oct 98	April 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Apr 01
Never	4	2	4	2	5	4	1	3	4
< 1 hr per week	5	7	7	6	9	11	8	8	8
1-3 hrs per week	23	21	24	28	25	25	29	31	26
4-6 hrs per week	20	24	24	24	21	20	23	20	20
7-10 hrs per week	17	18	17	17	17	18	18	17	18
> 10 hrs per week	31	29	24	23	23	22	20	21	24

And fully 9 out of 10 Hong Kongers read a newspaper on a regular basis. In fact, as Table 59 shows, many people read more than one newspaper a day on a regular basis. Newspaper readership is one more measure of the level of political information citizens act upon.

Table 56. How often do you read a newspaper?

	Oct 98	Apr 99	July 99	Nov 99	Apr 00	Aug 00	Apr 01
<b>Daily</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Several times a week</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Never</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>10</b>
<b>Don't know</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>--</b>

Comparatively, the grinding economic pressures have lessened people's reading of various sections of the newspaper as often as they did a year ago, perhaps due to increases in the workweek.

Table 57 How often do you read some or all of the following parts of the newspaper? (April 2000)

	Daily	Frequently	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
International affairs	<b>40</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>4</b>
China politics & news	<b>29</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>9</b>
Local politics & news	<b>43</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>2</b>
Op-ed pages	<b>21</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>13</b>
Business & market news	<b>22</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>17</b>

Table 58 How often do you read some or all of the following parts of the newspaper? (April 2001)

	Daily	Frequently	Sometimes	Seldom	Never
International affairs	<b>32</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5</b>
China politics & news	<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>7</b>
Local politics & news	<b>36</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>3</b>
Op-ed pages	<b>18</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>14</b>
Business & market news	<b>18</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>

Table 59 shows the distribution of newspapers read by respondents. The left wing press altogether barely reaches 1% of Hong Kongers. English readership ranges between 5 and 6%. Oriental Daily and Apple Daily dominate 86% of readers, though 54% read, or also read, other papers in addition to these two.

Table 59: Newspapers read (up to three selections allowed so does not sum to 100)

<b>48</b>	<b>Oriental Daily</b>
<b>38</b>	<b>Apple Daily</b>
<b>13</b>	<b>The Sun</b>
<b>12</b>	<b>Mingpao Daily</b>
<b>6</b>	<b>Sing Tao Daily</b>
<b>6</b>	<u>Hong Kong Economic Times</u>
<b>5</b>	<b>Singpao</b>
<b>3.5</b>	<b>South China Morning Post</b>
<b>3</b>	<u>Hong Kong Economic Journal</u>
<b>2</b>	<b>Hong Kong Daily News</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Others (Asian Wall Street Journal, Int'l Herald Tribune, etc.)</b>
<b>.5</b>	<b>Hong Kong iMail</b>
<b>1</b>	<b>China Daily, Tai Kung Pao, Wen Wei Pao</b>

## Discrimination and equality

One of the fundamental differences between politics based on Marxist-derived notions and those based on Western liberalism rests in definitions of equality and the concept of rights. Marxist-oriented states tend to define equality in terms of outcomes, usually economic outcomes. The concept of need or allocation of goods and services according to need ranks far higher than the adversarial notions of rights which dominate liberalism. This is the fundamental divide between the “two systems” of Hong Kong and the mainland. In Hong Kong, most people believe the state can and should be limited to mediating between disputants and to respecting and upholding rights of individuals. The terms of private engagements are stipulated in law with an eye to protecting, or allowing means to protect, human rights. These concepts of civil society and civil rights are increasingly fundamental to global interactions. As part of the WTO agreements, such processes of citizen and corporate interaction and restrictions on state power form the most difficult aspect of accession China faces.

They also pose problems to Hong Kong, for as a colonial entity the rights of individuals often were restricted by the colonial power for control purposes. And in the case of racial discrimination, first security considerations led to Europeans controlling the top offices; then the necessary process of localization led to Europeans being ousted from those positions, sometimes “unfairly”. Today, however, post-colonial and post-localization, Hong Kong faces pressures to conform to international liberal norms on a variety of human rights, especially those rights which affect minorities of various kinds. This is a fundamental aspect of citizenship development, and as such the HKTP introduced a new matrix to measure types of discrimination in Hong Kong. We asked, as indicated below (in order asked).

**Table 60 Have you/your family personally experienced or not experienced discrimination on account of:**

	Always experience	Frequently experience	Occasionally experience	Never experience	DK
Age	2	1	14	81	2
Gender	1	-	6	91	2
Race	1	1	6	91	1
Province/national birthplace	1	-	8	90	1
Sexual orientation	-	-	2	94	4*
Class/educational level	1	2	17	78	2
Political orientation	-	-	3	92	6*
Language/accent/dialect	1	-	10	86	2
Disability	-	1	4	94	2
Religion	-	-	1	97	2

The asterisked ( \* ) don't knows above which are much higher than 1-2% don't know average are more than likely indicators of the sensitive nature of the question and of reluctance to answer frankly. While Hong Kong has laws against gender discrimination, it does not against age and racial discrimination, areas which show equal or much greater need for legislation in terms of frequency of experience. And while discrimination against religious belief currently seems low,

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the concerns shown by some groups such as Protestants and Buddhists over religious freedom may indicate that this area may show a rise in future surveys. Since racial discrimination is one type of discrimination which always affects a minority but which in its pernicious effects infects a whole community, and since Hong Kong is so dependent on international trade and tourism, the lack of laws forbidding race discrimination seems anomalous, and self-defeating.

Hong Konger's overall state of mind? They seem confused about their place as part of the mainland but participants in the increasingly globalized wider world. The lack of consistent, legitimated, recognized leadership with a clear mandate and which practices interactive policy-making compounds the sense of drift and crisis. The Chief Executive election of 2002 may well prove decisive for Hong Kong's future, locking it into the slow decline so many predict and perceive, or renewing its sense of dynamism and outward drive.



Table 61 Gender distribution

Group	%
<b>Female</b>	<b>50</b>
<b>Male</b>	<b>50</b>

Table 62 Age distribution

Age	%
18-19	<b>6</b>
20-29	<b>16</b>
30-39	<b>26</b>
40-49	<b>26</b>
50-59	<b>11</b>
60-69	<b>8</b>
70-85	<b>6</b>

Table 63 Marital status

Status	%
Never married	<b>30</b>
Married	<b>67</b>
Widowed	<b>1</b>
Divorced	<b>2</b>

Table 64 Educational attainment

Years of schooling	%
None	<b>7</b>
Primary 1-6	<b>11</b>
F1-F2	<b>5</b>
F-3	<b>12</b>
F-4/T1 (Form 3)	<b>2</b>
F-5 graduate	<b>29</b>
F-6	<b>2</b>
F-7 graduate/TC graduate/1 <sup>st</sup> yr Assoc.	<b>10</b>
University 1 <sup>st</sup> -3 <sup>rd</sup> year	<b>2</b>
University graduate	<b>17</b>
Masters/Ph.D. Degree	<b>1</b>

### **Project Summary**

This longitudinal, multimethod project begun in February 1989 analyzes the nature and direction of political development over the period 1984-1997 and beyond the sovereignty change to 2007. Two elections in 2007-08, for Chief Executive and for the Legislative Council, will be the first conducted under rules laid down by Hong Kong people themselves. Thus 2007 marks the transition of Hong Kong people from colonial subjects to full citizens.

Aspects of political-economic development are examined through the identification and interview of politically active elites, social groups, and interest groups; in-depth social sector and random surveys; participant observation, and photo-validated visual observation of election campaigning. Project members currently are from Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong University, and Academia Sinica. Members are nationals from Hong Kong, Canada, US, and Taiwan, with past members also from Australia, Germany and the People's Republic of China.

### **Project Significance**

The significance lies in its longitudinal and in-depth documentation and analysis of the nature and direction of politics in a highly developed, highly educated and traditionally internationally-oriented capitalist Hong Kong which is within a unique situation of integration into a far less developed, less educationally endowed, and traditionally xenophobic socialist China, itself undergoing rapid, uneven modernization. Such a unique context of clashing political cultures in itself justifies close study, but of greater significance to the people of China and Hong Kong is the disproportionate impact that the economic and political behavior the 7 million people of Hong Kong are having on the modernization processes and international standing of their recent sovereign, the People's Republic of China. A detailed, documented, and longitudinal interdisciplinary study of political development in Hong Kong provides an invaluable database for understanding not only local political development but also the model which inspires, or challenges, that of key groups in the PRC.

CURRENT MEMBERS: Michael E. DeGolyer, Director (HKBU)  
Sonny S. H. Lo (HKU)  
Janet Lee Scott (HKBU)  
Alfred Hu Ko Wei (Academia Sinica)  
Kenneth Chan (HKBU)  
Newman Lam (U of Macau)  
Eilo Yu (HKU)  
Cheung Pui Ki (HKBU)





# 1982-2007 The Hong Kong Transition Project

Briefing written by: Michael E. DeGolyer

Survey analysis: Lo Shiu-hing, Hu Ko-wei, M. E. DeGolyer, Newman Lam, Janet Scott, Kenneth Chan.

Survey preparation: M.E. DeGolyer, Sonny S. H. Lo, Alfred K. W. Hu, Kenneth Chan, Janet Lee Scott, Newman Lam, Eilo Yu

Survey administrator: Cheung Pui-ki

The latest survey was carried out by telephone interviews using the Hong Kong Baptist University CATI (Computer Aided Telephone Interviewing) lab. Details of the sampling methods may be found on the project website. The results of a survey of April's sample size, 830, can be assumed with 95% confidence to be subject to a sampling error of not more than plus or minus 3.7 % (rounded off to +/-4). The registered and non registered voter sample of 1487 is plus or minus 2.9. (usually only 1059 likely registrants used, with a plus or minus 3 rate). The June 1997 rate was +/-3%, July 1996 error rate is +/- 3.2% and the December 1996 rate is 5%. Following World Association of Public Opinion Research guidelines, all survey results are rounded off to the nearest whole number to avoid the impression of overprecision. Other surveys by the Hong Kong Transition project in this series used the same methods, with varying contact and completion rates.

N=	Nov	91	902											
	Feb	93	615	Aug	93	609								
	Feb	94	636	Aug	94	640								
	Feb	95	647	Aug	95	645								
	Feb	96	627	July	96	928								
	Dec	96	326											
	Feb	97	546	June	97	1,129								
	Jan	98	700	April	98	852	June 98	625	July 98	647	Oct 98	811		
	Apr	99	838	July	99	815	Nov 99	813						
	Apr	00	704	Aug	00	625;	Aug 00	1059 registered	Oct 00	721	Nov 00	801		
	Apr	01	830											

All Figures are in percentages unless otherwise stated

All references should be to the Hong Kong Transition Project, which has project members at Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong University, and Academia Sinica. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via a competitive grant from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government and is a participating research project with the David C. Lam Institute of East-West Studies. None of the institutions mentioned above is responsible for any of the views expressed herein.

## Hong Kong Transition Project Contact Numbers:

Project Office 2339-5640  
 Project Director 2339-5644 (2602-8206)  
 Project Fax 2602-8206  
 Email address [hktp@hkbu.edu.hk](mailto:hktp@hkbu.edu.hk)  
 World Wide Web <http://www.hkbu.edu/~hktp>

All media releases, project briefings, current publication list, and occasional updates and special articles are put on the website. Public, media, and government (consulate) briefings are conducted at no charge.