

**‘FORMING OPINIONS MORE THOUGHTFULLY’
The first deliberative opinion poll in Hong Kong**

**First Report
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I. Introduction

In Hong Kong, opinion polls are commonly used in political, sociological and market research to gather measures of public attitudes. However, researchers and users of sample surveys have not paid adequate attention to the problem of ‘non-attitudes’, ‘opinions invented on the spot’, or ‘inconsistency in opinions’ in their findings. The problem is that respondents may not know the issues at question, or may not have considered them from different angles before they were polled. Few researchers venture very far into the less quantifiable aspects of underlying assumptions and latent values. Meanwhile, policy-makers and political leaders tend to be more concerned about shaping public opinion in the decision making process than about obtaining high quality information in citizens’ policy preferences.

The aim of this research project is to introduce and adapt a new method of public opinion research known as the Deliberative Opinion Poll (DOP) to Hong Kong. DOP seeks to combine deliberation in a small, focus group setting with scientific random sampling to provide public consultation on public policy and electoral issues. Participants in a DOP setting engage one another in the serious consideration of the pros and cons of a wide range of policy alternatives. In spite of its promising mixture of qualitative and quantitative methods, DOP has not been tried out before in Hong Kong. We therefore propose to carry out the first DOP (1) to demonstrate its viability, (2) to investigate whether and how it yields empirically identifiable results, and (3) to assess its strengths and shortcomings as a new research technique in local political and social research.

Theoretical and Literature Review

DOP is a rather new research technique in political science. Professor James S. Fishkin of the University of Texas at Austin first conceived it ten years ago in an article in the *Atlantic Monthly*. The idea was further developed in a seminal work, *Democracy and Deliberation: New Dimensions for Democratic Reforms*. In Fishkin’s words,

An ordinary opinion poll models what the public thinks, given how little it knows.
A deliberative opinion poll models what the public *would* think, if it had a more adequate chance to think about the question at issue (Fishkin, 1991:1).

It must be pointed out that deliberative polling is neither a matter of searching for *the* truth, nor a test of citizens’ knowledge on current issues. Rather, Fishkin’s idea is to provide respondents with a chance to become more informed about what is at stake. He convincingly argues that intensive, face-to-face deliberation will not only facilitate opinion formation, but will also contribute to stability and consistency in one’s beliefs. Furthermore, DOP includes in its procedure the familiar sampling methodology of conventional surveys to obtain a sample of respondents which is statistically representative of the entire population. In practice, respondents selected for the event are invited to attend a meeting lasting several days.

There is a strong normative aspect of deliberative polling, too. Political theorists and policy makers often stress the importance of an active, participatory and responsive citizenry (Elster 1998; King et. al. 1998; Melkers and Thomas, 1998). In this regard, advocates of DOP believe that the technique engenders authentic and meaningful public participation. What is more, it is important to explore ways to ensure not just accountability after decisions are made, but stronger consensus beforehand between leaders and citizens. A DOP can definitely provide citizens with the opportunity to have an impact on the policy process if it takes place before a key policy decision. In fact, Fishkin, a political philosopher by training, sees in deliberative polling a chance to bring a small-scale, participatory style of policy-making to modern, complex societies. The full case for

DOP was presented in *The Voice of the People: Public Opinion and Democracy* (Fishkin, 1995; also Dahl, 1989:340).

Fishkin once served as chief academic advisor to Station WETA in Washington, D.C., in an effort to carry out a DOP in the 1992 US presidential campaign. Funding difficulties forced them to abandon the event. But the idea was picked up by Britain's Channel 4 in 1994 for its *Power and the People* series, and the world's first DOP was carried out in Manchester, England with the focus on crime. Another DOP was completed successfully again in England a year later to examine public feelings toward the European Union. Two more DOPs were held in the ensuing years to study what people thought about the Monarchy and the key issues in the 1997 British General Election. Since 1988, there have been fourteen national DOPs in both the US and the UK, many more were held at the sub-national level in both countries and elsewhere. DOP has now become a major focus of public opinion research (Price and Neijens, 1998; Fishkin and Luskin, 1999; Smith and Wales, 1999).

To illustrate how deliberative polling is put into practice, the case of the first DOP in the United States is an appropriate case. In the 1996 presidential cycle, a national sample of 600 'delegates' representing the entire electorate took part in a National Issues Convention over four-day period at the University of Texas at Austin. The delegates were given the opportunity to discuss/debate certain issues in person with the candidates and with each other. They were polled before and after the event on their preferences on both the candidates and the key issues. The Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), the University of Texas at Austin and all ten national presidential libraries were among the organisers. The entire event was broadcast nationally.

Admittedly, DOPs are both costly and time-consuming. Moreover, participants face very high opportunity cost, as they are required to travel to a single site to take part in a DOP. To ensure a reasonable turnout rate, therefore, the participants normally receive a payment. Public perception of the importance of the issues for deliberation plays a role. It is self-evident that a high degree of issue salience and relevance will encourage a good deliberation atmosphere. Thus, it comes as no surprise that DOPs are usually held with a focus on issues of such fundamental importance as parliamentary and presidential elections, constitutional matters, a nation's identity problems, and the like.

The First DOP in Hong Kong: Issues, Methodology and Procedures

The above discussion is certainly relevant to Hong Kong as the government's conservative bureaucratic-elitist style of policy-making (Manuel, 1999) is increasingly under attack and Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa's popularity has been falling since he took office two years ago. The Asian financial turmoil and a bad economic recession have undermined confidence in the Special Administrative Region (SAR) authorities. Meanwhile, Government's proposals to reform the civil service, welfare and health care have encountered strong opposition. The decisions to abolish the two municipal councils and to re-introduce appointed members to the district boards did not win the Tung administration much acclaim either. Then came a controversial, quasi-constitutional justification to seek Beijing's approval to overrule the Court of Final Appeal decision on SAR right of abode. At the end of the day, one must turn to the issue of Tung's style of leadership in terms of his personality and vision.

Hong Kong's ruling elite and government officials have a duty to reconnect with the people. The government must therefore seek to engage a majority of citizens and must dispel the cynicism that is bringing the legitimacy of the SAR Government into doubt. This depends very much on how accurately officials perceive what people want. Moreover, the gap between the elite and the citizens will not be bridged without bringing genuine political opportunity and responsibility to communities and citizens themselves. However, while faster democratisation is a must in any serious effort to realise 'Hong Kong People Governing Hong Kong', the government thinks it is

right simply to follow the conservative timetable laid down in the Basic Law. It has also ruled out categorically any form of ministerial system of government in the foreseeable future. Meanwhile, conventional public consultation exercises are no longer regarded as adequate and reliable. Against this background, would deliberative polling, with its emphasis on deliberation and informed opinion, help to bring about both greater political participation and responsibilities for Hong Kong citizens?

On Sunday 25 April 1999 at Hong Kong University a representative group of Hong Kong citizens met for the day, first having been surveyed at length on three vital topics. They heard and questioned three panels of Hong Kong leaders and opinion formers on Hong Kong's economic performance and competitiveness, the rule of law and the Court of Final Appeal's decision on SAR right of abode, and government and party leadership toward the future. At the end of day, after deliberation and discussion among themselves, they were surveyed again on the same topics, to see if and how they have changed their views. But it is creating the motivation and the initial setting to make use of the technique in Hong Kong that was the real challenge for the research team.

The Fishkin model of deliberative polling had to be fine-tuned along the following lines to suit the unique social environment of Hong Kong and the purpose of this pilot study:

1. In the original DOP model, the mass media are involved as sponsors and programme producers. The entire event is filmed and then broadcast on national television. In Fishkin's view, 'the media could be expected to dramatise the process so much that most citizens would be glad of the opportunity to play a serious role in important historical events.' (Fishkin, 1991:9) In Hong Kong, however, it is doubtful if such a high degree of media involvement would facilitate free, interactive deliberation between the participants. However, as this was the first DOP, we decided to grant media access to all public sessions. Small-group discussions, however, were meant to be media-free.¹
2. Previous DOPs normally lasted for several days. For obvious reasons, this would not be feasible in Hong Kong. As a pilot study, we therefore proposed to organise a rather intensive 'Day Camp' which would still allow ample time and room for meaningful deliberation and interaction between participants (see Appendix 1 for the programme).² Also, though our participants were compensated for taking part in the event (travel expenses, lunch, refreshment and honorarium), we managed to keep the cost at a manageable level.
3. The original DOP model involves several hundred participants. In this pilot study, however, we started with a sample of 60 voting-age citizens. They were drawn from voluntary respondents of a Hong Kong Transition Project telephone survey in late October 1998. There is no doubt that the use of strict selection criteria improved upon purely voluntary attendance. The multi-step sampling method will

¹ Each participant was assigned randomly to one of the five small heterogeneous groups. Two moderators having been trained specifically for this project assisted all deliberation sessions. We obtained in advance participants' consent for photographic, video and tape recording. As it turned out, we were over-cautious about participants' reactions to the media. In fact, we discovered on the scene that our respondents did not seem to be bothered by the presence of the reporters, nor did the tape-recorders, cameras, or observers intimidate them. Thus, this restriction on media access was deliberately loosened and then quietly dropped.

² The choice of April 25 was by no means arbitrary. We checked with the Hong Kong Jockey Club early on to make sure that it was not a horse-racing Sunday.

be discussed in detail in the next part of this report. Suffice it to say at the moment that those chosen were able to reflect and draw on a diversity of backgrounds and experiences.

4. The requirement of issue relevance and salience would be crucial to the success of this pilot study. From our own surveys and observations, we gathered that Hong Kong citizens were then mostly concerned about (a) the issue of economic downturn and unemployment, (b) the rule of law and the issue of Hong Kong identity, and (c) political leadership. Naturally, these three subjects could serve as the organising themes of the event. To help reduce costs of information and to facilitate active interaction, we intended to follow the original DOP procedures in sending each participant a packet including carefully selected briefing materials. Moreover, participants were to engage in direct, face-to-face interaction with politically balanced teams of opinion leaders throughout the day.³
5. Finally, data from at least four surveys were employed for this research. In order to assess the impact of deliberation on the attitudes of the participants, all participants were polled before and after the April 25 event. Furthermore, we should compare the findings with those generated by the Hong Kong Transition Project telephone surveys which polled large samples of Hong Kong citizens in October 1998 (N=811) and April 1999 (N=838). Both computer-assisted telephone surveys therefore serve here as a baseline to measure the overall effect of deliberation on opinion formation.

What do we intend to find out with such a method? Hong Kong citizens are demanding a bigger say in the policy-making process and a faster pace of democratisation. If such calls are to be taken seriously, then it is important to reveal how Hong Kong people may interact among themselves with opinion leaders on crucial issues of our community and its future. Second, government always says that 'if people only knew the issues like we do, they would agree with our decisions.' A Deliberative Opinion Poll provides us with the necessary procedures to test that argument. Third, the three chosen topics are complex and multifaceted. If people are better informed through deliberation and interactions, then they may well change their views. This experiment will help us gauge how public opinion on key issues is currently formed and reformed.

³ Unfortunately, for reasons of time and postal delays, not all DOP participants studied the information prior to the event. Having said that, they were exposed to a wide range of opinions, viable policy options, and probable implications of each, provided by guest panelists in three separate public debate sections. Moreover, our respondents displayed a high level of political awareness in the surveys and in the small group discussions. Please see next section for more detail.

II. Sampling methods and characteristics of participants

Multi-step sampling method

As stated above, all DOP participants should be carefully selected in order to obtain true representatives of the population in Hong Kong. A telephone survey done by the Hong Kong Transition Project in October 1998 (N=811) obtained 146 respondents who showed initial interest in participating in the DOP research held in April, 1999. Most Deliberative Opinion Poll research studies emphasize the essential aspect of group size in facilitating the group discussion. We reckon that 8 to 12 respondents within a group is the optimal number for a sound discussion. With this in mind, we planned to have a sample of 60 voting-age citizens from the pool of 146 respondents. These 60 DOP participants would include 30 males and 30 females. They were randomly yet carefully selected with reference to Hong Kong demographic statistics (Table 1 and 2).

Table 1 Hong Kong People Demographic Statistics-age: (%)

	Age	Male	Female
I.	18-29	22	23
II.	30-49	48	47
III.	>=50	30	30

Note: Estimated Population by Sex and Age Group, *Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics January 1999*. P.3.

Table 2 Hong Kong People Demographic Statistics-education level: (%)

Education	Male	Female
I. primary or below	28	37
II. secondary	55	50
III. post-secondary, U.grad or Above	17	13

Note: Population by Age, Sex and Educational Attainment, *1996 Population By-census-Main Tables*, pp.62-63.

With reference to the age and educational distribution in the above tables, we were able to determine the numbers of males and females to be selected in the DOP (Table 3.1 and 3.2). Citing the case of males as an example, two males are needed in category <Age I and Education I> i.e. two male participants between 18 to 29 years old educated to primary level or lower.

Table 3.1 Numbers of male participants selected in specific category

Education	Age			Row total
	I	II	III	
I	2 (0)	4(2)	2(10)	8
II	4(20)	8(25)	5(7)	17
III	1(9)	2(12)	2(3)	5
Column total	7	14	9	30

Note: Numbers in brackets refer to those who satisfied the two conditions in the DOP database - 88 males out of 146 in total.

However, in reality no male participants could be found in category <Age I, Education I> in the DOP sample base of 146. In this event, we gave up the two cases in this category. By the same token, there were only two appropriate male participants available in the DOP database, who fitted the category <Age II Education I>. Thus, the total number of male participants was just 26 instead of the ideal target of 30 (Table 3.1).



Table 3.2 Numbers of female participants selected in specific category

Education	Age			Row total
	I	II	III	
I	3(0)	5(6)	3(9)	11
II	4(9)	7(16)	4(5)	15
III	1(4)	2(7)	1(2)	4
Column total	8	14	8	30

Note: Numbers in brackets refer to those who satisfied the two conditions in the DOP database - 58 males out of 146 in total.

Similar adjustments were made when selecting the female respondents. As no female participants were found in category <Age I Education I>, we did not have the three cases in this category. In that case, the total number of female participants here was just 27 instead of 30 (Table 3.2).

Invitations were made to citizens chosen to attend the forum scheduled for April 25,1999 at the University of Hong Kong. Of those invited, 27 of them showed further interest and confirmed their attendance. In order to widen such an opportunity for those who intended to come, the research assistant successfully contacted another 16 people in the pool of 146 DOP respondents who also met the criteria as stated above. The DOP group therefore contained 43 in total. In the end, 28 participants attended the DOP forum and completed and returned 28 pre-deliberation questionnaires (DOP I). But as one participant left the forum, only 27 post-deliberation (DOP II) questionnaires were collected at the end of forum.



Socio-economic characteristics of DOP respondents

Of those who attended the DOP forum, 44 per cent (12) were males while 56 per cent (15) were females. This is very different from the original sex ratio in the group of 146 potential respondents. Among the 146 respondents who expressed initial interest in attending the DOP forum, 60 per cent were males while 40 per cent were females.

The age of respondents varied from 19 to 57. Among the DOP group, 30 per cent belonged to the age group between 18 to 29, 41 per cent to the group between 30 to 49 and the remaining 29 per cent belonged to the age group of 50 or above.

With regard to the educational standard of the DOP respondents, 15 per cent had only primary education or below, while 63 per cent of them had attained secondary school. The remaining 22 per cent had university degrees or higher qualifications. Indeed this did not deviate very much from the figures found in the group of 146. Among the 146 respondents who expressed initial interest in attending the DOP forum, 19 per cent had only primary education or below, another 56 per cent had attained secondary school educational level and the remaining 25 per cent were university graduates or above.

Regarding the occupation of our respondents, 15 per cent said that they are in the category of Managers & Associate Professional. Another 27 per cent belonged to the category of service workers and clerical; 19 per cent were engaged in elementary occupations. Housewives accounted for 19 per cent of our group while 15 per cent were students and the remaining 4 per cent were unemployed.

Owing to the systematic sampling procedures, the final sample reflected the key features of the Hong Kong population in terms of educational background, occupation and sex ratio (Table 4). Although the higher education group was slightly over-represented, we were quite confident that our respondents represented a microcosm of Hong Kong society.

Table 4 Socio-economic characteristics of DOP respondents: (%)

	1999 HK People Demographic Statistics	DOP respondents (27)
Male	51	44
Female	49	56
Age I (18-29)	23	30
Age II (30-49)	47	41
Age III (>=50)	30	29
Education I (primary or below)	32	15
Education II (secondary)	53	63
Education III (post-secondary, U.Grad or above)	15	22

Note: Figures shown in the column of Hong Kong People Demographic Statistics were adopted from *1996 Population By-census-Main Tables, pp.62-63* and *Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics January 1999, p.3*.

III. Enhancing economic prosperity and competitiveness

Performance of the SAR government in running the Hong Kong Economy

Comparing the findings from different surveys, it is very interesting to note that DOP participants were more likely to describe themselves as well informed about politics (Table 5).

Table 5 Opinions on their political awareness among DOP participants

	Oct 98	146 respondents (%)	DOP I	DOP II	Apr 99
1. Not at all	3	3	0	0	3
2. Small extent	41	34	26	26	38
3. Fair extent	44	48	59	67	49
4. Great deal	10)54	14)62	11)70	7)74	9)58
5. Don't know	2	1	4	0	1
Total	100	100	100	100	100

Were DOP participants generally pessimistic and/or critical towards the SAR government in its running of the economy? In general, the DOP participants were inclined to express pessimistic opinions. They tended to be critical towards the economic performance of the SAR government. Also, they worried more about their personal living standard and financial situation when compared with those interviewed in the October 1998 and April 1999 telephone surveys. There was a 10 per cent increase between slightly worried to very worried as we compared the figures of DOP (I) and those of DOP (II) (Table 6). There was a 39 per cent increase between DOP (II) and the 98 Oct survey. This clearly showed that DOP participants tended to be more sensitive over changes in their living standard both before and after the forum was conducted. This tendency became more obvious in the post-deliberative opinion poll.

Table 6 How people worry about their personal standard of living?

	Oct 98	Apr 99 (%)	DOP I	DOP II
Not worried	46	48	18	8
Slightly worried	27	28	57	58
Somewhat worried	15	15	18	30
Very worried	11)53	8)51	7)82	4)92
Don't Know	1	1	0	0
Total:	100	100	100	100

When respondents were asked about their opinion towards Hong Kong's overall economic prospects, a more contrasting picture was obtained. Our findings showed that the more information DOP participants had, the more likely they were to express a pessimistic view on Hong Kong's economic prospects. In the end, an overwhelming 96 per cent of DOP participants said that they were worried about economic developments in Hong Kong (Table 7).

Table 7 How people worry about the Hong Kong's economic prospects?

	Oct 98	Apr 99 (%)	DOP I	DOP II
Not worried	30	33	18	4
Slightly worried	28	27	21	30
Somewhat worried	22	21	47	39
Very worried	17)67	16)64	14)82	27)96
Don't Know	3	3	0	0
Total:	100	100	100	100

When presented a list of worries (Table 8), a majority of the respondents chose economic prospects. Nevertheless, there was an obvious difference between DOP (I) and DOP (II). In DOP (I), only 39 per cent of respondents chose this particular option, while the next highest number of responses went to personal standard of living. In DOP (II), 54 per cent of respondents chose this option, while the next highest category was "corruption in Hong Kong". After the forum, respondents tended to think more about the negative impact of the economic downturn.

Table 8 Of the worries mentioned, which aspect worries you the most?

	Oct 98	Apr 99 (%)	DOP I	DOP II
Personal standard of living	10	9	14	8
Personal freedom in HK	4	3	7	8
Your family prospects in HK	7	6	11	4
HK's economic prospects	47	46	39	54
Efficiency of the SAR Government	7	6	11	4
Political stability of HK	6	7	7	7
Corruption in HK	9	11	11	15
Don't know	10	12	0	0
Total:	100	100	100	100

The most important area for government increase spending

Also, comparing the results of DOP (I) and DOP (II), another interesting finding is that respondents held different views concerning public spending priorities. In DOP (I), it was “primary & secondary education” and “Hi-technology” that came first, followed by “environmental protection” and “Comprehensive Social Security Assistance” (Table 9). After deliberation, “Hi-technology” ranked first, “primary & secondary education”, “public subsidized housing” and “medical services” became the next highest one. In the April 99 survey, the general public tended to focus more on primary and secondary education together with medical services provided by the government.

It seems that the DOP participants were concerned more about Hi-tech development after relevant scholars raised the issue, as they were increasingly concerned about Hong Kong’s international competitiveness. Not surprisingly, more people tended to think about the problem of employment and the negative growth rate (Table 10).

Table 9 The most important area for government to increase spending substantially

Items	Apr 99	DOP I (%)	DOP II
Transport infrastructure	3	7	4
CSSA-Comprehensive Social Security Assistance	8	11	4
Primary & Secondary education	22	19	15
University Education	5	4	0
Continuing education and job retraining	2	4	7
Environmental Protection	9	15	7
Public subsidized housing	10	7	15
Hi-tech investment	6	19	22
Medical services	21	7	15
Food Safety and public hygiene	2	0	0
Recreation/culture & other community services	2	0	0
Crime fighting	2	4	4
Expenditure on civil servants’ salaries & running	2	0	0
Others	6	3	7
Total	100	100	100

Table 10 Which problem of Hong Kong are you most concerned about now personally?

Items	DOP I (%)	DOP II
Salary cut	0	4
Welfare cuts	7	4
Negative growth	4	19
Business closings	7	4
Affordable housing	11	7
Property Market	3	4
HK International	18	22
Competitiveness		
Employment/ Unemployment	46	33
Political stability	0	3
Competence of Tung Chee	4	0
Hwa		
Total	100	100

The assessment of SAR economic policies

In terms of structural problems encountered by the economy, most DOP participants agreed that Hong Kong relied too much on the property market. The general view was that extremely high land prices, unbearable labour costs together with stock market speculation preceding the hand-over had had a devastating effect on the economy. Older DOP participants raised concerns about the decline of the manufacturing industry and the over-expansion of the service sectors, since such unbalanced economic development would slow down economic recovery from the financial crisis which happened last October.

Some young professionals attributed the current economic hardship to the Asian financial crisis. As one participant pointed out:

With an open and external oriented economy, Hong Kong would inevitably have an economic downturn as the conditions of other nations continued to deteriorate; no instant remedy is available to the SAR government for quickly reversing the situation, as the economic problem is too large and complicated. The best way to deal with economic difficulties is allowing the market to regulate itself.

Some participants believed that little could be done but to wait for the business cycle to come around. DOP participants of middle age attributed the problem to the educational system in Hong Kong as they believed that spoon-fed education and the conventional learning approach discouraged creativity in our young generation. As a middle-aged man point out:

Creativity and also the initiatives of young people will be the essential elements for Hong Kong to rebuild its economy.

Furthermore, they were unhappy to see the disappearance of family values and the lack of commitment towards our society.

With regard to the impact of economic recession on people's livelihood, DOP participants tended

to think that Hong Kong people would like to save money instead of spending, thus undermining the shrinking retailing sector further. Some participants feared that if the government was to put more money into social welfare the unemployed would be discouraged from finding jobs. They also expressed their concern about the soaring unemployment rate. One young lady feared that the high unemployment rate which existed among the younger generation might push up the crime rate and destabilise society. One woman believed that youngsters suffered from a low self-esteem because of their low paid jobs.

There were contrasting views in assessing the SAR government's performance in economic management. Concerning the recent economic and financial crises, there were two contending views. One participant said that the government should not have intervened into the stock market and it was now left with a very burdensome issue, i.e. when and how to sell government stocks without upsetting the market too much. A mainland respondent thought that the SAR government should go back to its former supervisory role and provide a free market environment for investors, rather than engaging in active economic interventions or large-scale infrastructure projects. Conversely, some held that the government was right to intervene in the stock market when it was too unstable. As one participant said:

The government should now conduct a territory-wide survey to ask the HK people what the government should do. It should also consult experts in the universities before setting its economic policies.

A young professional also put it in this way:

The high degree of flexibility and adaptability among Hong Kong people are two major reasons for the economic success under the colonial government. The SAR government has been unable to adapt to the quickly changing conditions after the sovereignty retrocession, especially when financial crisis was sweeping the Asian region.

One middle-aged woman said that the government should take a more aggressive role in drafting a plan for Hong Kong's future development. In the short term, the civil service system should be reviewed and the government should improve the efficiency and effectiveness of civil servants. A young lady suggested reforming the current curriculum. Nearly all participants agreed that the SAR government should take more action to initiate high-technology research and development projects. A young professional said that the government should establish a new fund for short term investment and create more job opportunities, and that the labour import scheme should be scaled down so as to allow local workers to take advantage of the jobs generated by infrastructure projects. Last but not least, most of DOP participants realised that Hong Kong people would have to learn new skills to strengthen their comparative competitiveness.

IV. The definition of a ‘Hongkonger’: controversies over right of abode and legal autonomy

The right of abode issue has vexed the SAR government ever since Hong Kong reverted to China. The long-drawn-out legal battle looked like finally coming to a close in late January 1999, when the Court of Final Appeal (CFA) ruled in favour of China-born children of Hong Kong permanent citizens. However, the 100-page ruling, which not only turned tens of thousands of mainland residents into Hong Kong citizens but also asserted the CFA’s role as the guardian of Hong Kong’s legal autonomy, instantly provoked criticisms from local pro-Beijing sectors and from mainland skeptics of the SAR’s common law tradition. The tension subsided but did not end with an unprecedented ‘clarification’ made by the CFA in February to acknowledge the supremacy of the National People’s Congress (NPC). In the ensuing months, the Government warned about an influx of migrants as a result of the CFA ruling and in May, officials came up with what they called a ‘rather conservative’ estimate of 1.67 million potential migrants whose arrival would cost HK\$710 billion. In the following month, the government succeeded in getting an interpretation of the Basic Law from the NPC Standing Committee in effect overturning the CFA ruling.

When the DOP took place in April, however, Hong Kong citizens were already nervous about the implications of the CFA decision for their living conditions and welfare. Given the difficult economic climate many people were suffering from, such reactions were understandable. Against this background, we asked DOP participants to reflect upon the more fundamental issues such as their self-identity (Q9-11, 16-17), their overseas connections (Q25-29), relations with their mainland compatriots (Q13-14, 20-21), their views on the prospects of China-Hong Kong relations (Q12, 23-24), as well as their sense of patriotism since the reunification less than two years previously (Q15). But inevitably the bone of contention in the deliberation remained whether and how the CFA ruling would affect Hong Kong society and the respondents personally (Q18-19, 32).

Hong Kong Identity

To start with, almost all DOP participants (96 per cent) are permanent residents of Hong Kong and most of them describe themselves as ‘Hongkongers’ (50 per cent) or ‘Hong Kong Chinese’ (21 per cent). Importantly, the local identity is strong despite the fact that almost 80 per cent have relatives or family members living in China and about one-fifth of them were actually born in Mainland China. Our survey also shows that misunderstanding and mistrust obstruct relations between mainland migrants and Hongkongers, lack of communication and stereotypes that are weakly articulated. For example, one participant tried to explain during the deliberative session that mainland migrants ‘might have an inferior complex and misinterpreted some of their experiences in Hong Kong as evidence of discrimination’. She then went on to complain about ‘being discriminated while working in a mainland-owned firm’. Some participants said that they worried that the newcomers would add a heavy burden to Hong Kong’s public spending, especially in the area of social welfare. Another participant, who is a mainland migrant himself, suggested that ‘*they* should simply learn the “Hong Kong way of living”’.

Ironically, equivocal manifestations of a Hong Kong identity do not bring about an equally strong sense of belonging or commitment to Hong Kong; only one-fourth would not want to leave if Hong Kong no longer guaranteed freedoms or economic prosperity. In fact, four DOP participants in every ten participants have relatives or family who have already emigrated from Hong Kong. Our respondents are neither optimistic nor pessimistic about Hong Kong’s prospects as part of China (more than 60 per cent), though admittedly there are many more optimists (around 20 per cent) than pessimists (7 per cent). Notably, they are rather indifferent toward the celebration of National Day or SAR Establishment Day, though the extra holidays are definitely

welcomed by most people. Some DOP participants observed that Hong Kong has become more Chinese and less westernized than before. Accordingly, they worried that Hong Kong might be less attractive than other major Chinese cities when it became a Chinese city itself. On the other hand, many held that as long as Hong Kong remains a free port where people can come and go freely, there is no deterioration of Hong Kong's international personality.

With regard to the above-mentioned elements of a 'Hong Kong identity', DOP participants do not differ in any significant ways from the respondents of the Transition Project surveys in October 1998 and April 1999 (see also DeGolyer, forthcoming). It should be noted, however, that DOP participants have a weaker sense of belonging to Hong Kong and appear to be less certain about Hong Kong's prospects as part of China (Table 11).

Table 11 Aspects of Hong Kong Identity

	Oct 98	DOP (%)	Apr 99
Permanent HK citizens	97	96	97
HK born	69	70	66
Mainland born	27	19	31
Relatives living in China	63	85	65
Self-identification:			
a. HK person	42	52	46
b. HK Chinese	26	22	20
HK's prospects as part of China:			
a. Very optimistic/optimistic	47	22	42
b. Neutral	31	63	33
d. Very pessimistic/pessimistic	16	7	17
e. Don't know or unknown	7	7	7
Leave if HK no longer suitable			
a. Yes	42	59	43
b. Would like but can't	4	26	6
c. No	45	15	45
d. Don't know/Can't say	9	0	7
Oct 1st National Day			
a. Proud/excited	16	15	19
b. Indifferent/just another holiday	83	85	78
July 1st SAR Day			
a. Proud/excited	24	27	26
b. Indifferent/just another holiday	73	73	70

Right of Abode Controversy

Turning to the right of abode controversy, while many of our participants found it difficult to grasp the legal aspects, they expressed serious worries about the impacts of the CFA ruling. Many actually shared their fear of the mass influx of Chinese migrants into Hong Kong; in particular, if the newcomers were too young, too old, or uneducated, they would be only a burden to Hong Kong society (Table 12).

Table 12 Are you or are you not worried that SAR Right of Abode Claimants on Mainland will cause problems in the following areas?
(1=not worry, 2=slightly worried, 3=somewhat worried 4=very worried, 5=don't know)

	DOPI (%)					DOPII (%)				
	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5
Crime	15	54	23	8	0	20	48	20	12	0
Traffic	30	41	19	10	0	8	54	30	8	0
Housing	4	33	33	30	0	0	19	54	27	0
Education	4	26	37	33	0	4	19	46	31	0
Welfare	7	26	19	48	0	8	27	39	27	0
Corruption	21	36	21	21	0	8	46	23	23	0
Medical service	7	19	41	33	0	11	15	37	37	0
Employment	0	26	30	44	0	4	16	44	36	0
Over-population	0	30	30	40	0	0	23	23	50	4
Pollution	22	22	22	33	0	0	35	31	35	0

What is more important for this research, however, is that there is some evidence that the deliberation process transformed initial policy preferences of the participants (which may be based on fear, self-interest, prejudice and so on) into carefully balanced policy proposals. One participant pithily summed up the dilemma he encountered:

I agree with the CFA's ruling because it was based on the stipulations of the Basic Law, but when taking the practical consequences of that ruling into account, the ruling was bad for Hong Kong.

In fact, the same dilemma was raised and debated in all focus groups. And there emerged a wide consensus among the respondents that Hong Kong would better protect herself by setting some criteria to screen the claimants before granting them the right of abode. But what surprised us most was that many participants accepted 'family reunion' to be a key criterion as well. Participants were deeply impressed by a powerful plea on behalf of the migrants by one of our guest panelists, Ms. Hung Ling Yu of the Catholic Commission of Justice and Peace. Other, more expected, criteria that DOP participants considered included: 'having the necessary skills or expertise that can benefit Hong Kong's economic development (employability)', 'being young and willing contribute to Hong Kong society for years to come', as well as 'willing to mix in and communicate with others'.

A number of DOP participants argued that claimants must go through proper procedures—that is, to remain in China before both the Hong Kong and Chinese authorities verified their applications according to the CFA ruling. Regarding the concern that corrupting practices of Chinese officials could easily bend rules and procedures (also attributable to Ms Hung), some participants suggested that the Hong Kong government should be involved in reviewing and approving applications.

In all, DOP participants now tend to see the right of abode issue from two different perspectives, one was 'humanitarian', the other; 'cost-benefit analysis'. It is an encouraging sign that both perspectives were examined thoroughly in the process of free deliberation. At the end of the day, even though the latter appeared to have gained an upper hand, DOP respondents were more willing to stand by the CFA ruling than most respondents of our April telephone survey. Likewise, they were far less impressed by the performance of the Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung (Table 13).

Table 13 Attitudes toward Court of Final Appeal Ruling/Satisfaction with Elsie Leung

	Oct 98	Apr 99 (%)	DOPI	DOPII
Heard of CFA Ruling	NA	87	85	94
Support or oppose CFA Ruling?	NA			
a. Strongly support/support	----	31	50	65
b. Neutral	----	13	18	19
c. Oppose/strongly oppose	----	51	32	16
d. Don't know	----	4	0	0
Secretary for Justice Performance				
a. Very/somewhat satisfied	35	24	25	11
b. Very/somewhat dissatisfied	29	58	71	85
c. Don't know	36	18	4	4

V. Government and party leadership toward Hong Kong's future

The third session was devoted to a number of related topics. Participants were invited to assess the performance of the SAR government and its key office-holders (Q39-42, 56), as well as the performance of parties and their leaders (Q48-54, 63-67). Next was their sense of political efficacy and their feeling about the political influence of various sectors in Hong Kong society (Q33, 43, 46-47). The pace of democratisation was the third focus which constituted the natural subject for more thorough discussion in the focus group (Q35-38, 57).

Government Besieged

On the one hand, Chief Executive Tung and his team did not seem to command much support or sympathy from DOP participants (Table 14). Although our moderators were trying their best to get a more balanced picture, few participants could think of anything positive to say about the government, yet everyone could think of something negative. It was commonly felt that the government has been making promises without knowing how to deliver them. On the other hand, DOP participants were happy to concede that Tung 'has tried hard', that he 'is okay', that he 'has not betrayed the Hong Kong people', and that 'some of the problems could not be blamed entirely on the SAR government'.

Table 14 Net Satisfaction (Satisfaction minus Dissatisfaction) with Performance of SARG and Top Officials

	Oct 98	Apr 99	DOPI	DOPII
	% Net satisfaction (Don't Know)			
HK Government	-6 (10)	+3 (11)	-1 (0)	-34 (0)
Chief Executive Tung Chee hwa	+4 (12)	+8 (8)	-25 (3)	-30 (4)
Chief Secretary Anson Chan	+54 (15)	+70 (8)	+44 (0)	+33 (0)
Financial Secretary Donald Tsang	+41 (14)	+68 (8)	+45 (4)	+45 (4)
Secretary for Justice Elsie Leung	+6 (36)	-34 (18)	-46 (4)	-74 (4)

Yet, many hoped that the Tung government could propound some sort of vision, coherent policies, long-term plans, and above all, leadership. Compared with the colonial administration, participants thought that the SAR government has not done well (Table 15). In particular, education, employment, housing, population control and relations with China are areas that they felt the government should focus on for improvement. To restore Hong Kong's prosperity was considered by all an urgent task. Many shared the view that his background helped the Chief Executive little to understand what the 'common' people think and what they need. Rather, they were quite concerned about the 'hidden' influence of business interests/tycoons on the administration in general and on Tung in particular (Table 16). One participant was disgruntled with Tung's failure 'to show enough concern for the interests of Hong Kong when dealing with the Chinese government'. Another complained that 'the government has not been doing what it should do and has been doing what it should not do', citing stock market intervention as example.

The issue of civil service reform, which was not surveyed this time, was nonetheless raised in the focus group discussion. Some participants argued that the government is too big and spent too much. For example, salary and benefits enjoyed by civil servants should not be so much higher than those in the private sector. The prolonged and complicated process of firing incompetent civil servants should also be simplified. However, a participant who himself is also a civil servant tried to explain why we should not rush through any reform proposals, especially when reforming the disciplined services.

Table 15 HKSARG versus the British Colonial Administration

	Jul 98	DOPI (%)	DOPII
Running the economy:			
a. Much better/better	9	7	4
b. Same	23	21	26
c. Worse/much worse	58	68	70
d. Don't know	9	4	0
Insuring quality of education:			
a. Much better/better	16	8	8
b. Same	35	39	22
c. Worse/much worse	38	53	70
d. Don't know	10	0	0
Improving people's livelihood:			
a. Much better/better	21	8	4
b. Same	38	36	26
c. Worse/much worse	35	56	68
d. Don't know	6	0	0
Protecting freedom of press:			
a. Much better/better	13	4	7
b. Same	43	57	67
c. Worse/much worse	36	39	26
d. Don't know	8	0	0

Table 16 Preferential Treatment?

	Apr 99	DOPI (%)	DOPII
Tung's communication with public in the past six months:			
a. Improved a lot/somewhat	29	35	37
b. Stay same	47	43	22
c. Deteriorated a lot/somewhat	17	18	37
d. Don't know/refuse to answer	7	4	4
Business people like Li Ka Shing's influence on Tung:			
a. Too much influence	46	48	56
b. Reasonable amount of influence	26	33	15
c. Very small amount of influence	13	11	15
d. No influence	4	0	4
e. Don't know	11	7	11

In Search of Alternative Leaders⁴

DOP participants generally did not feel well-informed about the workings of political parties. But at least the major obstacle facing the parties seemed to be well-understood: Parties do not have a big role in policy-making under the current system of government and politics. Among the major political parties, the Democratic Party was the one that received the best rating from DOP participants (Table 17). Nevertheless, few were convinced that the parties and their leaders were ready for power. As one participant pertinently remarked: ‘it is one thing for Martin Lee to look good by cracking a few jokes but it is a totally different thing to be a leader’.

From the above analysis, it follows that Hong Kong’s political elite, be they in power or in opposition, will have to do lots more to win over an electorate that is as difficult to please as one might expect to find under any democratic regime anywhere in the world.

Table 17 Net Satisfaction with Parties and Their Leaders

	Oct 98	Apr 99	DOPI	DOPII
	% Net satisfaction (Don’t Know)			
Democratic Party led by Martin Lee	+20 (22)	+11 (23)	+29 (7)	+48(7)
DAB led by Tsang Yok Tsing	-1 (33)	-10 (32)	-41 (15)	-89 (12)
Liberal Party led by Allen Lee/James Tien	-7.5 (36)	-24.6 (35)	-18 (15)	-50 (19)
Frontier led by Emily Lau	+26 (29)	+18 (28)	+7 (14)	+41 (15)
Citizens Party led by Christine Loh	+28 (40)	+28 (39)	+29 (21)	+52 (26)
HK Progressive Alliance led by Ambrose Lau	-10 (63)	-14 (60)	-30 (41)	-23 (54)
HK Association for Democracy and People’s Livelihood led by Fredrick Fung	NA	+22 (40)	+15 (26)	+52 (33)

Democratisation? Yes, But...

DOP participants overwhelmingly endorsed the idea of democracy as a matter of principle. However, in the discussion many became unsure how democratisation in Hong Kong should proceed. On the one hand, a majority wanted a fully elected legislature, from which functional constituencies should be removed altogether. They were also in favour of a more reasonable distribution of powers between the Chief Executive and the Legislative Council (Legco) by strengthening the latter. On the other hand, the number of those who wanted to speed up the pace of democratisation (i.e. full-scale direct election of all 60 Legco seats) actually decreased after deliberation. Table 18 shows that exactly a third of DOP participants (up from 18 per cent in the pre-deliberation poll) could not make up their mind about the pace of democratisation after deliberation, whilst those taking a gradualist stance remained consistent in the polls.

⁴ For reasons of time, participants’ voting behaviour, political identification and their attitudes toward political parties and party leaders were surveyed but only treated briefly in the deliberation sessions. For these and other significant issues we should definitely call a separate DOP to unravel the formation of party preference and ideological orientations of the Hong Kong electorate, as well as their attitudes toward electoral participation. One idea of course is to have a DOP in conjunction with the next Legislative Council elections in 2000.

Table 18 Attitudes toward the Pace of Democratization in Hong Kong

	Jun 98	DOPI (%)	DOPII
Should or should not the functional constituencies have the power to veto bills passed by a majority of directly elected members in Legco?			
a. Should	39	23	26
b. Should not	41	54	56
c. Don't know	20	23	18
Should or should not the Chief Executive have the power to veto a Legco bill passed by a majority in Legco			
a. Should	35	22	30
b. Should not	53	63	66
c. Don't know	12	15	4
Do you support or oppose functional constituency elections?			
a. Strongly support/support	42	29	19
b. Neutral	17	32	37
c. Strongly oppose/oppose	30	35	44
d. Don't know	11	4	0
Should the functional constituencies be replaced by direct elections?			
a. Yes	58	44	63
When?			
1. In next election	71	50	39
2. In 5 years	24	42	50
3. In 10 years	5	8	11
b. No	25	30	22
c. Don't know	17	26	15
According to the Basic Law, the first full-elected Legco may be created in 2007. In your opinion:			
a. This is too soon.		0	4
b. This is too late.		43	30
c. This target is appropriate.		39	33
d. Don't know		18	33

Why did DOP participants become more ambivalent in their views toward democratisation after deliberation? We submit that it is because DOP participants, who became more informed about politics and social issues in the discussions, realised that a directly elected legislature would not be a *panacea* for all their problems. More pertinently, elections will achieve little, some participants reasoned, if none of the parties were ready to govern. What is important in such harsh words is the very sensible view that democracy is not simply about election. True, 'one person, one vote' is undoubtedly a necessary condition for democratic government in our complex, modern society. Yet, democracy is also a form of government, which means in real terms that the quality of public policies in such a system will rely very much on the quality of the competing teams of political leaders. It goes without saying that this explanation, while very plausible, must still be subjected to more rigorous research in the future.

VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications

What did the first deliberative opinion poll accomplish? Fishkin and Luskin (1999:10) proposed four criteria against which the quality of such deliberation can be evaluated:

- (1) the completeness or incompleteness with which arguments offered by some participants are responded to by others;
- (2) the seriousness with which participants listen to the arguments or concerns expressed by other participants;
- (3) the accuracy of facts introduced into the discussion, either in the initial groundwork for the dialogue or during the process of deliberation itself; and
- (4) the extent to which the discussions allow all participants to have their say.

The findings presented here have demonstrated how DOP can influence individual and collective opinion formation in a positive manner. It is clear that there was a marked difference between the pre-deliberation preferences and judgements and those after deliberation. Of course, deliberation need not have any impact on public opinion, and we do not anticipate that deliberation must yield normatively superior results. That said, we did notice in the deliberative setting that ordinary citizens were able to inform themselves and take part in serious debates. From the moderators' reports we learn that our respondents spontaneously reflect on their own experiences in relation to the three 'big' issues in question. This helped the participants to clarify their thinking by spelling out the latent values and underlying assumptions behind their preferences. More importantly, they were encouraged to 'weigh and balance' the advantages and disadvantages between available options whenever possible. This research shows that our participants were not only able to express their initial views, but also to adjust their views following reasoned discussion. Deliberation thus helped to lessen 'bounded rationality' to a large extent. As a result, our research has yielded high quality opinions in terms of stability, consistency, and understanding and acceptance of a decision's consequences in most cases.

Turning to the practical implications of our experiment, DOP promises a better framework for citizen participation than the conventional channels of 'public' participation which, in our view, are hopelessly bureaucratized and elite-oriented. In such static and reactive processes, citizen participation is more symbolic than real. As a radical departure from the status quo, deliberative polling can be regarded as a new public consultation initiative to involve citizens in open, free, and equal exchange of ideas at any level or sector of policy-making. Arguably, government officials and political leaders should listen more carefully to informed public opinion.

Of equal importance, this project suggests new means whereby the government might seek public endorsement of policies and strategies to tackle key social, political and economic issues that confound Hong Kong citizens at large. Our respondents overwhelmingly endorsed deliberative polling as a desirable means to engender authentic public participation, as well as a problem-solving, conflict-resolving device. This is largely because the deliberative setting *encourages* mutual respect and empathy (putting oneself 'in everybody's place'), and is oriented toward the realisation of the common good (Rattila, 1999). For the SAR Government a more legitimate and trustworthy form of authority can be derived from the process of deliberation itself.

The SAR Government's recent effort to improve civil service performance in terms of efficiency and cost-effectiveness, however, may unwittingly exacerbate public cynicism and apathy toward the policy-making process. As one of our moderators reported from his focus group:

Participant B (female, middle-aged, recently finished a degree course at the Open University) felt that, compared with the colonial government, there were decreasing channels for the public to express their grievance to the government... Others shared her feeling... Some wondered whether the changes were caused by differences in administrative values between the current and colonial governments.

These Hong Kong citizens thought that the government has not done enough to increase citizen participation in policy-making (for example, see Q41g). Thus, to the extent that 'managerialism' turns civil servants into arrogant 'expert technicians and managers', citizen participation will become increasingly conflictual and judgmental rather than collaborative and interactive.

To sum up, institutional settings do matter. We proved that ordinary citizens could be serious about policy-making on the condition that they are provided with adequate channels of expression and appropriate incentives. What is more, DOP helps bring about a fuller conception of citizenship. On April 25 the participants became active citizens. It was an empowering process. Face-to-face interactions with the panelists effectively helped narrow the distance between the elite and the masses.⁵ Building a civil, deliberative policy-making environment is not only intrinsically desirable but also possible. Government, political parties and other public bodies in Hong Kong should consider such new techniques and procedures as deliberative opinion polls to enhance transparency, responsiveness and accountability in the decision making process. The first DOP on April 25, therefore, was not just an event, but the beginning of a process.

⁵ Legislative Councillor Ms. Cyd Ho's presence throughout the day not only reinforced our message that 'we are here to listen to what you have to say', but, as an unintended consequence, won her grouping, the Frontier, three times more votes, up from 7 per cent in the pre-deliberation poll, to 22 per cent in the post-deliberation poll. In terms of overall net satisfaction, Frontier's rating improved from +7 to +50! See Table 7 and Appendix 2 (Q51) for more detail.

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VIII. Photo Gallery

Citizen's Forum: Forming Opinions More Thoughtfully

Department of Politics and Public Administration
University of Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Transition Project
Hong Kong Baptist University

VIII. Photo Gallery

1999 Hong Kong Deliberative Opinion Poll



DOP Forum 1:

“Enhancing economic prosperity and competitiveness”

From left to right: Mr. Yau Sing-Mo, Ms. Cyd Ho Sau Lan and Dr. Newman Lam (Moderator).



DOP Forum 2:

“The definition of a Hongkonger: controversies over right of abode and legal autonomy”

From left to right: Prof. Lui Tai Lok, Dr. Raymond Wu, Dr. Sonny Lo (Moderator) and Ms. Hung Ling Yu.



DOP Forum 3:

“Government and party leadership toward HongKong’s future”

From left to right: Mr. Ma Lik, Mr. Martin Lee, Dr. Kenneth Chan (Moderator) and Ms. Ada Wong.



Dr. James Tang presented souvenirs to our guest speakers:
Ms. Cyd Ho Sau Lan (Frontier, Legislative Councillor) and Mr. Yau Sing-Mo (Hong Kong Economic Times)



Young Turks: Organizing Committee with Mr. Martin Lee (Legislative Councillor, Democratic Party Chairman).
From left to right:
Pui Ki, Tommy, Nelson, Mr. Martin Lee, Donis, Lawrence, Jean and Hong.



Think tank: DOP participants air their views in small group deliberation.



Happy ending: A round of applause to the organisers.



The path-setters: participants and organisers of the first DOP in Hong Kong

IX. Appendix 1

HONG KONG CITIZENS' JURY
“FORMING OPINIONS MORE THOUGHTFULLY”
APRIL 25, 1999
MING WAH COMPLEX T6, UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG

9:00am	Registration	
9:30am	Opening	
	<i>Dr. James Tang</i>	<i>Dr. Michael DeGolyer</i>
	<i>Head</i>	<i>Director</i>
	<i>Department of Politics &</i>	<i>Hong Kong Transition Project</i>
	<i>Public Administration</i>	<i>Hong Kong Baptist University</i>
	<i>University of Hong Kong</i>	
10:00am	First forum – “Enhancing economic prosperity and competitiveness”	
	<i>Ms. Cyd Ho Sau Lan</i>	<i>Mr. Yau Sing-Mo</i>
	<i>Frontier, Legislative Councillor</i>	<i>Hong Kong Economic Time</i>
11:00am	First small-group deliberation session	
12:00pm	Second forum – “The definition of a Hongkonger: controversies over right of abode and legal autonomy”	
	<i>Prof. Liu Tai Lok</i>	<i>Dr. Raymond Wu</i>
	<i>Department of Sociology</i>	<i>Basic Law Committee</i>
	<i>Chinese University of Hong Kong</i>	
	<i>Ms. Hung Ling Yu</i>	
	<i>Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace</i>	
1:00pm	Lunch	
2:00pm	Second small-group deliberation session	
3:00pm	Tea	
3:15pm	Third forum – “Government and party leadership toward HongKong’s future”	
	<i>Mr. Martin Lee</i>	<i>Mr. Ma Lik</i>
	<i>Legislative Councillor</i>	<i>Deputy, National People’s</i>
	<i>Democratic Party Chairman</i>	<i>Congress</i>
	<i>Ms. Ada Wong</i>	
	<i>Member, Provisional Urban Council</i>	
4:15pm	Third small-group deliberation session	
5:15pm	Post-deliberation poll	
5:45pm	Questions and feedback from participants	
6:00pm	Closing	

香港公民論壇『一項從市民議政到民意形成的研究』
一九九九年四月二十五日（星期日）
香港大學校園<程序>

上午

9:00 a.m.

與會者進場及登記入座

9:30 a.m.

主辦機構代表致歡迎辭，並介紹本研究的目的

香港大學政治及公共行政學系主任

鄧特抗教授

香港過渡期研究計劃總監

戴高禮教授

10:00a.m.

論壇一：

<經濟政策多面睇：如何促進香港繁榮及競爭力>

主持：香港大學林明基博士

11:00a.m.

分組討論

12:00a.m.

論壇二：

<誰是香港人？從入境權問題到司法自主爭論>

主持：香港大學盧兆興博士

下午

1:00 p.m.

午膳

2:00 p.m.

分組討論

3:00 p.m.

小息（下午茶）

3:15 p.m.

論壇三：

<港人治港：政府、政黨及地區領袖如何面向未來>

主持：浸會大學陳家洛博士

4:15 p.m.

分組討論

5:15 p.m.

問卷調查

與會者自由發言

6:00 p.m.

閉幕及致謝辭

IX. Appendix 2

Citizens' Forum:
Forming Opinions More Thoughtfully

**Department of Politics and Public Administration
University of Hong Kong
The Hong Kong Transition Project,
Hong Kong Baptist University**

**DOP Respondent Questionnaire
25 April 1999**

IX. Appendix 3

論壇一：經濟政策多面睇

討論大綱:

- 1) 香港經濟表現欠佳，從整體角度看，到底我們的經濟結構出了什麼問題？
- 2) 就一般市民而言，經濟衰退為日常生活帶來什麼影響和憂慮？
- 3) 您覺得特區政府在經濟管理方面的表現如何？
- 4) 您認為政府應在幫助經濟復甦方面扮演什麼角色，負起什麼責任，採取什麼具體措施？一般市民又可以做什麼？

論壇二：誰是香港人？

討論大綱:

- 1) 香港經常被形容為『華洋雜處，中西文化薈萃』的國際性都會。這個形象有沒有因回歸后中港關係的發展有所改變？
- 2) 您覺得香港人跟國內的人民是否仍有很深的隔膜或誤解？為什麼？
- 3) 中國大陸人民申請來港定居，您覺得他們要符合那些資格？
- 4) 目前香港終審庭就香港永久居民身份問題所作的判決，是否符合您的想法？
- 5) 您覺得要成為『香港人』最重要的條件是什麼？

論壇三：港人治港：政府、政黨及地區領袖如何面向未來？

討論大綱:

- 1) 面對回歸以來的各種困難，您怎樣評價特區政府的領導班子的表現？具體來說，他們有什麼做得好，又在那方面做得不好？
- 2) 香港的政黨表現如何？您認為政黨及它們的領袖有管治香港的能力嗎？
- 3) 您接受特區政府取消兩個市政局及恢復地區議會委任議席的決定嗎？
- 4) 您覺得回歸以來香港的政制發展經歷了民主倒退？還是符合中港情況的民主步伐？
- 5) 就政治發展和行政改革兩方面，您對政府有什麼要求嗎？