

# Listening

to the wisdom of the masses

Hong Kong people's attitudes toward constitutional reform  
(January 2004)



A survey commissioned by Civic Exchange  
conducted and analyzed by the Hong Kong Transition Project

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ROOM 701, HOSEINEE HOUSE, 69 WYNDHAM STREET, CENTRAL, HONG KONG  
TEL: (852) 2893-0213 FAX: (852) 3105-9713

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## Executive Summary

Key findings of this random sample telephone survey on issues related to constitutional reform conducted in early November 2003 are:

1. Of those with an opinion, 63 percent want consultations on constitutional reform to start before the September 2004 Legco elections and another 13 percent to start just after the 2004 elections. A total of 88 percent want constitutional reform before 2007. Only 8 percent want consultations to start after the 2007 Chief Executive election while 4 percent oppose any consultations or reforms. Support for reforms before 2007 are opposed by 52 percent of those 70 and above, 26 percent of those in their 60s, and by well under 10 percent among those 18 to 49.
2. 81 percent of respondents support direct election of the Chief Executive, with 70 percent of respondents preferring that such a direct election be held in 2007. 73 percent think direct election of the Chief Executive would make government policies fairer and 68 percent think direct election would make government management more effective.
3. 41 percent think the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao will increase the likelihood of direct election of the Chief Executive in 2007. 22 percent think it will decrease the likelihood of such a direct election. 58 percent support President Hu and Premier Wen to dismiss Tung Chee-hwa for his performance while only 44 percent support the central government leaders dismissing Hong Kong principal officials for their performance. 83 percent support the top leaders dismissing mainland officials for their performance.
4. 77 percent of respondents support direct election of all Legco seats, with 69 percent preferring that direct elections for Legco take place in 2008. 75 percent of respondents think direct election of all Legco seats would help make government policies fairer, with the highest levels of such a belief held by managers and administrators and professionals (business people). 40 percent of respondents think the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao will increase the likelihood of direct election of all Legco members in 2008 while 27 percent think it will decrease the likelihood of such elections.
5. 82 percent of respondents support direct election of all District Council members. 29 percent of respondents support the 2003 government appointments to District Councils while 55 percent oppose.
6. 88 percent support commissioning university conducted surveys on constitutional reform issues while only 55 percent support the CPU to conduct such surveys. 83 percent support referendums and the holding of public forums on the direct election of Chief Executive and Legco. 82 percent support NGOs and parties being part of public forums on constitutional reform. 77 percent support holding public hearings in Legco after the 2004 elections while just 63 percent support setting up a public opinion assessment office as was done after the 1984 Joint Declaration.
7. Dissatisfaction with the performance of the Hong Kong Government is, at 75 percent, an all time record. Dissatisfaction tends to rise with education, with 84 percent of all

university and post-graduates dissatisfied. 88 percent of managers and administrators, 86 percent of professionals and associate professionals (the business categories) are dissatisfied, the highest among occupational classifications. 73 percent are dissatisfied with the performance of the Chief Executive with the very dissatisfied at an all time high of 37 percent of respondents. 82 percent of managers and 83 percent of professionals are dissatisfied with Tung Chee-hwa's performance. Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong, at 51 percent, is an all time low. Satisfaction with the Chinese central government in ruling China is 68 percent while satisfaction with its handling of Hong Kong affairs is at 72 percent, the second highest level ever achieved. 25 percent have participated in a demonstration within the previous 12 months, up from just 2 percent in April 2002 and a record level well beyond the previous high of 8 percent set in 1996.



Following the defeat of allies in the November 2003 District Council election, Hong Kong's Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa went on a "routine duty visit" to Beijing. There, in the Great Hall of the People, President Hu Jintao admonished the Chief Executive to "be close to the general public, experience and observe the public feelings, and draw on the wisdom of the masses." After the meeting, Tung admitted the poor performance of his government and said "We have done a lot of soul-searching and are trying to improve communication with the people." He repeated this pledge in his policy address 7 January 2004. In the interest of assisting the CE to meet his pledge to the people of Hong Kong, and in aide of the admonition of President Hu Jintao to draw on the wisdom of the masses, we release this report on a telephone survey of Hong Kong people's wisdom on constitutional reform issues.

The random sample survey of 836 respondents was conducted 4-12 November 2003. Partial results of the same survey were released 21 November as a District Council election forecast titled "Political Tsunami." It forecast that over 40 percent turnout was highly likely and that pro-democracy parties would win by large margins. The election forecast, which turned out correctly predicting the November election results, concluded:

This survey only indicates the mood and inclinations of those who plan to vote and the general public. That mood is decidedly not in the favor of those who support the Tung administration blindly. Those like the Liberals who show they have a line beyond which they will not cross have clearly gotten respondent's approval, so support of the government alone is not the kiss of death. But Hong Kong people do seem to want politicians who listen to them, and who will take courageous action like James Tien's resignation from the Executive Council when circumstances call for it. Those who wish to ignore the public, and who support restrictions on their freedoms, will lose support despite their appeals to patriotism, for patriotism no longer seems to be the code word for blindly supporting Tung Chee-hwa. The voter's verdict will be made clear to all when the results are tallied: results for and respect towards the views of the public are the bottom line in Hong Kong politics. If democracy is making the voice of the people heard no matter how hard political leaders try to stop up their ears and close their eyes, then this election may become the most "democratic" in Hong Kong's history.

The accuracy of the forecast was proven by events, with a record turnout of 44.06 percent and victory by pro-democracy groups over pro-government parties. In direct contests, the Democratic Party (DP), the largest anti-government party, defeated the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB) by 69 seats to 12. Hong Kong people have shown repeatedly—in the massive demonstration on 1 July, in the record turnout at and stunning results of the November polls and yet again in a demonstration of around 100,000 on New Year's Day 2004—that they insist on their voices being heard and their views being heeded. Only if the Chief Executive genuinely proves willing to, as President Hu put, "draw on the wisdom of the masses" can Tung Chee-hwa succeed in the most difficult task he has ever faced, conducting the constitutional review the Hong Kong people have so clearly shown they demand. In this report is the "wisdom of the masses" on constitutional reform issues.

### **The Framework for Constitutional Reform**

Constitutional reform in the Hong Kong context refers to a process and timeline built into the Basic Law (BL), the constitutional document promulgated in April 1990 by the National People's Congress which went into effect on 1 July 1997 with Hong Kong's

reversion to the Peoples Republic of China. The Basic Law stipulates the steps and timing of constitutional development up to 2007 for the Chief Executive (CE) and 2008 for the Legislative Council (Legco). Up to 2007 the CE was nominated and elected by an election committee. The first election committee which chose Tung Chee-hwa in December 1996 was made up of 400 members wholly nominated by Central Government officials. The body in 2002 which returned Tung to office unopposed was of 800 members, three fourths returned by elections in the 30 Functional Constituencies (FC) from Legco. The 30 FCs have a total franchise of under 200,000 persons and corporations. Some of the FCs allow corporations to cast ballots, giving larger corporate entities up to several hundred votes among the various FCs. Some FCs are large, with 30,000 registered voters or more; others are of less than 200 voters. Only 24 of the 800 were universal suffrage elected members from Geographic Constituencies.

The Basic Law indicates in Article 45 that:

The Chief Executive of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be selected by election or through consultations held locally and be appointed by the Central People's Government. The method for selecting the Chief Executive shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the HKSAR and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the selection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democratic procedures.

Annex I of the Basic Law spells out procedures for the CE elections up to 2007 and concludes in Section 7 that:

If there is a need to amend the method for selecting the Chief Executive for the terms subsequent to the year 2007, such amendments must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all the members of the Legislative Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for approval.

This provision of the BL has been taken to mean that the method for the 2007 CE election may be changed by the Legco elected in September 2004. The central government has also indicated, so far indirectly through the opinions of mainland legal experts involved in the BL drafting process and editorials in central government newspapers such as the China Daily, that BL Annex I Section 7 means changes must not only receive the endorsement of two-thirds of Legco and the consent of the CE; they must also have the approval of the SCNPC. There is some dispute as to who decides "if there is a need to amend" with some mainland experts insisting Beijing makes this call.

Article 68 of the Basic Law stipulates that the constitution of Legco:

The Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by election. The method for forming Legislative Council shall be specified in the light of the actual situation in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the election of all members of Legislative Council by universal suffrage.

Annex II Section III of the Basic Law provides that:

With regard to the method for forming the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and its procedures for voting on bills and motions after

2007, if there is a need to amend the provisions of this Annex, such amendments must be made with the endorsement of a two-thirds majority of all members of the Council and the consent of the Chief Executive, and they shall be reported to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for the record.

This wording has been taken to mean that election methods for Legco in the 2008 election are wholly up to the Legco elected in 2004 and the CE. The 2004 Policy Address and the Chief Secretary's comments in the press conference afterwards indicate the HKG believes Beijing is in charge of deciding "if there is a need to amend" the processes of electing Legco and the CE. However, many Hong Kongers and apparently even the HKG until recently made the assumption that while the 2007 CE election requires negotiation with the SCNPC as well as two-thirds support in Legco and the consent of Tung Chee-hwa, the method of returning the 2008 Legco is up to the 2004 Legco and perhaps the CE returned in early 2007.

Both Basic Law articles require that changes be "in accordance with the principle of gradual and orderly progress" and that they be made "in light of the actual situation in the HKSAR." Some argue that direct election of the CE in 2007 and of all Legco members in 2008 would not be in accord with the principle of gradual and orderly progress that has obtained in Hong Kong's process of political development to date. The development of democracy in Hong Kong has certainly been gradual. But democracy, defined as people choosing their leaders and conducting their affairs according to majority rules, has a more extensive history in Hong Kong than most realize. This long indigenous history is what makes Hong Kongers insistent on participating in governance. It is this history behind the July march of well over half a million and this history that made itself felt in the record turnout for the November 2003 District Council elections.

For example, governance elections held by local Chinese resumed in 1926 when the British permitted New Territories villages to go back to their long-held practice of choosing their village heads. These elections consisted of male elders deciding. Women, like nearly everywhere else then, were excluded. But NT villages have been nearly all along self-governing entities with centuries of experience managing their own affairs. This is one reason why those District Council constituencies dominated by NT villagers, such as Island District, routinely cast ballots in much higher proportions than others of the 18 districts which have more recent traditions of electing leaders. However, voluntarily organized mutual help organizations and clan associations have been choosing their leaders, managing funds, and conducting their business, including elections, without government input for over a century. Charitable, social groups and churches have also been self-managing and choosing their leaders for a century and a half. Business associations have been electing officers and conducting their own affairs going back well over a century. One reason democracy has put down such strong roots in Hong Kong is due to this small group, grass roots democratic process having such a long duration and such wide practice. The process of opening up government of the territory to its inhabitants, not its citizens until 1997, has been more recent, but even it has a fairly extensive history.

In the early 1970s the British colonial government recognized the value of elected, self-managing associations and began setting up Mutual Aid Committees in public housing estates. It encouraged ownership associations in private housing estates. Over the last 20 years, around 1 in 4 Hong Kongers have participated in MACs and ownership committees,

democratically electing their officers and deciding their own affairs. The British ran functional constituency elections for Urban Council beginning in 1952. Though the franchise was limited to between 20,000 and 35,000 voters, this was a policy-making body with revenue disbursing powers open to election and considerable local participation. This voting franchise was, in many cases, larger than almost all functional constituency seats in today's Legco. In 1982 the British set up the first universal suffrage elections for District Boards, now District Councils. Though part was government appointed until 1994 and then again in 1997, the great majority directly represented local neighborhoods. In 1985 the first elections to Legco functional constituencies began. In 1991, the year the Cold War passed into history, came the first direct elections to Legco. In 2004, nearly 20 years since Legco elections started, just half of Legco's seats will be directly elected, half functionally elected. In 2004, for the first time no government appointee will be "voting" for representatives in Legco. Currently, six are returned by an 800-member election committee, nearly one fourth government appointees, the rest elected from functional constituencies. Moving to a fully directly elected Legco in 2008, some 17 years after direct elections started and 23 years after elections for functional seats began, could hardly be considered hasty, especially in light of the actual situation in Hong Kong where demands for greater democracy are growing so insistent as to be unmistakable even to those who deliberately try to blind themselves to them. And these demands for more democracy are neither foreign plots nor plans by blackhands to destabilize Hong Kong. They are the natural result of Hong Kongers, long accustomed to electing their own leaders and running their own affairs, simply applying the practice to government's two highest levels, and simply extending their already considerable involvement at those levels at that. Few can deny this history constitutes the "gradual," orderly progress toward the full democracy the Basic Law calls for as the ultimate goal.

Hong Kongers actually have long experience with handling their own affairs; they have clearly concluded the hands currently running things at the highest level are not doing so very well. The first part of this report thus looks at the actual situation in Hong Kong regarding the current system in operation at the start of consultations over constitutional reform, promised to begin sometime later in 2004. The second part examines current preferences for various constitutional reforms, prior to the start of formal consultations. The third part of this report looks at the preferences on the process of consultations. First, however, the framework of analysis for the three main sections of this report.

### **The Framework for Survey Analysis**

This section of the introduction lays out the variables, other than standard demographic ones such as age and sex, against which responses are tested for significance. That is, the variables listed below are examined for any significant relationship with the responses to other questions. The strength of the association is indicated by the simple statistical measure of Chi-square (and by other measures) which indicates the level of probability that the distribution of responses is a matter of chance. The closer to zero of Chi-square, the greater the odds the distribution of responses is not a matter of chance. These variables and the strength of their association reveal various characteristics of the process and also allow forecasts of certain trends. For example, older, less educated age groups tend to have much higher proportions of don't know responses and responses against change. As the older, less educated die to be replaced by better educated, overall support for reforms seems set to rise. This has been the case since 1991 when the Hong Kong

Transition Project started surveys. The growth in the better educated, more widely experienced populace is a driver of the growing demands for participation. The variables tested against other questions are:

1. Birthplace
- \*2. Sex
- \*3. Education
- \*4. Occupation
- \*5. Private/public sector
6. Living outside HK
7. Right of abode in another country
8. Affiliation identity
9. Patriotic identity
- †10. Satisfied/Dissatisfied with performance of HK government
- †11. Satisfied/Dissatisfied with performance of Tung Chee-hwa
- †12. Satisfied/Dissatisfied with performance of PRC government in dealing with SAR affairs
- †13. Satisfied/Dissatisfied with life in HK
- †14. Registered to vote
- †15. Plan to vote
- †16. Petition signers/non-signers
- †17. Donors to political groups
- †18. July march participants/non-participants

\*Described in more detail except for birthplace at the end of this report.

†Described in Part I below.

The first five items are demographic variables. Items 6 through 9 probe variables associated with experience outside Hong Kong and identity with Hong Kong, which are examined here. Items 10 through 13 are attitudes toward the present circumstances in Hong Kong. The last five items are measures of political participation, in rank order. All responses in this report are from Hong Kong permanent residents who have right of abode and the right to vote in Hong Kong. These people may be considered HKSAR “citizens” even though they may not be Chinese ethnics or Chinese nationals. We do not include those without the right to vote. It is a fundamental right of citizenship to choose one’s leaders and to have the power to amend the constitution.

Birthplace is a standard demographic variable which has additional significance in Hong Kong. Technically, those born here are now considered as having been born in China, while those born in China are technically now merely residents in a different part of the same country. However, birthplace has much greater political significance in the Hong Kong of today than in states such as the US. Since Hong Kong does not determine citizenship, as defined above, by birthplace (again unlike the US or many other countries), we begin the erection of the analytical framework by explaining the nature of this normally uncontroversial and simple variable.



**Table 1: Birthplace**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Born in Hong Kong</b>	<b>608</b>	<b>73</b>
<b>Born in mainland China</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Born elsewhere</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>4</b>

The 2001 Census indicated 59.7 percent of those normally residing in Hong Kong were born in the SAR, and that 85.1 percent of the population in 2001 had been resident in Hong Kong seven years or more. Seven years residency is the minimum required to qualify for permanent residency and the right to vote. This survey may be taken as representative of that 85 percent who are or are qualified to be citizens, not of all residing in Hong Kong. There is a large population of domestic helpers and expatriates and a significant number of recent emigrants from the mainland. (Approximately a million people). These, roughly 15 percent of the population, are excluded from this survey. Since the focus of the survey is on constitutional reform, we have chosen to focus on those who are citizens and who are thus entitled to participate in changing constitutional structures.

Just because someone is an HKSAR citizen or permanent resident does not mean that they identify with the SAR. We asked 836 randomly selected permanent resident respondents how they classify themselves, as expatriates, mainland migrants or professionals, returnees after extended time abroad, or as Hong Kongers or “other” classification. We refer to this form of identity as affiliation identity. We also ask another identity question (see below) which we refer to as the patriotic identity. These two forms of self-classified identity show distinct differences, as will be shown in parts I to III.

**Table 2: Which of the following categories do you think you fall into?**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Expatriate</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Chinese mainland migrant</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Mainland professional</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>--</b>
<b>Grew up in HK, returned from abroad</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>2</b>
<b>Hong Konger</b>	<b>734</b>	<b>88</b>
<b>Other</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>3</b>

Only 12 percent of permanent residents identify themselves in some other way than a Hong Konger, indicating that birthplace is not the only means by which permanent residents form an attachment to Hong Kong sufficient to identify themselves as primarily Hong Kongers. Table 3 shows a reclassification of Table 2 responses due to the need for a minimum number of respondents in each category to facilitate analysis. Other surveys by the Hong Kong Transition Project with a greater number of respondents have shown returnees from abroad to have response patterns broadly aligned more with expatriate response patterns than with Hong Kongers or mainlanders, thus we group the 18 returnee respondents with the expat and other identities of Table 2. This reclassified table will be used for significance of association testing with other variables in the survey.

**Table 3: Reclassified Affiliation identity categories**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
<b>Expat, other and returnee id</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>Mainlander id</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>5</b>
<b>Hong Konger id</b>	<b>734</b>	<b>88</b>

As Table 4 indicates, birthplace is the strongest factor influencing identity, even though a majority (53%) of those born elsewhere also identify themselves primarily as Hong Kongers. Of those born in Hong Kong, 6 percent describe themselves as having an expat, other or returnee identification, while 75 percent of those born in mainland China identify themselves as Hong Kongers in the affiliation identity question asked at the beginning of the questionnaire.

**Table 4: Affiliation Identity by birthplace**

	<b>HK born</b>	<b>China born</b>	<b>Elsewhere born</b>	<b>total</b>
<i>Other id #</i>	<i>37</i>	<i>46</i>	<i>17</i>	<i>100</i>
<i>percent</i>	<i>6</i>	<i>25</i>	<i>47</i>	<i>12.0</i>
<i>Hong Konger id #</i>	<i>571</i>	<i>141</i>	<i>19</i>	<i>731</i>
<i>percent</i>	<i>94</i>	<i>75</i>	<i>53</i>	<i>88.0</i>
<i>Total #</i>	<i>608</i>	<i>187</i>	<i>36</i>	<i>831</i>
<i>Total percent</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>	<i>100</i>

table contents: Count

Percent of Column

Chi-square = 90.32 with 2 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

The second form of identity, patriotic identity, asked at the end of the survey questionnaire, are obtained in responses to the following question:

**Table 5 The following is a list of how you might describe yourself. Which is the most appropriate description of you?**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Count</b>	<b>%</b>
I'm a HK Chinese	<b>226</b>	<b>27</b>
I'm a Chinese	<b>182</b>	<b>22</b>
I'm a HK person	<b>365</b>	<b>44</b>
I'm a HK British	<b>16</b>	<b>2</b>
I'm an Overseas Chinese	<b>13</b>	<b>2</b>
Other	<b>34</b>	<b>4</b>

The replies to the patriotic identity question above have been remarkably stable after a period of considerable fluctuation just before and just after the 1 July 1997 handover, as Table 6 below and the chart of the table indicate. We refer to this form of identity as patriotic because it has been shown in many previous analyses to be strongly correlated to other questions probing the degree of patriotism felt by respondents. (See the Hong Kong Transition Project website, <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktip> for earlier reports examining this aspect). As Table 7 below shows, patriotic identity has a strong association with birthplace, but 28 percent of those born outside Hong Kong or China identify themselves

as Chinese while a third (not much less than the 44 percent for the whole sample) identify themselves as a Hong Kong person. Identity in the case of Hong Kong is not a simple matter of birthplace or even nominal nationality or ethnicity.

**Table 6 Patriotic Identity choices**

	Chinese	HK Chinese	HK people	HK British	Overseas Chinese	Others
Feb 93	19	36	37	7		1
Aug 93	20	34	35	10		1
Feb 94	21	40	28	8		1
Aug 94	19	38	32	10		1
Feb 95	20	32	35	11		1
Aug 95	22	32	36	8		1
Feb 96	30	28	35	5		2
July 96	30	20	45	3		2
Feb 97	30	28	35	3	3	1
June 97	25	24	44	4	2	1
Jan 98	27	27	39	3	2	2
Apr 98	30	24	41	2	2	2
July 98	22	27	44	4	1	1
Oct 98	25	27	43	4	1	1
Apr 99	20	28	45	3	1	2
July 99	21	27	46	4	1	1
Nov 99	23	27	44	3	1	2
Apr 00	24	30	39	4	1	2
Aug 00	22	27	45	4	2	1
Nov 00	24	28	42	3	2	2
Apr 01	28	24	42	3	2	2
July 01	26	26	43	3	1	2
Nov 2001	22	26	45	4	1	2
Apr 2002	27	24	43	3	1	2
Aug 2002	28	24	44	2	1	1
Nov 2002	24	25	44	2	1	3
Nov 2003	22	27	44	2	2	4






Table 7 shows being born in Hong Kong makes one more likely to identify oneself as a Hong Kong person, but age also makes a difference as Table 8 shows.

**Table 7 Patriotic identity by birthplace**

	<b>HK born</b>	<b>China born</b>	<b>Elsewhere</b>	<b>total</b>
HK Chinese	<b>26</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>27</b>
Chinese	<b>19</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>22</b>
Hong Kong person	<b>49</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>44</b>
Overseas Chinese, HK Brit, other	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 52.37 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

**Table 8 Patriotic identity by Age Group**

	<b>18-19</b>	<b>20-29</b>	<b>30-39</b>	<b>40-49</b>	<b>50-59</b>	<b>60-69</b>	<b>70-85</b>	<b>total</b>
HK Chinese	<b>36</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>28</b>
Chinese	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>22</b>
Hong Kong person	<b>38</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>48</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>31</b>	<b>43</b>
Overseas Chinese, HK Brit, other	<b>12</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 32.46 with 18 df  $p = 0.0194$

Living outside Hong Kong has an affect on some of the constitutional reform issues examined below. Nearly one in four citizens (23 percent) have such experience. One in 10 have right of abode in another country (and 44 percent have family members and close relatives living abroad with right of abode, excluding those in Taiwan, Macau and the mainland). The experience of Hong Kongers with overseas entities, either living in having right of abode there, or living there for extended periods, or by visiting close relatives living there, is considerable. This direct experience with alternative forms of governance by so many lays a substantial basis for many Hong Kongers to compare their forms of government and the conduct of their officials with others. These variables lay the main lines of the framework of analysis outside of those related to attitudes toward the current processes forms and leaders of government, which are examined in Part I.

## Part I Attitudes toward current processes of government


The following nine variables are examined below, and these and the other variables listed in the introduction above are examined for significant relations with other issues examined in this part of the report. The numbering refers to the original list in the introduction above.

10. Satisfied/Dissatisfied with performance of Hong Kong government
11. Satisfied/Dissatisfied with performance of Tung Chee-hwa
12. Satisfied/Dissatisfied with performance of PRC government in dealing with SAR affairs
13. Satisfied/Dissatisfied with life in HK
14. Registered to vote
15. Plan to vote
16. Petition signers/non-signers
17. Donors to political groups
18. July march participants/non-participants

Table 9 indicates long term trends in variable10, performance of the Hong Kong Government (HKG). Satisfaction with the general performance of the HKG has dropped to barely one in five while dissatisfaction has risen to three out of four.

**Table 9 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the general performance of the HKG?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 93	60	31	9
Aug 93	57	28	15
Feb 94	58	28	14
Aug 94	56	30	14
Feb 95	43	35	22
Sep 95	46	45	9
Feb 96	60	26	15
July 96	67	21	11
Feb 97	73	20	7
June 97	66	27	7
Jan 98	51	35	4
Apr 98	48	41	12
June 98	37	56	7
July 98	42	49	9
Oct 98	42	48	10
April 99	46	43	11
July 99	40	52	7
Nov 99	41	51	8
Apr 00	39	53	8
Aug 00	30	61	4
Oct 00	31	62	6
Nov 00	35	58	7
Apr 01	32	58	10
June 01	37	55	7
July 01	35	59	5
Nov 01	24	68	7
Apr 02	31	60	9
Aug 02	22	72	6
Nov 02	23	69	9
June 03	23	69	8
Nov 03	20	75	5



More significantly, the intensity of dissatisfaction has risen, with only 1 percent (9 people out of 836) very satisfied while 30 percent are very dissatisfied.

**Table 10 Intensity of Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with performance of HKG**

Group	Count	%
Very dissatisfied	251	30
Dissatisfied	377	45
Satisfied	161	19
Very satisfied	9	1
Don't Know	38	5

We drop the don't knows and reclassify the very satisfied with satisfied (there are too few very satisfied to analyze reliably, statistical analysis requires around 50 cases as a minimum per category). This gives us Table 11 which are then tested against other variables.

**Table 11 Reclassified satisfaction/dissatisfaction with performance of HKG**

Group	Count	%
Very dissatisfied	251	31
Dissatisfied	377	47
Satisfied	170	21

Birthplace has a fairly weak significance of association with satisfaction with the performance of the government, being strongest in explaining satisfaction rather than dissatisfaction, as Table 12 shows.

**Table 12 Satisfaction with HKG performance by Birthplace**

	HK born	China born	Elsewhere born	total
Very dissatisfied	33	26	26	31
Dissatisfied	48	46	46	47
Satisfied	19	29	29	21
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 10.19 with 4 df p = 0.0374

But as Tables 13 and 14 indicate, age and education level are far more strongly associated with level of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the performance of the government.

**Table 13 Satisfaction with HKG performance by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Very dissatisfied	22	26	39	36	26	21	15	31
Dissatisfied	46	56	44	48	50	50	28	47
Satisfied	32	19	17	16	24	29	56	21
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 51.08 with 12 df p ≤ 0.0001

As the Chart of Table 13 illustrates, teenagers and those 50 and above have higher levels of satisfaction than the overall sample average. (For overall sample breakdown by age, see Demographics section at end of the report.) Those in their 30s and 40s have much higher levels of very dissatisfied than other groups. Only those 70 and above show a majority satisfied with the performance of the HKG. This is also why surveys which

exclude those over age 65 introduce a small degree of distortion into their results in the many questions where age has an association with responses.

**Chart of Table 13 Satisfaction with HKG performance by Age group**




While age and education level are strongly associated (see demographics section at end of this report for details), the correlation of dissatisfaction with education can be seen in the chart to Table 14 quite clearly. Table 14 gives years of education (post-graduate and tertiary are collapsed since there are only 17 people with post-graduate degrees, too few to analyze separately) across the top, by levels of satisfaction with performance of the government (also collapsed into satisfied or dissatisfied for clarity of relationship).

**Table 14 Satisfaction with performance of HKG by Education level**

	No formal	Primary 1-6	Form 1-3	Form 4-5	Form 6-7	Univ & post-grad	total
Dissatisfied	63	70	78	79	79	84	79
Satisfied	37	30	22	21	21	16	21
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 11.71 with 5 df p = 0.0390

One of the consequences of higher education of citizens for government is that such better educated citizens have more confidence in their abilities, including their abilities to understand and participate in the making of community and governmental decisions. In turn, better educated citizens expect better performance from government leaders than the less educated, and this is what is behind the trends made highly visible in the Chart of Table 14.

**Chart of Table 14 Satisfaction with performance of HKG by Education level**



Managers and administrators as well as professionals/associate professionals show the highest proportion of dissatisfied while retirees show the highest proportion satisfied with the performance of the HKG. The old bedrock of government authority, support by business and professionals, has clearly been eroded, with only 13 percent of that category and 14 percent of professionals/associate professionals satisfied with the performance of the HKG. Even a larger proportion of the unemployed are satisfied than managers and administrators and professionals, indicating the argument that high unemployment is behind the government's "unpopularity" is not well based in fact. The government gets most approval from retirees and those aged 70 and up, and the second most approval from students. Both groups are heavily subsidized by the government and the least involved in the economy and in societal issues. (See Chart of Table 15 below).

**Table 15 Satisfaction with performance of HKG by Occupation**

	Manager/ Admin	Professional Assoc professional	Clerk	Service & sales	Ag.fish, craft, machine operator	House wife	Retiree	Unemployed	Students educator	total
Very dissatisfied	46	32	30	29	31	34	18	33	20	31
Dissatisfied	42	54	54	48	46	46	35	44	55	48
Satisfied	13	14	16	22	24	20	47	23	25	22
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 49.29 with 16 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

**Chart of Table 15 Satisfaction with performance of HKG by Occupation**




As Table 16 shows, the occupational makeup of those very dissatisfied is disproportionately managers and administrators. One person in five of those very dissatisfied are managers and administrators, well above the 13 percent of the sample that occupational category comprises. Retirees make up nearly the same proportion of those satisfied with the government's performance, 19 percent, far outweighing their overall sample proportion of just 9 percent.

**Table 16 Occupation makeup of Satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Managers/Administrators	20	12	8	13
Professionals/Assoc Prof	11	12	7	11
Clerks/secretaries	13	15	10	13
Service & sales	7	8	8	7
Ag & fish, craft, machine operators	13	13	15	13
Housewife	17	15	14	15
Retired	5	7	19	9
Unemployed	6	5	6	6
Students/educators	8	14	14	12
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 49.29 with 16 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

**Chart of Table 16 Occupations of dissatisfied and satisfied**


The measure to remember while examining Table 16 and the chart above are that just 22 percent of the sample are satisfied with government performance, meaning that while retirees make up small proportions of the very dissatisfied and dissatisfied columns above, in actuality 53 percent of all retirees are very dissatisfied or dissatisfied. They just proportionately make up a smaller segment of the larger groupings. This is a key finding of the survey. The assumption was turning Hong Kong over to business people, giving them disproportionate influence in the Legco and making sure that the CE would be a businessman, would virtually guarantee support of business people for the government. This is no longer the case, with 88 percent of administrators and managers and 86 percent of professionals and associate professionals saying they are dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with government. Another assumption was that public sector (civil service and quasi-public services like the Airport Authority and Hospital Authority) would continue to support the government. For the first two years of the SAR, this was the case, but support among public sectors workers has dropped. After the pay cuts and job losses in the public sector, one would suspect that workers in the public sector would, in anything, be more dissatisfied with the government than those in the private sector, and in terms of intensity of dissatisfaction, the assumption is correct. However, in terms of proportions satisfied, private and public sectors are nearly the same. Only the non-workforce sector—students, housewives, retirees and unemployed—show more satisfied than the other two sectors.

**Table 17 Satisfaction with performance of HKG by sector**

	Public	Private	Non-working	total
Very dissatisfied	40	33	27	31
Dissatisfied	42	50	45	47
Satisfied	19	17	28	22
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 14.22 with 4 df p = 0.0066



Table 18 shows that affinity identity (see framework for analysis section above) makes a difference in satisfaction with performance of the government as the small group of permanent residents who identify themselves with the mainland show distinctly less degrees of the highest level of dissatisfaction than Hong Kongers and much more satisfaction than that same group.

**Table 18 Affinity identity by satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Expat/other	Mainlander	Hong Konger	total
Very dissatisfied	24	8	33	32
Dissatisfied	47	59	47	47
Satisfied	29	33	20	21
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 14.85 with 4 df p = 0.0050

Patriotic identity shows some greater degree of satisfaction by those who identify themselves as Chinese (predominately the aged and teenagers, see framework analysis section above) than by those who identify themselves as Hong Kong persons (Hong Kongese), but the association is not strong, indicating that patriotism toward the mainland has less to do with people's dissatisfaction with the performance of the HKG. (See below on attitudes toward the mainland government). There is still some influence in the call to "patriots" to support the Hong Kong government, but increasingly those who identify themselves as Chinese do not necessarily agree that it means expressing satisfaction with the HKG or its leader, Tung Chee-hwa. (See below on Tung).

**Table 19 Patriotic identity by Satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Chinese	HK Chinese	Hong Kongese	HK British, Overseas Chinese, other	total
Very dissatisfied	33	25	35	35	32
Dissatisfied	41	53	47	45	47
Satisfied	26	23	18	21	21
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 11.35 with 6 df p = 0.0781

The tables following test satisfaction levels with the performance of the HKG against the variables of Registered to vote, Plan to vote, Petition signers/non-signers, Donors to political groups, and July 1 march participants/non-participants. This list, in the order given, postulates increasing degrees of political activism, from the most nominal, registering to vote, to the most involved, donating to political groups and participating in the historic 1 July march.

The first category, register to vote responses, shows extremely weak association (Chi-square 0.1245) with satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government. Of respondents, 76 percent claimed to be registered to vote.

**Table 20 Registered to vote by Satisfaction with HKG performance**

	Not registered	Registered	total
Very dissatisfied	27	33	32
Dissatisfied	47	47	47
Satisfied	26	20	21
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 4.167 with 2 df p = 0.1245

Table 21 shows that at the next level of political activism, planning to vote, which 60 percent of registered respondents said they planned to do in two weeks before the District Council elections, significance of association begins to show between levels of satisfaction with the performance of the government and planning to vote. For example, 18 percent of those planning to vote say they were satisfied with HKG performance while 27 percent of those not planning to vote were satisfied.

**Table 21 Plan to vote by Satisfaction with HKG performance**

	Do not plan to vote	Plan to vote	total
Very dissatisfied	27	35	32
Dissatisfied	47	48	47
Satisfied	27	18	21
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 10.50 with 2 df p = 0.0053

Of the 45 percent who signed a petition to government during the preceding 12 months, the association with levels of satisfaction and this level of participation is even stronger. Of those who signed a petition, only 16 percent were satisfied with government performance.

**Table 22 Signed petition by Satisfaction with HKG performance**

	Signed petition	Did not sign	total
Very dissatisfied	39	25	32
Dissatisfied	46	49	47
Satisfied	16	26	21
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 22.09 with 2 df p ≤ 0.0001

The 16 percent who made a donation to a political party or group in the preceding 12 months also show similar patterns of satisfaction to petition signers.

**Table 23 Donation to political group by Satisfaction with HKG performance**

	Made donation to political group	Did not donate	total
Very dissatisfied	43	29	32
Dissatisfied	40	49	47
Satisfied	17	22	21
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 9.808 with 2 df p = 0.0074

And the one in four (24 percent) of respondents who said they marched in the 1 July protest, who are perhaps the most active politically, show the greatest degree of dissatisfaction with the government and biggest differences with non-marchers.

**Table 24 Marchers by Satisfaction with HKG performance**

	<b>1 July marchers</b>	<b>Non-marchers</b>	<b>total</b>
Very dissatisfied	<b>54</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>31</b>
Dissatisfied	<b>39</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>47</b>
Satisfied	<b>7</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>21</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 72.01 with 2 df  $p \leq 0.0001$


Clearly dissatisfaction with the performance of the HKG motivated many if not most marchers on 1 July. Just as clearly, dissatisfaction with Tung Chee-hwa's performance also played a role in motivating the marchers on 1 July as will be seen. The overall pattern of dissatisfaction with the Chief Executive has come to close mirror and even exceed that felt toward the HKG, as seen in Table 25. Just before the District Council vote the level of dissatisfaction with the Chief Executive hit new highs, particularly in intensity of dissatisfaction, while levels of satisfaction remained as low as in June, two weeks before the massive march on the first of July.

**Table 25 Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with performance of C. E. Tung?**


	<b>Very Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Somewhat dissatisfied</b>	<b>Somewhat Satisfied</b>	<b>Very Satisfied</b>	<b>DK</b>
Feb 97	5	19	48	5	23
June 97	5	24	46	4	21
Jan 98	3	26	57	3	11
Apr 98	8	28	48	5	11
June 98	13	34	41	5	7
July 98	12	33	45	4	6
Oct 98	9	33	42	4	12
Apr 99	8	34	47	3	8
July 99	13	33	42	4	8
Nov 99	14	39	36	3	8
Apr 00	17	37	36	2	9
Aug 00	19	37	31	1	12
Oct 00	23	37	31	2	7
Nov 00	16	40	34	3	7
Apr 01	18	39	29	2	12
June 01	14	40	36	1	9
July 01	19	38	34	2	6
Nov 01	25	40	24	1	10
Apr 02	17	41	31	2	9
Aug 02	28	39	20	1	11
Nov 02	32	34	24	2	8
June 03	29	41	19	1	8
Nov 03	37	36	20	1	6

The line and bar charts of this table, particularly the bar chart below, show very graphically the overall trends of rising dissatisfaction with the Chief Executive.

**Line Chart of Table 25 Satisfaction with Tung's performance**



**Bar Chart of Table 25 Satisfaction with Tung's performance**



As with the variable satisfaction with the performance of the HKG, we remove the don't knows and collapse very satisfied (10 cases) with satisfied. This results in 40 percent being very dissatisfied, 38 percent dissatisfied, and 22 percent satisfied with Tung's performance. For Tung, born in Shanghai, not Hong Kong, birthplace of respondents makes a difference, with born elsewhere showing more satisfied than any other group.

**Table 26 Satisfaction with Tung performance by Birthplace**

	HK born	China born	Elsewhere born	total
Very dissatisfied	42	32	37	39
Dissatisfied	39	38	26	38
Satisfied	19	31	37	22
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 17.64 with 4 df p = 0.0015

**Table 27 Satisfaction with Tung performance by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Very dissatisfied	31	35	45	43	38	31	24	39
Dissatisfied	42	45	37	40	36	31	29	38
Satisfied	27	19	18	17	26	39	47	23
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 32.75 with 12 df p = 0.0011

The pattern of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with the performance of the CE are similar to that of satisfaction with the performance of the HKG. (Cf above, Table 13). However, the degree of satisfaction is less and dissatisfaction is greater. The same holds true with levels of education and satisfaction with the CE.

**Table 28 Satisfaction with Tung performance by Years of Education**

	0	1-6	7-9	10-11	12-13	14-18	total
Very dissatisfied	31	27	38	38	38	46	39
Dissatisfied	33	38	37	42	41	35	38
Satisfied	36	36	25	20	21	19	23
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 17.98 with 10 df p = 0.0554

There is less variance among occupational categories with satisfaction with the CE's performance than there is with satisfaction with the performance of the HKG. Only retirees and students/educators show significantly higher or lower levels.

**Table 29 Satisfaction with Tung performance by Occupation**

	Manager/ Admin	Professional Assoc professional	Clerk	Service & sales	Ag.fish, craft, machine operator	House wife	Retire	Unem ployed	Students educator	total
Very dis- satisfied	42	44	42	44	40	41	30	33	36	40
Dissatisfied	40	39	38	42	41	32	32	45	36	38
Satisfied	18	17	21	14	19	27	38	21	28	23
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 20.70 with 16 df p = 0.1902

Occupation thus appears less of an influence on satisfaction with Tung's performance than it did with satisfaction with the HKG's performance. The association of work sector

with satisfaction is stronger than occupation, but the differences among the sectors especially at the very dissatisfied level are smaller than satisfaction with government performance.

**Table 30 Satisfaction with Tung performance by Employment sector**

	Public sector	Private sector	Non-working	total
Very dissatisfied	41	42	36	40
Dissatisfied	39	40	35	38
Satisfied	20	18	29	23
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 13.00 with 4 df p = 0.0113

Only affinity identity shows association with satisfaction with Tung's performance. There is no association with patriotic identity, meaning patriotism, already weakly associated with attitudes toward the government, bears no relation at all to how people feel regarding Tung.

**Table 31 Satisfaction with Tung performance by affinity identity**

	Expat/other	Mainlander	Hong Konger	total
Very dissatisfied	35	29	41	40
Dissatisfied	33	37	39	38
Satisfied	33	34	21	22
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 8.030 with 4 df p = 0.0905

Those registered to vote, the first level of political participation, show a higher degree of dissatisfaction with Tung's performance than non-registered. The next level, planning to vote in District Council elections, shown in Table 33, shows stronger association with attitudes toward Tung than registration to vote.

**Table 32 Satisfaction with Tung performance by registered to vote**

	Not registered	Registered to vote	total
Very dissatisfied	34	41	40
Dissatisfied	38	38	38
Satisfied	29	20	22
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 6.319 with 2 df p = 0.0424

**Table 33 Satisfaction with Tung performance by Plan to vote**

	No plan to vote	Plan to vote	total
Very dissatisfied	35	43	40
Dissatisfied	38	38	38
Satisfied	27	20	22
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 7.286 with 2 df p = 0.0262

As with satisfaction with government performance, signing a petition made a difference in attitudes toward the CE, with 48 percent of signers very dissatisfied versus 32 percent of non-signers.

**Table 34 Satisfaction with Tung performance by Signed petition in previous 12 months**

	Signed petition	Non-signers	total
Very dissatisfied	48	32	40
Dissatisfied	35	41	38
Satisfied	17	27	22
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 24.53 with 2 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Giving money to a political group shows a higher level very dissatisfied, 52 percent, than simply signing a petition, but the difference with non-donors is less than among petition signers. And the highest level of political participation makes a very large difference in attitudes toward Tung, as Table 36 shows.

**Table 35 Satisfaction with Tung performance by donated to political group**

	Donated to political group	Non-donor	total
Very dissatisfied	52	37	39
Dissatisfied	32	40	39
Satisfied	16	23	22
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 10.73 with 2 df  $p = 0.0047$

**Table 36 Satisfaction with Tung performance by marched on 1 July**

	Marched 1 July	Did not march	total
Very dissatisfied	60	33	39
Dissatisfied	31	41	38
Satisfied	9	27	22
total	100	100	100

table contents: percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 53.35 with 2 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Those very dissatisfied with the performance of the HKG also tend to be very dissatisfied with Tung's performance (78 percent) while those satisfied with government tend to be satisfied with Tung just 64 percent of the time. This means the association between satisfaction with the HKG's performance and that with the performance of the CE is a stronger explanation for dissatisfaction than satisfaction. That is, those who are satisfied with the performance of the government tend less to be also satisfied with the performance of Tung. Those dissatisfied with the government also tend to be dissatisfied with Tung Chee-hwa to a stronger degree, indicating that Tung is a likely cause of dissatisfaction focused on the government, but that Tung is less likely to be a mitigating factor in attitudes toward the government. For example, 9 percent of those satisfied with the government are also very dissatisfied with the CE while only 3 percent of those very dissatisfied with the performance of the HKG are also satisfied with the CE. The Spearman Rank Correlation is 0.473, showing a very strong explanatory link between the ranks of satisfaction and dissatisfaction in the two variables.



**Table 37 Satisfaction with Tung performance by Satisfaction with HKG**

	<b>Very dissatisfied w HKG perform</b>	<b>Dissatisfied w HKG performance</b>	<b>Satisfied w HKG performance</b>	<b>total</b>
Very dissatisfied	<b>78</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>40</b>
Dissatisfied	<b>19</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>38</b>
Satisfied	<b>3</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>22</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 370.7 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$


The difference between satisfaction with the performance of the Peoples Republic of China Government (PRCG) in handling Hong Kong affairs and satisfaction with the performance of the HKG and its CE could hardly be greater, as Table 38 and the chart show. The leap in satisfaction following the withdrawal of the Article 23 legislation was unmistakable, zooming from 57 percent satisfied two weeks before the 1 July march to 72 percent satisfied ten days before the November 2003 District Council elections which saw allies of the Tung government soundly trounced at the polls. The election was NOT about Beijing.

**Table 38 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRCG in dealing with Hong Kong affairs?**

	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Don't know</b>
Aug 93	25	54	22
Feb 93	23	56	21
Aug 94	21	63	16
Feb 95	20	60	20
Sept 95	17	62	22
Feb 96	31	49	20
July 96	27	58	15
June 97	45	41	14
Jan 98	61	22	18
Apr 98	67	17	16
June 98	68	17	15
July 98	74	11	15
Oct 98	67	15	17
Apr 99	65	19	16
July 99	60	25	16
Nov 99	57	26	17
Apr 00	55	31	13
Aug 00	56	27	15
Nov 00	50	36	14
Apr 01	46	34	21
July 01	57	29	14
Nov 01	55	26	19
Apr 02	59	25	17
Aug 02	57	25	19
June 2003	57	28	16
Nov 2003	72	18	10



**Chart of Table 38 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG handling HK affairs**



**Table 39 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRCG in dealing with HKSAR affairs? (November 2003)**

Group	Count	%
Very dissatisfied	32	4
Dissatisfied	118	14
Satisfied	513	61
Very satisfied	92	11
Don't know	81	10

As in the analyses above, we drop the don't knows and in contrast to the above analyses of satisfaction with the performance of the HK government and of satisfaction with Tung's performance, we consolidate the very dissatisfied with dissatisfied because there are too few very dissatisfied to analyze separately. We retain the very satisfied as a category of this analysis. This gives us the results of Table 40.

**Table 40 Reclassified Satisfaction with performance of PRCG handling HK affairs**

Group	Count	%
Dissatisfied	150	20
Satisfied	513	68
Very satisfied	92	12

Table 41 shows remarkable differences with the analyses of satisfaction with the performance of the HKG and Tung Chee-hwa. Birthplace makes almost no significant difference between those born in Hong Kong and those born on the mainland. The difference arises among those born elsewhere, who are more dissatisfied or very satisfied (polarized) by far than either Hong Kong born or mainland born.

**Table 41 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Birthplace**

	<b>HK born</b>	<b>China born</b>	<b>Elsewhere born</b>	<b>total</b>
Dissatisfied	<b>20</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>
Satisfied	<b>69</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>68</b>
Very satisfied	<b>11</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>12</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 11.17 with 4 df p = 0.0247

Another distinct difference with the prior results is that sex makes a strong difference in attitude on this question. Considerably more females than males are dissatisfied with the PRCG's handling of HKSAR affairs than men.

**Table 42 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Sex**

	<b>Male</b>	<b>Female</b>	<b>total</b>
Dissatisfied	<b>15</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>20</b>
Satisfied	<b>71</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>68</b>
Very satisfied	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>12</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 14.13 with 2 df p = 0.0009

Another distinct contrast with previous results can be found in the breakdown by age group. Younger groups and those over 70 have HIGHER levels of dissatisfaction with the PRC government's performance handling SAR affairs. These same groups have LOWER levels of dissatisfaction than other ages with HKG performance and Tung's performance. Again, there seems very little connection between attitudes toward the central government and its leaders and those toward the local HKG and its leaders. The "China factor" in Hong Kong elections appears well and truly dead (see below for voters results in which there is no significant relationship with voting or other forms of political participation).

**Table 43 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Age group**

	<b>18-19</b>	<b>20-29</b>	<b>30-39</b>	<b>40-49</b>	<b>50-59</b>	<b>60-69</b>	<b>70-85</b>	<b>total</b>
Dissatisfied	<b>30</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>20</b>
Satisfied	<b>65</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>68</b>
Very satisfied	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 20.66 with 12 df p = 0.0556

Again in contrast to earlier results, less educated have HIGHER levels of dissatisfaction than those with more education. The level of very satisfied among those with the highest levels of education is by far the highest among the groups shown in Table 44.

**Table 44 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Education**

	0	1-6	7-9	10-11	12-13	14-16	17-18	total
Dissatisfied	30	31	20	14	20	22	13	20
Satisfied	60	51	68	74	73	67	44	68
Very satisfied	10	18	12	13	8	11	44	12
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 31.64 with 12 df p = 0.0016

Again in high contrast with satisfaction patterns with Tung's and the HK government's performance, business people and professionals show high levels of satisfaction with the performance of the PRCG in handling Hong Kong affairs. Housewives and students, again in contrast, are the most dissatisfied occupational groups with the PRCG.

**Table 45 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Occupation**

	Manager/ Admin	Professional Assoc professional	Clerk	Service & sales	Ag.fish, craft, machine	House wife	Retire	Unem ployed	Students educator	total
Dissatisfied	12	19	16	22	16	30	14	24	28	20
Satisfied	67	68	72	63	75	62	69	73	64	68
Very satisfied	21	14	12	15	9	8	17	3	8	12
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 30.57 with 16 df p = 0.0153

Again in contrast, the public sector is more satisfied than the private sector with the PRCG's performance in handling Hong Kong affairs. There is no significant relationship with affinity identity. Patriotic identity shows some association (Table 47.)

**Table 46 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Workforce sector**

	Public sector	Private sector	Non-working	total
Dissatisfied	15	17	26	20.0
Satisfied	65	70	65	68.0
Very satisfied	20	13	9	12
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 15.72 with 4 df p = 0.0034

**Table 47 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Patriotic identity**

	Chinese	HK Chinese	Hong Kongese	HK British, Overseas Chinese, other	total
Dissatisfied	11	19	21	40	20
Satisfied	74	66	68	53	68
Very satisfied	15	15	10	7	12
total	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 24.85 with 6 df p = 0.0004

The results of Table 47 demonstrate the ranking of patriotic identity clearly, with the lowest level of dissatisfaction with the PRCG among those calling themselves Chinese and highest levels among those choosing Hong Kong British, overseas Chinese or other.

However, even among these, a clear majority (60 percent) are satisfied with the performance of the PRCG in handling Hong Kong affairs. Patriotism has much less to do with political attitudes today. In terms of political participation and attitudes toward the PRCG, those registered to vote are more satisfied than non-registered. There is no significant relationship with those planning to vote, or those signing petitions or even the July 1 marchers.

**Table 48 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Registered to vote**

	Not registered	Registered to vote	total
Dissatisfied	25	18	20
Satisfied	67	68	68
Very satisfied	7	14	12
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 7.483 with 2 df p = 0.0237

Tables 49 and 50, however, show very interesting results. Rows are levels of satisfaction with the performance of the PRCG in handling Hong Kong affairs. As might be expected, 28 percent of those very dissatisfied with the HKG are also dissatisfied with the PRCG. Unexpectedly, 13 percent of the very dissatisfied with the HKG are very satisfied with the PRCG. Further, 7 percent of the few satisfied with HKG are dissatisfied with PRCG, and only 17 percent of those satisfied with the HKG's performance are also very satisfied with the PRCG, not much higher than the 13 percent very satisfied with the PRCG among the very dissatisfied with the HKG. Satisfaction with the two governments has become unlinked in many minds.

**Table 49 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Very dissatisfied with HKG	Dissatisfied with HKG	Satisfied with HKG	total
Dissatisfied	28	20	7	20
Satisfied	59	71	76	68
Very satisfied	13	9	17	12
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 30.04 with 4 df p ≤ 0.0001

A nearly identical pattern is found in Table 50. There seems to be several reactions identifiable within these patterns. First, dissatisfaction with HKG, and even more so with Tung, contributes marginally to dissatisfaction with PRCG. Satisfaction with the HKG and Tung contribute even less significantly to satisfaction with PRCG. The most significant finding is that 72 percent in Table 49 and 71 percent in Table 50 (statistically the same levels) who are very dissatisfied with HKG and with Tung are satisfied or very satisfied with the PRCG's performance in handling Hong Kong affairs. The conclusion is that something other than the PRCG's backing for Tung is driving its approval for the most. The economic support for Hong Kong gains credit for the PRCG but apparently little credit given to Tung. On the other hand, PRCG support for Tung does seem to cost the PRCG some dissatisfaction. True, there are those who seem to blame the PRCG for perhaps not backing Tung enough (the 10 percent satisfied with Tung but dissatisfied

with the PRC), but these very few are considerably outnumbered by the 30 percent who are very dissatisfied and the 16 percent dissatisfied with Tung who are also dissatisfied with the PRCG, probably for backing Tung too strongly. These same patterns may be seen with results from Table 51, satisfaction with the performance of the PRCG in ruling China.

**Table 50 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG in HK affairs by Satisfaction with performance of Tung Chee-hwa**

	Very dissatisfied with Tung performance	Dissatisfied with Tung	Satisfied with Tung	total
Dissatisfied	30	16	10	20
Satisfied	60	75	71	68
Very satisfied	11	9	19	12
total	100	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 36.00 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

**Table 51 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of the PRCG in ruling China?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Feb 93	35	49	16
Aug 93	26	55	19
Feb 94	29	53	18
Aug 94	24	64	12
Feb 95	22	62	16
Sept 95	15	62	24
Feb 96	30	49	22
July 96	28	56	16
Feb 97	38	45	17
June 97	34	51	15
Jan 98	37	39	24
Apr 98	43	34	23
June 98	44	34	22
July 98	52	24	24
Oct 98	53	24	23
Apr 99	49	31	20
July 99	44	28	27
Nov 99	49	31	20
Apr 00	38	37	24
Aug 00	47	31	22
Nov 00	47	29	24
Apr 01	41	33	26
July 01	53	28	19
Nov 01	57	20	24
April 02	60	18	22
Aug 02	60	18	22
June 03	61	22	18
Nov 03	68	15	17

As the chart shows, never have levels of satisfaction with the way the PRCG is ruling China been higher, quite in contrast to the record levels of dissatisfaction with the performance of the HKG and its CE.

Chart of Table 51 Satisfaction with performance of PRCG ruling China



The overall results of dissatisfaction with the performance of the HKG and with the CE can be seen in the replies to whether people are satisfied or dissatisfied with their lives in Hong Kong as shown in Table 52.

Table 52 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong?

Group	Count	%
Very dissatisfied	119	14
Dissatisfied	251	30
Satisfied	391	47
Very satisfied	36	4
Don't know	39	4

We reclassify the categories above, dropping the don't knows and collapsing the very satisfied, at 36 cases too small to analyze, into the satisfied group.


Table 53 Reclassified Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong

Group	Count	%
Very dissatisfied	119	15
Dissatisfied	251	32
Satisfied	427	53

The results of November's survey are by far the lowest level of satisfaction with life in Hong Kong recorded, and the 15 percent very dissatisfied today equals the entirety of those dissatisfied in 1991, and far exceed the 9 percent dissatisfied recorded in February 1997.

**Table 54 Are you currently satisfied or dissatisfied with your life in Hong Kong?**

	Satisfied	Dissatisfied	Don't know
Nov 91	84	15	1
Feb 93	85	13	2
Aug 93	88	10	2
Feb 94	88	10	2
Aug 94	87	10	3
Feb 95	86	9	5
Sept 95	80	18	2
Feb 96	85	13	2
July 96	88	10	2
Feb 97	90	9	1
June 97	86	12	2
Jan 98	81	16	3
Apr 98	71	26	3
June 98	68	30	2
July 98	74	25	1
Oct 98	70	27	3
Apr 99	72	24	3
July 99	73	26	1
Nov 99	72	26	2
Apr 00	65	33	2
Aug 00	65	31	4
Nov 00	67	30	3
Apr 01	61	34	5
June 01	71	25	4
July 01	65	32	3
Nov 01	64	33	3
Apr 02	66	31	3
Aug 02	62	34	4
Nov 02	66	31	3
June 03	60	37	3
Nov 03	51	44	4



That satisfaction with life in Hong Kong is strongly associated with attitudes toward the HKG and toward the CE can be seen the following tables. Only 4 percent of those satisfied with the performance of the HKG are also very dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong whereas 39 percent of those very dissatisfied with the HKG's performance are also very dissatisfied with life in Hong Kong. On the other hand, 30 percent of those very



dissatisfied with the HKG are satisfied with life in Hong Kong, but this rises to 82 percent satisfied with life in Hong Kong among those also satisfied with the HKG.

**Table 55 Satisfaction with life in HK by Satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Very dissatisfied with HKG	Dissatisfied with HKG	Satisfied with HKG	total
Very dissatisfied w life in HK	39	4	4	15
Dissatisfied with life in HK	32	40	13	32
Satisfied with life in HK	30	55	82	53
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 206.3 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

The same pattern, slightly less strong, appears in satisfaction with Tung's performance and satisfaction with life in Hong Kong. But there is also evidence youth and old age make for optimism, as Table 57 shows. Dissatisfaction is most pronounced among those in their 30s, 40s and 50s—the ages of fiscal responsibilities and family burdens.

**Table 56 Satisfaction with life in HK by Satisfaction w performance of Tung Chee-hwa**

	Very dissatisfied with Tung	Dissatisfied with Tung performance	Satisfied with Tung performance	total
Very dissatisfied w life in HK	30	7	6	16
Dissatisfied with life in HK	33	39	19	32
Satisfied with life in HK	38	54	75	53
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 100.2 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

**Table 57 Satisfaction with life in Hong Kong by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Very dissatisfied	9	6	19	15	16	19	11	15
dissatisfied	21	30	32	37	31	26	32	32
satisfied	70	64	50	48	53	56	58	54
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 21.36 with 12 df  $p = 0.0453$

The bottom line of analysis to this point is that satisfaction with life in Hong Kong is heading toward, if not already in, a crisis. Satisfaction with the HKG and with the CE are already deeply in crisis. In a real sense, satisfaction with the PRCG is a major factor currently holding Hong Kong together. This makes the attitude of the central government toward constitutional reform critical. Clearly, Hong Kongers believe reform is needed and those already attempted, such as the principal officials accountability system, have largely failed. The percentage thinking the accountability system (POAS) has made government less accountable to the public has risen from 12 percent in April 2002 to 21 percent in November. However, following the 1 July march and government reactions to it, those thinking POAS has made government more accountable recovered a bit from just 12 percent before the march to 16 percent in November.



**Table 58 How do you think the accountability system has affected government accountability to the public since it started in July 2002?\***

	<b>April 2002</b>	<b>June 2003</b>	<b>Nov 2003</b>
Make gov less accountable	<b>12</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>21</b>
Make gov more accountable	<b>38</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>16</b>
No change	<b>27</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>49</b>
DK	<b>24</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>14</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

\*the April 2002 question asked “. . .will affect gov accountability to the public when it starts in July?”

The majority believe POAS has failed and further reform is needed sooner than later.

**Table 59 Do you support or oppose the government to commence consultations on election changes and constitutional reforms:**

<b>Group</b>	<b>%</b>
Before the 2004 elections	<b>47</b>
After the 2004 elections	<b>10</b>
Before the 2007 CE election	<b>9</b>
After the 2007 CE election	<b>3</b>
After the 2008 Legco elections	<b>3</b>
Oppose any constitutional or election reforms	<b>3</b>
Don't know	<b>25</b>
Total	<b>100</b>

More than two thirds, 66 percent, want consultations and reform before the 2007 CE election. With those not having an opinion (the don't knows) removed, the vast majority want consultations to start sooner than later, fully 76 percent sometime in 2004.

**Table 60 Do you support or oppose the government to commence consultations on election changes and constitutional reforms (DK out)**


<b>Group</b>	<b>%</b>
Before the 2004 elections	<b>63</b>
After the 2004 elections	<b>13</b>
Before the 2007 CE election	<b>12</b>
After the 2007 CE election	<b>4</b>
After the 2008 Legco elections	<b>4</b>
Oppose any constitutional or election reforms	<b>4</b>
Total	<b>100</b>

Even with don't knows (25 percent of respondents in Table 59) left in, two thirds (47 percent preferring before 2004 elections + 10 percent after 2004 + 9 percent before 2007) of respondents want reforms *before* the 2007 CE election. The don't know responses cannot be taken as against reforms, however. Some reject consultations with the HKG as futile; others think negotiations should be with Beijing and others do not think consultations will result in any significant improvements so what is the point in preferring a date. Others still, usually the less educated, do not think themselves qualified to respond on the issue. But the march of 100,000 on New Year's Day 2004, specifically in demand of constitutional reforms and direct elections, underlines the fact that it is the vast

majority, not the don't knows or those few who want no reforms, who are increasingly agitated and activist about the need to change Hong Kong's system of governance. Most in this increasingly well educated, younger age majority insist on change. That Hong Kongers have become more activist, not least in terms of demonstrating, can be seen in Table 61 and the chart, which shows a leap in demonstration participation and petition signing in 2003.

**Table 61 Did you express concern or seek help from any of the following groups in the past 12 months? (% Yes responses only)**

	7/96	6/97	1/98	10/98	7/99	11/99	4/00	11/00	4/01	11/01	4/02	11/03
Contact Government Dept.	8	10	13	12	10	12	17	12	11	11	10	10
Contact Direct Elected Legco rep.	7	6	3	5	6	4	5	6	6	4	3	3
Contact Legco Funct Rep.	1	1	--	1	2	3	3	3	3	1	1	1
Contact District Council/Dist officer										6	6	7
Contact Xinhua/China Adviser, NPC	-	1	-	1	1	1	1	--	1	1	--	--
Contact Mass Media	5	5	6	6	5	6	6	5	3	3	4	5
Contact MAC/Kaifong/ Unions	6	7	8	11	8	10	10	3	2	3	2	2
Contact pressure/pol. group	2	2	2	3	3	3	5	1	2	1	2	1
Demonstrate/protest	8	7	5	4	6	5	5	4	3	3	2	26
Signature Campaign	44	43	41	52	45	51	49	47	36	37	25	45
Opinion survey	32	33	37	48	40	47	46	46	39	37	36	40
Donate to pol. party	11	16	18	20	15	17	17	12	15	14	14	16




While only 10 percent of those over 70 joined a demonstration, 30 percent of those in their 30s and 29 percent of those in the 40s said they had joined a demonstration in the previous 12 months. It may not be middle class concerns that see people take to the streets so much as middle age concerns, as Table 62 shows the highest levels of demonstrators among those in their 30s and 40s.

**Table 62 Within the past 12 months, did you express your concern or seek help in the following ways: By joining rally/demonstration/protest? (Read across)**

	Non-demonstrator	Demonstrator	total
18-19	72	28	100
20-29	76	24	100
30-39	70	30	100
40-49	71	29	100
50-59	81	19	100
60-69	82	19	100
70-85	91	10	100
total	75	25	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total

Chi-square = 13.68 with 6 df p = 0.0334



The total of 25 percent of respondents who demonstrated is also a sharp rise from the 2 percent who said they had demonstrated in April 2002. These demonstrators are not the same as those who said they participated in the July 1 march, but of course, most are since it was the single biggest demonstration. However, a demonstration of 50,000 or so took place later in July for direct elections, and in December 2002, one rally against Article 23 drew around 65,000 while a rally for legislation saw some 40,000 turn out. Demonstrations as a whole have gotten larger and larger demonstrations more frequent.

These demonstrators are not only younger but also much better educated than non-demonstrators or even the average among the population. Table 63 shows that only 1 percent of demonstrators had no formal education versus 7 percent among non-demonstrators and 6 percent with no formal education in the overall sample. On the other hand, 45 percent of demonstrators had university or post-graduate study versus 24 percent of non-demonstrators and 29 percent in the sample average.

**Table 63 Participation in demonstration previous 12 months by Education levels**

	<b>Non-demonstrator</b>	<b>Demonstrator</b>	<b>total</b>
(No formal)	<b>7</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>6</b>
Primary 1-6	<b>9</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>
Form 1-3	<b>18</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>16</b>
Form 4-5	<b>29</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>27</b>
Form 6-7	<b>14</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>14</b>
University	<b>24</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>


table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 44.38 with 5 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Table 64 presents the same data as Table 63. It shows the educational composition of demonstrators versus non-demonstrators, i.e. how many of each educational category demonstrated. Read across. Astonishingly, 39 percent of university or post-graduate degree holders said they participated in a demonstration in the previous 12 months. Meanwhile 94 percent of those with no education had not participated. Tables above show support for reform is strong among the active, educated and young while support for the CE is among those mainly politically passive, largely ill-educated, and elderly.

**Table 64 Education levels by demonstrate or not in previous 12 months**

	<b>Non-demonstrator</b>	<b>Demonstrator</b>	<b>total</b>
(No formal)	<b>94</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>100</b>
Primary 1-6	<b>90</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100</b>
Form 1-3	<b>80</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100</b>
Form 4-5	<b>78</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>100</b>
Form 6-7	<b>72</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100</b>
University	<b>61</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Row Total  
 Chi-square = 44.38 with 5 df  $p \leq 0.0001$



These younger, better educated demonstrators also tend to demand reform sooner than later. While 63 percent of respondents want consultations on reforms before 2004 Legco elections, 67 percent of demonstrators want them earlier. And while 14 percent of non-demonstrators want no reform or to wait until after 2007, only 6 percent of demonstrators feel the same. (Again, these demonstrators are not the same as those who marched on 1 July).

**Table 65 Demonstrate or not in previous 12 months by Support/oppose reforms**

	Non-demonstrator	Demonstrator	total
Before 04 elections	62	67	63
Before 2007	24	27	25
No reform or after 2007	14	6	12
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 620 (DK reform and DK demonstrate dropped)  
 Chi-square = 9.292 with 2 df p = 0.0096

The bottom line? The most educated and younger groups, the heart of Hong Kong's economy and the hope of its future, want constitutional reform and increasingly are willing to demonstrate. However, these demonstrators are also by no means isolated from the rest of the community. The great majority of those who did not demonstrate support the same aims. (62 percent for consultations before 2004 elections among non-demonstrators versus 67 percent feeling the same among demonstrators is not a large difference). There is a silent majority, but increasingly, its "representatives," those who protest, are speaking out for those who do not. With only 3 percent opposing constitutional reforms (29 people from a survey of 836), the demand for reform may be characterized as overwhelming, even if a tiny minority, some 6 percent, want to wait until after 2007 or 2008 to start consultations. With don't knows taken out, just 12 percent oppose consultations before 2008. This is versus 88 percent who want consultations to start before the CE election in 2007, and who thus obviously want changes in the CE election as well as for Legco elections. Demand for constitutional reforms can thus fairly be characterized as overwhelming. As Table 66 shows, those opposing reforms until after 2007 or altogether are overwhelmingly older. While 93-94 percent of under 30s support reforms, 74% of those 60-69 support reforms (though three out of four is still a huge majority). Only those above age 70 show a bare majority against reform. Significantly, many advisors to the CE, HKG and PRCG are in their 60s and 70s, the only age groups with large numbers of opponents to reforms.

**Table 66 Supporters/Opponents of constitutional reforms by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Reform before 2007	94	93	90	91	84	74	48	88
No reform or after 2007	6	7	10	9	16	26	52	12
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 609 DK on reforms dropped  
 Chi-square = 46.60 with 6 df p ≤ 0.0001

The age group composition of supporters and opponents of reforms prior to 2007 is in Table 67. Read across not down. That is, of the 12 percent in Table 66 who oppose reform before 2007, 15 percent are 70 or over and one in four (26 percent) are 60 and up. While 24 percent or about one in four are in their 40s, that is because the 40-49 age group

make up such a large proportion of the sample as a whole (32 percent). See demographic section at end of this report for all age group sample sizes. It is important to remember that the numbers in Table 67 are percentages of very different numbers of persons, with the top line being percentages of the 88 percent who support reform before 2007 and with those against reform or only after 2007 being breakdowns of only 12 percent of the sample.

**Table 67 Age group composition of Supporters/Opponents of constitutional reform**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Reform before 2007	9	16	25	33	11	4	2	100
No reform or after 2007	4	8	21	24	17	11	15	100
total	8	15	25	32	12	5	3	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total

Chi-square = 46.60 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Table 68 shows men dominate opponents to constitutional reform, with 15 percent opposed to reforms before 2007 or altogether while half as many women, 8 percent, feel similarly. Again, significantly, advisors to the CE and PRCG are mostly older men.

**Table 68 Supporters/opponents of constitutional reform by Sex**

	Male	Female	total
Reform before 2007	85	92	88
No reform or after 2007	15	8	12
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 6.130 with 1 df  $p = 0.0133$

No other demographic variable has a significant association with those who oppose reform, and no political participation variable but joining the 1 July march showed any significant association. Some critics of the marchers charge the 1 July march was not about constitutional reform but about the economy and many other issues. There appears to be a little truth to the charge, but only a very little, as Table 68 shows. The great majority of opponents to reform before 2007 did not march on 1 July though a few, 5 percent who said they wanted reform after 2007 or not at all, did. However, opponents of constitutional reform have publicly charged that non-marchers were a “silent majority” who backed the Tung government and therefore deserved to have their allegedly conservative views represented by 102 government appointees to the District Councils. Table 69 shows that 85 percent of those who did not march on 1 July (versus 95 percent among those who did march) want constitutional reform before 2007.

**Table 69 Supporters/opponents of constitutional reform by Marched 1 July**

	Marched 1 July	Did not march	total
Reform before 2007	95%	85%	88%
No reform or after 2007	5%	15%	12%
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 12.05 with 1 df  $p = 0.0005$

There is a “silent majority,” but they back constitutional reform almost as overwhelmingly as the marchers on 1 July. There are a few who joined that march for reasons other than constitutional reform, but not very many. Those who oppose

constitutional reform or want to postpone it until after 2007 and even supporters of reform do not always take their stance because they are dissatisfied with the performance of the CE or the HKG. Reading across in Table 70 shows 58 percent of those against reform until after 2007 or later (18 percent very dissatisfied plus 40 percent dissatisfied) are dissatisfied with Tung's performance, versus 86 percent of those for reforms before the 2004 Legco elections. True, 43 percent of those who oppose reforms are satisfied with Tung's performance versus only 15 and 18 percent respectively of those who support reforms before 2007, but the case can be made that dissatisfaction with the CE is not the sole factor behind the support of the vast majority for reforms. Tung should not feel that demands for constitutional reforms are a rejection of him, per se. In part, people blame the system itself for the failures of the HKG and CE.

**Table 70 Supporters/opponents of constitutional reform by Satisfaction with Tung**

	Very dissatisfied with Tung's performance	Dissatisfied with Tung's performance	Satisfied w Tung's performance	total
Before 04 elections	51	35	15	100
Before 2007	36	46	18	100
No reform or after 2007	18	40	43	100
total	43	38	19	100

table contents: Percent of Row Total  
 Chi-square = 44.43 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

The same can be shown in terms of satisfaction with the performance of the HKG.

**Table 71 Supporters/opponents of constitutional reform by Satisfaction with HKG**

	Very dissatisfied with HKG's performance	Dissatisfied with HKG's performance	Satisfied HKG's performance	total
Before 04 elections	41	42	17	100
Before 2007	33	53	15	100
No reform or after 2007	12	54	35	100
total	36	46	19	100


table contents: Percent of Row Total  
 Chi-square = 30.04 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Many (though not most) thus support reform NOT out of dissatisfaction with the performance of the current CE and HKG but out of dissatisfaction with the system. This is even more the case with those satisfied or dissatisfied with the performance of political parties. It appears that people want direct elections and constitutional reforms to increase their say in government, whether or not they feel satisfied with the performance of the current holders of office. Table 72 shows the overall levels of satisfaction and dissatisfaction by party. Don't knows are dropped, leaving the number with an opinion as listed in the far right column. This allows relative comparison of the satisfaction levels of the parties.



**Table 72 Satisfaction with political parties (ranked in order of dissatisfaction in 2003)**

Party	Dissatisfied with performance	Satisfied with performance	Number of respondents
Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong	74	26	641
HK Progressive Alliance	72	28	326
New Century Forum	59	41	196
Federation of Trade Unions	56	44	522
Frontier	52	48	586
Democratic Party	49	51	629
Citizens Party	48	52	268
Liberal Party	44	56	590
Confederation of Trade Unions	36	54	545
HK Assoc. for Democracy & People's Livelihood	32	68	442



It is apparent that parties affiliated with the HKG show higher levels of dissatisfaction. DAB, HKPA, NCF, FTU are generally supporters; Frontier, DP, CTU and ADPL are



usually opponents. Liberals were fervent HKG supporters until July 2003 when LP chairman James Tien quit Exco over Article 23 legislation being pushed forward after he urged postponement. However, other aspects of their stances clearly affect satisfaction levels with their performance. With close ties between FTU and DAB, for example, the difference in dissatisfaction of 18 percentage points cannot be attributed to their almost indistinguishable support for Tung (at least up to the 2003 District Council election). The changes in attitudes toward the parties between 1999 and 2003 can be seen in the table below and the two charts.


**Table 73 Satisfaction/Dissatisfaction with Hong Kong parties and leaders 2003/1999**

	Dissatisfied 2003	Satisfied 2003	Difference +/- Nov 2003	% know about party 03	Dissatisfied 1999	Satisfied 1999	Difference +/- Nov 1999	% know about party 99
Democratic Party led by Yeung Sum	47	53	+6	75	48	52	+4	79
DAB led by Tsang Yok-sing	74	26	-48	77	53	47	-6	69
LP led by James Tien	45	55	+10	71	60	40	-20	65
Frontier led by Emily Lau	49	51	+2	70	35	65	+30	72
CTU led by Lau Chin-shek	31	69	+38	65	29	71	+42	70
FTU led by Cheng Yiu Tong	60	41	-19	62	38	62	+24	57
HKPA led by Ambrose Lau	73	26	-47	39	67	33	-34	39
Citizens Party led by Alex Chan	45	54	+9	32	28	72	+44	62
HKADPL led by Fredrick Fung	29	71	+42	53	29	71	+42	59
New Century Forum by Ng Chingfai	56	44	-12	33	--	--	NA	


\*Numbers are percentages of those who plan to vote

The changes in dissatisfaction and satisfaction levels between 1999 and 2004 are mainly explainable in terms of changes in stance toward the HKG and the CE, not in changes in leadership though in several of the parties this did take place, and in at least one case, the Citizens Party, changes in leadership seem to have made very large differences both in percentages of those who know about the party and in people's favor toward it. While the FTU, DAB and HKPA all were negatively affected by their joining the pro-government coalition in the July 2002 Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS) reform, the Frontier who have always been opponents of the HKG and CE appear to have seen rising dissatisfaction with their performance as well.

**Chart of Dissatisfaction with parties, ranked by dissatisfaction in 1999**



**Chart of Satisfaction with parties, ranked by satisfaction in 1999**



As with dissatisfaction or satisfaction with the performance of the CE and the HKG, support or opposition to reforms has a fair degree of association with satisfaction with the performance of various parties, but not wholly. For example, 7 percent of those satisfied with the performance of the Democratic Party (DP) want no reforms or delayed past 2007, something completely contrary to DP fundamentals and party platforms.

**Table 74 Support for constitutional reforms by Satisfaction with Democratic Party**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Reform before 2004 Legco elections	59	66	63
Reform before 2007 CE election	24	26	25
No reform or after 2007	17	7	12
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 629  
 Chi-square = 11.52 with 2 df p = 0.0032

Similarly, of those satisfied with the performance of the Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong (DAB), who before the District Council elections were staunch supporters of Tung Chee-hwa, a majority support reforms before the 2004 elections and

an overwhelming majority want reforms before the 2007 CE election (53 percent by 2004 and 85 percent before 2007 combining the two categories.) Only 16 percent of those satisfied and 10 percent of those dissatisfied with DAB want no reforms or delays until after 2007.

**Table 75 Support for constitutional reforms by Satisfaction with DAB**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Reform before 2004 Legco elections	67	53	64
Reform before 2007 CE election	24	32	25
No reform or after 2007	10	16	11
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 641  
 Chi-square = 7.288 with 2 df p = 0.0261

There is no association between the satisfied with LP and views on reforms. In fact, those satisfied show 90 percent wanting reform before 2007 versus 87 percent of those dissatisfied, and more dissatisfied with the LP and want no reforms or delayed reforms are, at 13 percent, higher than the 10 percent of satisfied with the LP taking the same stance. The LP, which has no clear support for reforms but whose supporters do, would lose no satisfaction by backing reforms. Reform is seen as making the HKG system respond to the people; something Tien accomplished by resigning, an act which rocketed the LP satisfaction levels.

**Table 76 Support for constitutional reforms by Satisfaction with LP**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Reform before 2004 Legco elections	65	62	63
Reform before 2007 CE election	22	28	26
No reform or after 2007	13	10	11
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 590  
 Chi-square = 3.027 with 2 df p = 0.2202

There is association between satisfaction with the Frontier and support for reforms, in fact the strongest association of any of the parties. (Measured by Chi-square, which shows less chance of the pattern being random the closer to zero it comes. The totals change slightly as each party has differences in number of respondents, as shown in Table 72 far right column.)

**Table 77 Support for constitutional reforms by Satisfaction with Frontier**

	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Reform before 2004 Legco elections	57	66	62
Reform before 2007 CE election	25	26	26
No reform or after 2007	18	7	13
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 586  
 Chi-square = 12.74 with 2 df p = 0.0017

There is weaker association between satisfaction levels with the Confederation of Trade Unions (CTU), an ally of Frontier and DP and support for constitutional reforms, and none at all between its pro-government, pro-Beijing rival, the Federation of Trade Unions (FTU).

**Table 78 Support for constitutional reforms by Satisfaction with CTU**

	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>total</b>
Reform before 2004 Legco elections	<b>57</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>63</b>
Reform before 2007 CE election	<b>23</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>25</b>
No reform or after 2007	<b>20</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>12</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 11.21 with 2 df p = 0.0037

None of the other parties show significant association between levels of satisfaction and the stance of respondents toward reform (the Assoc. for Democracy & People's Livelihood shows very weak association). Since the DP, DAB, Frontier, and CTU all make clear their stance supporting constitutional reform, it should be no surprise to see some association between attitudes toward reform and levels of satisfaction with these. On the other hand, the other parties have a less clear or no clear stance on reforms. As constitutional reform rises as a campaign issue in the 2004 Legco election, however, and certainly after those elections, stances on reforms and satisfaction levels may be expected to more closely correlate. Next, we look at what those for reform want in terms of specific constitutional changes.

**Part II Attitudes toward specific constitutional issues**

This section examines attitudes toward specific constitutional issues such as direct election of the CE and Legco. The final section will examine how Hong Kong people would like to be consulted on these issues and their views on the role of the PRCG in the process.

Given the results of the November 2003 District Council elections in which allies of the CE lost heavily and taking the demonstration of around 100,000 on New Years Day 2004 against the 102 government appointees to District Councils and for direct elections of all government officials, we start with views on direct elections of the District Council. Clearly, a very large majority, 82 percent (Strong support +support), back direct election to District Councils.

**Table 79 Do you support or oppose direct election of all District Council members?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	214	26
Support	465	56
Oppose	98	12
Strongly oppose	10	1
Don't Know	49	6

Removing those who do not have an opinion and collapsing the 10 people strongly opposed into the same group as those opposed gives the results in Table 80. Of those with an opinion, 86 percent support direct election of all District Council members.

**Table 80 Recoded support/oppose direct election of all District Council members**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	214	27
Support	465	59
Oppose	108	14

Interestingly, while those born in Hong Kong and those born in China have the same levels of opposition, those born in China more strongly support direct election of District Council members than those born in Hong Kong. Nearly half of those born elsewhere feel strongly that all members should be directly elected.

**Table 81 Support direct election of District Council by Birth**

	HK born	China born	Elsewhere born	total
Strongly support	24	33	49	27
Support	62	53	46	59
Oppose	14	14	6	14
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 13.21 with 4 df p = 0.0103

Males also more strongly support direct elections than females, with 31 percent of men strongly supporting versus 24 percent among women.

**Table 82 Support direct election of District Council by Sex**

	Male	Female	total
Strongly support	31	24	27
Support	56	62	59
Oppose	13	15	14
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 5.284 with 2 df p = 0.0712

Surprisingly, those in their 70s and up most strongly support direct elections while teenagers are the most indifferent, and surprisingly, almost as many teenagers oppose direct elections (23 percent) to District Councils as oppose among those 70 and up (29 percent). And surprisingly, neither education level nor occupation had significant association with support or opposition to direct elections of District Councils.

**Table 83 Support Direct election of District Council by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Strongly support	18	20	27	28	32	26	37	27
Support	59	65	62	58	58	62	34	59
Oppose	23	15	11	14	10	13	29	14
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 23.04 with 12 df p = 0.0274

Of those very dissatisfied with the HKG, 93 percent support or strongly support election of all District Council members. On the other hand, 75 percent of those satisfied with the HKG also support or strongly support direct elections, so again, while dissatisfaction with the HKG may play a role in strengthening support for direct election of all District Council members, it is by no means the deciding factor for the majority, as clearly an overwhelming percentage of both those dissatisfied and satisfied with the HKG support direct elections.

**Table 84 Support direct election of District Council by Satisfaction with HKG**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Strongly support	40	22	20	27
Support	53	65	55	59
Oppose	7	13	25	14
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 758

Chi-square = 50.21 with 4 df p ≤ 0.0001

The same pattern appears regarding satisfaction with Tung Chee-hwa's performance, showing that most—both among critics and supporters—have concluded that the system needs reform in order to make it work better, not just a replacement of the present leadership. It may be that deeply entrenched interests, misplaced loyalty to the CE or the HKG, or simply fear of change and the unknown repercussions which may ensue lie behind the fears of the few to make the systemic reforms the vast majority want.


**Table 85 Support direct election of District Council by Satisfaction with Tung**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Strongly support	41	21	15	28
Support	50	66	62	59
Oppose	9	14	23	14
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 751

Chi-square = 53.80 with 4 df p ≤ 0.0001

**Chart of Table 85 Support direct election of District Council by Satisfaction with Tung**



While in principle and in the future so many support direct election of all District Council members, a smaller majority (55 percent) opposed the appointment of members to the District Councils as provided in the current laws.

**Table 86 Do you support or oppose the government to appoint 102 additional members to the 400 District Council members directly elected?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	18	2
Support	225	27
Oppose	316	38
Strongly oppose	139	17
Don't Know	138	16

With those who do not have an opinion removed (don't know above), the appointments to the District Councils were opposed two to one, and strongly opposed by one in five.

**Table 87 Recoded support/oppose government appointments to District Councils**

Group	Count	%
Support	243	35
Oppose	316	45
Strongly oppose	139	20

N = 698

This apparent lessening of opposition to government appointees to District Councils has a very striking peculiarity. While there are no significant variations in the association of distribution by birthplace or sex, age groups show a striking difference between teenagers and all others, with only 8 percent of teenagers and 12 percent of those in their 20s strongly opposing appointments versus around 20 percent on average among other ages, including the normally most pro-government age group of 70 and up. Fully 60 percent of teenagers said they supported the government appointments to District Councils, far above all other groups.



**Table 88 Support/oppose government appointments to District Councils by Age**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Support	60	36	33	27	44	40	32	35
Oppose	32	53	47	49	37	37	48	46
Strongly oppose	8	12	20	24	20	23	19	19
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 684

Chi-square = 30.37 with 12 df p = 0.0025

This age group distribution explains why only among students and educators does a bare majority support the appointments. Strikingly, among the occupations, only the unemployed support the government appointments to the District Councils less than business managers and administrators, and it is among these business people that the strongest opposition to government appointments (30 percent) to District Councils arise.

**Table 89 Support/oppose government appointments to District Councils by Occupation**

	Manager Admin	Professional Assoc professional	Clerk	Service & sales	Ag.fish, craft, machine operator	House wife	Retire	Unemployed	Students educator	total
Support	29	34	32	37	43	31	36	23	51	35
Oppose	42	47	46	40	42	49	46	56	39	45
Strongly oppose	30	20	22	23	15	20	18	21	10	20
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 684

Chi-square = 23.84 with 16 df p = 0.0932

Also striking, opposition to the appointments is strongest among the public sector, that is, civil servants and quasi-public organizations, (71 percent) while the least opposition is among the non-working (63 percent). Government is least supported by its own employees.

**Table 90 Support/oppose government appointments to District Council by Work sector**

	Public	Private	Non-working	total
Support	22	36	37	35
Oppose	49	44	46	45
Strongly oppose	29	20	17	20
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 692

Chi-square = 9.033 with 4 df p = 0.0603

The appointments are also least supported by those most dissatisfied with the performance of the government. However, opposition and support are equally divided even among those satisfied with the performance of the HKG.



**Table 91 Support/oppose government appointments to District Council by Satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Support	19	39	50	35
Oppose	51	45	37	45
Strongly oppose	30	17	13	20
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 671  
 Chi-square = 47.53 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

And a similar pattern obtains among those satisfied or dissatisfied with Tung's performance.

**Table 92 Support/oppose government appointments to District Council by Satisfaction with performance of Tung**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Support	23	37	52	35
Oppose	47	48	37	45
Strongly oppose	30	15	11	20
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 666  
 Chi-square = 49.25 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Those who marched in the huge 1 July protest show much stronger opposition to the appointments, and as might be expected, much stronger support for direct elections of all members of the District Councils than those who did not. Clearly for many who participated, the 1 July march was about constitutional reform.

**Table 93 Support government appointments to District Council by 1 July protest**

	Marched 1 July	Did not march	total
Support	24	39	35
Oppose	47	45	45
Strongly oppose	29	17	20
total	100	100	100


table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 697  
 Chi-square = 18.36 with 2 df  $p = 0.0001$

**Table 94 Support direct election of all District Council members by 1 July protest**

	Marched 1 July	Did not march	total
Strongly support	37	24	27
Support	55	61	59
Oppose	8	16	14
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 786  
 Chi-square = 16.08 with 2 df  $p = 0.0003$

**Chart Support direct election of all District Council members by 1 July protest**



There was very weak association between satisfaction with performance of the PRCG in Hong Kong affairs and support or opposition to government appointees or direct elections, nor was there association with patriotic identity to either appointment or direct elections. This lack of association among these variables indicates that to date, the China factor and/or patriotism have little to do with opposition to direct elections or District Council appointees. This may change if the PRCG insists on inserting itself into the constitutional reform debate.

We turn to attitudes toward Legco. Legco will take the next step toward becoming a fully directly elected representative body as promised in the Basic Law in September 2004 with the direct election of 30 members and the functional election of 30. Thereafter, the pace of reform will depend on two thirds of Legco and the consent of the CE to their decision and perhaps the PRCG agreeing there is a need to change the Basic Law. Currently, the pro-democracy groups in Legco and the DAB are both on record in support of full direct elections for Legco in 2008. If these political groups plus the 6 additional directly elected members in September 2004 support full direct elections to Legco, the odds are high that 40 or more out of the 60 Legco votes will be found to support a fully directly elected Legco. Legislator Eric Li (functionally elected to the accountancy seat) in RTHK Radio Three's "Letter to Hong Kong" (4 January 2004) suggested that a fully elected Legco should wait until 2016, unless, he said, public opinion polls showed a two thirds majority view in support of a faster pace of change. At 77 percent in support of universal suffrage direct elections, clearly far more than two thirds of the public support such elections to Legco.

**Table 95 Do you support or oppose direct election of all Legco seats?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	244	29
Support	397	48
Oppose	109	13
Strongly oppose	13	1
Don't Know	73	9

A far smaller number answered don't know on this question than most others, but with those without an opinion dropped and the few who strongly oppose collapsed into the same category with those who oppose (for analysis reasons), the proportions become even more clearly in favor of direct election of all Legco seats, with 84 percent of those having an opinion favoring direct elections.

**Table 96 Support/oppose direct election of all Legco seats recoded**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	244	32
Support	397	52
Oppose	122	16

But this still does not answer the question of when such elections are favored to occur even if a very large majority support direct elections in principle. Of that 84 percent who support direct elections for Legco, 90 percent support full direct elections in 2008 while 4 percent prefer 2012 and 6 percent a later election. Of the total sample, as Table 97 shows, with don't knows and those opposed included, a total of 69 percent, above two thirds, prefer full direct election of all Legco members in 2008.

**Table 97 If you support direct elections of all Legco seats, when would you implement?**

Group	Count	%
2008	576	69
2012	27	3
2016 or later	38	5
(Don't Knows and opposed)	195	23

The above results prove that, *if the two thirds rule for Legco to decide on reform for itself were applied to the population as a whole, two thirds if not more of the people already have decided they want direct elections of all of Legco in 2008.* Mr. Li's criteria of two thirds suggested in the RTHK broadcast on means to decide whether to speed up the pace of electoral reform for Legco faster than his proposal of achieving a directly elected Legco by 2016 have already been clearly met, even before consultations have started. *Two thirds already support full direct elections of all Legco members by 2008.* Further, while the don't knows and opposed are combined above, other analyses in this report indicate that many don't knows are more skeptical of the efficacy of direct elections than opposed to them. The 69 percent in support of direct elections in 2008 are likely the low end, not the high end, of community support for direct elections to Legco sooner rather than later.


While neither birthplace nor sex made differences in support or opposition to directly electing all Legco members, age did, and as with the District Councils, surprisingly among those in their teens who showed the highest opposition of all groups to direct elections for Legco. Not surprisingly, those in their 60s and 70s also showed fairly high numbers of opponents to direct election, though those in their 70s also gave the strongest support to direct elections.

**Table 98 Support/oppose direct election of all Legco seats by Age group**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Strongly support	26	24	36	32	35	26	39	32
Support	44	61	52	53	53	52	33	52
Oppose	31	15	12	15	13	22	27	16
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 744

Chi-square = 23.44 with 12 df p = 0.0242



Of the other variables we have tracked consistently in this report such as occupation and identity, none but satisfaction level with the performance of the HKG and the CE and whether or not they marched on 1 July had any significant association with support or opposition to direct election of Legco (Tables 99, 100 and 101).

**Table 99 Support/oppose direct election of all Legco seats by Satisfaction with performance of the HKG**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Strongly support	48	27	19	32
Support	43	57	54	52
Oppose	9	16	27	16
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 740

Chi-square = 53.38 with 4 df p ≤ 0.0001


**Table 100 Support/oppose direct election of all Legco seats by Satisfaction with performance of the CE**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Strongly support	49	25	13	32
Support	42	60	57	52
Oppose	10	15	31	16
total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 730

Chi-square = 85.98 with 4 df p ≤ 0.0001

**Chart of Table 100 Support Legco direct elections by Satisfaction with CE**



The association of marching or not with support for direct election of Legco is not all that significant, except in the difference between a huge majority or an overwhelming majority of support, with 82 percent who did not march supporting direct election versus 91 percent of those who marched supporting direct election

**Table 101 Support/oppose direct election of all Legco seats by Marched 1 July**

	Marched 1 July	Did not march	total
Strongly support	39	30	32
Support	52	52	52
Oppose	9	18	16
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 762  
 Chi-square = 11.11 with 2 df p = 0.0039

While 27 percent of those satisfied with HKG performance opposed direct election of all Legco, 9 percent of very dissatisfied and 16 percent of dissatisfied also opposed direct election (Table 99). Once again, the HKG's performance is not the trigger for supporting or opposing constitutional reform for all who support or oppose such changes as direct election.

What might explain why those satisfied with government performance nevertheless also support the constitutional reform of direct election? The next set of questions probe some of the reasoning other than performance behind these attitudes. In many examples of political science research across countries, notions of fairness and efficacy tend to predominate in reasons given for support or opposition to constitutional structures or other political processes. Table 102 indicates that much support for direct elections for Legco arise for many from a sense that direct elections would make government policies fairer. Indeed, even the 16 percent who oppose direct election falls to 6 percent (with don't knows removed) who see direct elections as making government policies less rather than more fair. This means many opponents to direct elections oppose changes they admit improve fairness.

**Table 102 Would direct election of all Legco seats help make government policies fairer or less fair?**

Group	Nov 2002	Nov 2003
Much fairer	24	27
Fairer	44	48
Stay same	8	8
Less fair	7	4
Much less fair	2	1
Don't know	15	11

The results of the November 2003 survey show significant differences with a Hong Kong Transition Project survey of November 2002. In November 2002, 68 percent thought direct elections would make government policies fairer or much fairer while the latest survey shows 75 percent think direct elections improve fairness. Also of interest, those thinking direct elections reduce fairness dropped from 9 percent to 5 percent (a change of 4 percentage points indicates at a 95 percent confidence level that the change is real and not just a statistical sampling error). Before dropping Nov 2003 don't knows in Table 102, run the fairness results against support for direct election for Legco shows the don't knows actually fall somewhere between those who think direct elections will make government policies fairer and those thinking they will stay the same. The don't knows cannot be taken as supportive of the conservatives, but perhaps more as leaning toward being uncertain about the efficacy of such reforms, a more "what's the use" sort of response, or perhaps even a fear to get hopes up that changes might actually result in improvements.

**Table 103 Direct election of Legco effect on policy fairness by support direct election**

	Much fairer	Fairer	Stay same	Less fair	Don't know	total
Strongly support	66	21	13	9	14	32
Support	29	66	51	35	58	52
Oppose	5	13	36	56	29	16
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total 763

Chi-square = 225.9 with 8 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

For further analysis, we drop the don't knows and recode. The number of people replying less fair is at the bare minimum to sustain a separate category, but there consistently appears to be significant differences between those who are neutral or see no change or chance of improvement and those opposed to reform, so we will retain the separation of categories.

**Table 104 Would direct election of all Legco seats help make government policies fairer or less fair, recoded**


Group	Count	%
Much fairer	229	31
Fairer	402	54
Stay same	68	9
Less fair	42	6

None of the demographic variables show significant association with views on the fairness effect of direct elections of Legco on government policies except occupation. It might be expected categories such as managers, administrators and professionals might be the most likely to deem direct Legco elections to make policies unfair to them, but this is not the case.

**Table 105 Occupation by Effect on policy fairness of direct election of all Legco seats**

	Manager Admin	Professional Assoc professional	Clerk	Service & sales	Ag.fish, craft, machine operator	House wife	Retire	Unem ployed	Students educator	total
Much fairer	33	29	28	29	30	30	33	51	24	31
Fairer	59	55	59	59	52	56	49	35	58	55
Stay same	5	15	8	11	7	7	12	2	14	9
Less fair	3	1	6	2	11	8	5	12	5	6
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 724  
 Chi-square = 36.99 with 24 df p = 0.0439



In fact, as the chart of Table 105 makes very clear, managers and professionals have the lowest levels of deeming direct elections to have an unfair effect on Legco policies. The unemployed are most polarized, having both the highest level deeming the effect of direct elections as much fairer and of making policies less fair.

Other variables such as satisfaction with the performance of the HKG and Tung, as before, show significant association with judgments on the fairness effect of direct elections. Of those very dissatisfied with HKG performance, 47 percent think direct elections would make policies much fairer while only 18 percent of those satisfied with HKG performance feel the same.



**Table 106 Satisfaction with performance of HKG by Effect on policy fairness of direct election of all Legco seats**

	<b>Very dissatisfied</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>total</b>
Much fairer	<b>47</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>31</b>
Fairer	<b>45</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>54</b>
Stay same	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>9</b>
Less fair	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>6</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 709  
 Chi-square = 61.28 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

But as before, neither satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the government or Tung explain all the variation among respondents about the effects of direct elections on fairness of policy making. Many appear to support direct elections out of the principle that equal voting power for equally proportioned representatives is inherently fairer than the present system of highly disproportionate voting power and representative power.

**Table 107 Satisfaction with performance of Tung by Effect on policy fairness of direct election of all Legco seats**

	<b>Very dissatisfied</b>	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>total</b>
Much fairer	<b>44</b>	<b>26</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>32</b>
Fairer	<b>48</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>55</b>
Stay same	<b>4</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>8</b>
Less fair	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>5</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 61.91 with 6 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Nor does perceptions of satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the PRGC much affect distributions of support for direct elections because they result in fairer policies.

**Table 108 Satisfied with performance of PRGC handling Hong Kong affairs by Effect on policy fairness of direct election of all Legco**

	<b>Dissatisfied</b>	<b>Satisfied</b>	<b>Very satisfied</b>	<b>total</b>
Much fairer	<b>38</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>31</b>
Fairer	<b>49</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>55</b>
Stay same	<b>7</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>9</b>
Less fair	<b>7</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>5</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N= 679  
 Chi-square = 13.37 with 6 df  $p = 0.0375$

There does seem to be a rather strong association between assessments of the fairness effect of direct elections with those who marched on 1 July, with only 9 percent of those who marched thinking fairness would not change or become less with direct elections versus 17 percent who feel this way among those who did not march. Nevertheless, both the 91 percent among marchers and 83 percent among non-marchers who think direct elections would make government policies fairer represents an overwhelming majority of public opinion. Since a sense of fairness is a key component in the legitimacy of a system of governance, and crucial to government's ability to rule, clearly moving to



direct elections of Legco would help substantially in addressing Hong Kong's current legitimacy crisis in governance.

**Table 109 Marched on 1 July by Effect on policy fairness of direct election of Legco**

	<b>Marched 1 July</b>	<b>Did not march</b>	<b>total</b>
Much fairer	<b>40</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>31</b>
Fairer	<b>51</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>54</b>
Stay same	<b>6</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>
Less fair	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 740  
 Chi-square = 12.31 with 3 df p = 0.0064

And just as clearly, assessments that direct elections bring improved fairness are stronger among those who said they planned to vote in the November District Council elections than in those who did not. In a sense, many who may have been voting for greater fairness via direct elections in November 2003 no doubt had a sense of fairness which was offended by the CE's appointment of 102 pro-government councilors which overrode the mandate of the electorate. This sense of offended fairness must have contributed to the larger than expected turnout of demonstrators on 1 January.

**Table 110 Plan to vote by Effect on policy fairness of direct election of all Legco seats**

	<b>No plan to vote</b>	<b>Plan to vote</b>	<b>total</b>
Much fairer	<b>25</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>31</b>
Fairer	<b>56</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>54</b>
Stay same	<b>11</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>9</b>
Less fair	<b>8</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>6</b>
<b>total</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 739  
 Chi-square = 11.54 with 3 df p = 0.0091

A second vector of why people support or oppose direct elections to Legco has to do with efficacy, that is, a sense of whether such a reform might improve government performance or ability to get things done. Currently, Hong Kong is in a spiral of weak government being unable or unwilling to do anything much, which then triggers even more criticism that government is inert in the face of a crisis or ongoing necessities, further weakening the ability and willingness of government to attempt anything significant or controversial.

**Table 111 How much influence does Legco have on making government policies?**

<b>Group</b>	<b>Nov 2002</b>	<b>Nov 2003</b>
A great deal	<b>18</b>	<b>20</b>
Fair amount	<b>28</b>	<b>35</b>
Very small amount	<b>29</b>	<b>25</b>
No influence	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>
Don't Know	<b>15</b>	<b>11</b>

The sense that Legco has influence on the making of government policies has grown considerably since November 2002. Then less than a majority (46 percent) thought

Legco had a great deal or fair amount of influence. A year later, 55 percent see Legco has influence on government policy making. While 63 percent in November 2002 thought direct elections would increase Legco's influence (Table 112), a year on 72 percent see direct elections as increasing Legco's influence on policy-making. The greatest rise has been among those who say direct elections would greatly increase Legco's influence, from 10 percent in November 2002 to 21 percent in November 2003.

**Table 112 If all Legco seat were directly elected, would that influence increase, decrease or stay the same? (November 2002)**

Group	Nov 2002	Nov 2003
Greatly increase	10	21
Increase	53	51
Stay same	18	15
Decrease	4	2
Greatly decrease	2	1
Don't know	13	10

The influence effect of direct elections of all Legco seats seems to have a greater strength of association with people's support or opposition to direct elections of all Legco than even the sense of fairness. Two thirds of those who think direct elections will greatly increase Legco's influence on policy making strongly support direct elections. Nearly the same proportion of those who think direct elections will decrease that influence oppose direct elections (59 percent).

**Table 113 Direct elections of Legco influence effect by Support for direct elections of all Legco**

	Greatly increase	Increase	Same	Decrease	Don't know	total
Strongly support	67	25	16	14	15	32
Support	23	63	59	27	60	52
Oppose	11	12	25	59	25	16
total	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 169.0 with 8 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Men more than women believe direct elections will increase Legco's influence on policy making (77 percent versus 67 percent). Again teens are most doubtful about the efficacy of direct elections, with 29 percent saying no effect and 5 percent forecasting a decrease.

**Table 114 Direct elections effect on Legco influence by Age groups**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
Greatly increase	12	14	27	24	15	15	21	21
Increase	47	62	51	51	55	46	29	52
Stay same	29	15	13	11	17	17	17	15
Decrease	5	2	2	5	3	2	7	3
Don't know	7	7	7	9	10	20	26	10
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 816  
 Chi-square = 59.16 with 24 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

The greater the education level, the more certain respondents are about direct elections increasing Legco's influence. While just 50 percent of those with no formal education think direct elections will increase Legco's influence, 80 percent of those with university

or post-graduate degrees see direct elections as having an effect of increasing Legco's influence, and just 2 percent of university graduates see elections as decreasing Legco's influence versus 9 percent of those who no formal education.

**Table 115 Direct elections effect on Legco influence by Education level**

	No formal	Primary 1-6	Form 1-3	Form 4-5	Form 6-7	University	total
Greatly increase	24	12	16	28	15	20	21
Increase	26	43	49	48	60	60	52
Stay same	17	23	20	12	13	12	15
Decrease	9	5	3	2	4	2	3
Don't know	24	18	12	10	8	5	10
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 826  
 Chi-square = 56.47 with 20 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

Two groups with disproportionate influence in Legco under current arrangements also show much higher levels of expectations that influence will decrease than other occupational groups. These two, the manager/administrators or usually business people, and those in agriculture, fisheries, craft work and machine operators, both have 7 percent who believe direct elections will decrease Legco's influence on policy making. These two groups, along with professionals, have a number of seats in the functional constituencies set aside for them. The members of these occupational categories may consider that direct elections would reduce the ability of their candidates or representatives of their groups to win seats to Legco, thus reducing the influence of Legco in making policies or influencing government policies which most affect them. On the other hand, among managers and administrators at least, there appears to be a high level of those who believe direct elections would greatly increase Legco's influence, and at 27 percent, only clerks with 29 percent exceed the proportions of business people who see direct elections as having a great effect on Legco's influence. In some sense, those who currently enjoy functional constituency enhanced influence in the present Legco will have to choose between more influence in a less effective body and perhaps less influence in a more influential or effective body.

**Table 116 Direct elections effect on Legco influence by Occupation**

	Manager Admin	Professional Assoc professional	Clerk	Service & sales	Ag.fish, craft, machine operator	House wife	Retire	Unem ployed	Students educator	total
Greatly increase	27	22	29	16	18	13	18	26	13	20
Increase	51	60	57	62	48	47	43	44	55	52
Same	12	9	8	13	20	16	14	17	21	15
Decrease	7	1	0	2	7	4	3	0	4	3
DK	3	8	6	7	8	21	22	13	6	10
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 817  
 Chi-square = 77.95 with 32 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

We turn now to the core issue of constitutional reform in our executive-led system, preferences on the means of electing the Chief Executive. The CE is currently nominated and elected by an 800 member group made up primarily (three fourths of the seats) of representatives elected by the fewer than 200,000 functional constituency members. All

60 members of Legco sit on the committee as part of the one fourth made up of ex officio political representatives, so 24 of 800 are directly elected. The balance of the 200 out of 800 seats are National Peoples Congress members and other current or former political appointees of the HKG and PRCG.

*The support for direct election of the CE is the constitutional reform most highly supported of any other change. One third strongly support such a constitutional reform, and overall 81 percent, even not excluding the don't knows, support this change. Besides being the most supported and most strongly supported of all constitutional changes, it is also the most supported to take place sooner rather than later. Even with don't knows and those who oppose recoded together, 70 percent support directly electing the CE in 2007.*

**Table 117 Do you support or oppose direct election of the Chief Executive?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	275	33
Support	398	48
Oppose	93	11
Strongly oppose	15	2
Don't know	55	6

**Table 118 When should direct election of CE be implemented?**

Group	Count	%
In 2007	586	70
In 2012	51	6
Later than 2012	36	4
(Oppose or Don't know)	163	19

We recode these two tables as follows for analysis. We drop the don't knows from Table 117 and collapse oppose and strongly oppose together (15 strongly opposed is far too few to analyze).

**Table 119 Support for direct election of CE recoded**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	275	35
Support	398	51
Oppose	108	14

We will retain the don't knows with the oppose in Table 120, though the don't knows do not oppose direct election so much as, usually, doubt that change will make a difference.

**Table 120 When to implement direct election recorded**

Group	Count	%
In 2007	<b>586</b>	<b>70</b>
In 2012 or later	<b>87</b>	<b>11</b>
Oppose/Don't Know	<b>163</b>	<b>19</b>

Cross tabulating Table 119 against the list of demographic variables shows no association of support for direct election of the CE with any of them. Neither does identity or attitude toward the PRCG show any association. Only the political variables of satisfaction with the performance of the HKG and CE and whether they are registered to vote, planned to vote on 23 November, or marched on 1 July show a significant association. Table 121 and following show the details of each of these variables.

**Table 121 Support for direct election of CE by Satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Strongly support	<b>50</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>35</b>
Support	<b>42</b>	<b>56</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>51</b>
Oppose	<b>9</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>14</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 754  
 Chi-square = 43.40 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

**Table 122 Support for direct election of CE by Satisfaction with performance of CE**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Strongly support	<b>52</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>36</b>
Support	<b>41</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>51</b>
Oppose	<b>7</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>14</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 748  
 Chi-square = 89.00 with 4 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

The association of support for direct election of the CE with satisfaction with performance of the HKG and of the current CE is not surprising. What is a bit surprising is that there is little difference in the pattern of association with registration to vote and support for direct election of the CE and even very little difference between the pattern of responses of registered voters with those who planned to vote in the November District Council elections.

**Table 123 Support for direct election of CE by Registered to vote**

	Not registered to vote	Registered to vote	total
Strongly support	<b>26</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>35</b>
Support	<b>56</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>51</b>
Oppose	<b>19</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>14</b>
total	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100</b>

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 781  
 Chi-square = 11.65 with 2 df  $p = 0.0029$

**Table 124 Support for direct election of CE by Planned to vote in District Council election**

	No plan to vote	Planned to vote	total
Strongly support	29	39	35
Support	54	49	51
Oppose	17	12	14
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total  
 Chi-square = 10.82 with 2 df p = 0.0045

Marching on the first of July does make a bigger difference than registering or planning to vote, but surprisingly, the marchers are a bit less strongly in support of direct elections than those very dissatisfied with the performance of the HKG or CE. (See Tables 121 and 122).

**Table 125 Support for direct election of CE by Marched on 1 July**

	Marched 1 July	Did not march	total
Strongly support	45	32	35
Support	47	52	51
Oppose	8	16	14
total	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 780  
 Chi-square = 15.27 with 2 df p = 0.0005

These two variables, satisfaction with performance of the HKG and CE also show the biggest effect on preferences on when to bring in direct elections for the CE. So while principle may play a part in support for reforming the process of electing a CE toward direct election, for most it appears that performance is the key reason. Tung Chee-hwa tried to improve government performance by making ministers accountable to him. At Tables 126 and 127 show, and as the charts below each table make even clearer, it appears rather evident that the vast majority of Hong Kongers want to improve government performance by making the CE directly account to themselves through the ballot box. Even among those satisfied with the performance of the HKG and CE, around a two thirds majority support direct elections and among all respondents, an overwhelming majority want direct election of the CE.

**Table 126 Support direct election of CE by Satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Strongly support	83	71	53	71
Support	7	12	13	10
Oppose	11	17	34	19
Total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 798  
 Chi-square = 47.65 with 4 df p ≤ 0.0001

**Table 127 Support direct election of CE by Satisfaction with performance of CE**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
Strongly support	83	75	48	72
Support	8	10	13	10
Oppose	9	15	39	18
Total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 787

Chi-square = 81.59 with 4 df p < 0.0001

The same patterns appear in terms of the association of satisfaction with the performance of the HKG and the CE and preferences on when to put this constitutional change into effect.

**Table 128 When to implement direct election of CE by Satisfaction with performance of HKG**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
In 2007	83	71	53	71
In 2012 or later	7	12	13	10
Oppose/Don't Know	11	17	34	19
Total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 798

Chi-square = 47.65 with 4 df p < 0.0001

**Table 129 When to implement direct election of CE by Satisfaction with performance of CE**

	Very dissatisfied	Dissatisfied	Satisfied	total
In 2007	83	75	48	72
In 2012 or later	8	10	13	10
Oppose/Don't Know	9	15	39	18
Total	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total N = 787

Chi-square = 81.59 with 4 df p < 0.0001

A majority even of those satisfied with the performance of the HKG prefer direct election of the CE in 2007 and nearly a majority, 48 percent, of those satisfied with Tung's performance want the next CE directly elected in 2007. Among those dissatisfied with the HKG and CE performance an overwhelming majority want direct election of the CE in 2007. As Table 130 shows, a similar overwhelming majority believe that direct election of the CE would make government policies fairer.

**Table 130 Would direct election of the CE make government policies fairer or less fair?**

Group	Count	%
Much fairer	231	28
Fairer	375	45
Stay same	82	10
Less fair	42	5
Much less fair	15	2
Don't know	91	11

The issue of fairness seems a more powerful explanation for support for direct elections



than effectiveness as Table 131 shows. But only 5 percentage points separate those who consider that direct election of the CE will make government policies fairer from those who think direct election of the CE will make government management more effective. (73 percent versus 68 percent). Very large majorities believe direct election of the CE will bring improvement in fairness and effectiveness.

**Table 131 Would direct election of the CE make government management more effective or less effective?**

Group	Count	%
Much more effective	172	21
More effective	393	47
Less effective	127	15
Much less effective	21	3
Don't know	123	15

There are more ways than directly electing the CE to make government management more effective, though clearly most feel the Principal Officials Accountability System (POAS) implemented in July 2002 has failed to achieve its aims. (See Part I above). Other than direct election to make management more effective as 68 percent above see as a means to improve effectiveness, Table 132 presents in rank order of support various other means to improve the POAS. Some gain even broader support than direct election of the CE. For example, 89 percent support strengthening conflict of interest reporting for POs and 78 percent support clarifying terms under which POs would resign. While 87 percent support increasing POs supervision of public bodies, nearly the same percentage, 81 percent, want Legco's role in supervising POs strengthened. Three in four support revitalizing the role of the Chief Secretary for Administration, a position drastically weakened in the POAS.

**Table 132 Do you support or oppose revision of the accountability system in the following ways: (Results ranked according to support)**

	Strongly support	Support	Oppose	Strongly oppose	DK
Strengthen conflict of interest reporting for principal officials (PO)	29	60	3	--	8
Clarify conditions for resignation of POs	24	54	7	1	14
Strengthen PO's supervision of public bodies like the Hospital & Housing Authorities	17	70	4	1	8
Strengthen role of Legco in supervising POs	18	63	7	1	10
Re-vitalize role of Chief Sec for Admin (CSA) in managing day-to-day coordination	15	60	6	--	19
Focus CE on international and mainland relations and make CSA responsible for local affairs	10	48	22	2	17

Clearly Hong Kong people want government effectiveness to improve and many have strong opinions on what needs to be done. Part of the strength of support for these types of measures derives from the contrast between the HKG and the PRCG in handling the



SARS outbreak in early 2003. During that outbreak, the PRCG dismissed over a hundred officials for poor performance, including the Minister of Health and the Mayor of Beijing. In Hong Kong, not a single official lost his job though several doctors and nurses lost their lives as did a total of 299 people, and hundreds more health workers on the front lines fell gravely ill along with hundreds of other patients, with some suffering lifelong effects from the disease and the treatments for it. As Table 133 shows, there is overwhelming support for the actions taken by PRCG officials in dismissing mainland officials for performance failure.

**Table 133 Do you support or oppose President Hu and Premier Wen dismissing mainland officials for their performance?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	243	29
Support	455	54
Oppose	38	5
Strongly oppose	8	1
Don't know	92	11

However, while 83 percent support the president's and premier's actions against mainland officials, only 43 percent feel the PRCG should do the same with Hong Kong's principal officials and 46 percent oppose such a move, a percentage more than double the percentage of those satisfied with the HKG's performance, so in this case, principle not performance seems a stronger contributor to objections to their dismissal.

**Table 134 Do you support or oppose President Hu and Premier Wen dismissing Hong Kong principal officials for their performance?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	90	11
Support	265	32
Oppose	295	35
Strongly oppose	93	11
Don't know	93	11

However, when it comes to the CE, whose election by the Election Committee is confirmed by PRCG officials, a majority of Hong Kongers (58 percent) support the president and premier to have the power to dismiss for performance, and those objecting drops to 28 percent.

**Table 135 Would you support or oppose President Hu and Premier Wen to dismiss Tung Chee-hwa for his performance?**

Group	Count	%
Strongly support	155	19
Support	326	39
Oppose	182	22
Strongly oppose	50	6
Don't know	123	15

These questions and the patterns of response to them indicate that the relationship between Hong Kong people and the mainland is a complex one, with Hong Kongers distinguishing between the roles the PRCG should play and those it should not, despite rather than because of their feelings toward the current local system or current local leaders. More, many more, support direct election of the CE by themselves than leaving it up to mainland leaders. And the experiences of 2003, some of them traumatic such as SARS or dramatic such as the march of over half a million on 1 July or the record turnout and dramatic rout of the DAB by pro-democracy groups in the District Council elections, affect their assessments of chances for constitutional reform. These events have also affected Hong Kongers' views on how they prefer to be consulted on these reforms. To these effects and attitudes we turn in the concluding section of this report.

### Part III Attitudes toward processes of consultation

A survey conducted by the Hong Kong Transition Project in June 2003, before the huge march on 1 July, but close on the heels of the end of the SARS outbreak, showed a fair proportion of Hong Kongers had hopes about the impact of the new team of President Hu and Premier Wen. Hu and Wen had been formally elevated with power officially handed over at the NPC in March 2003. They had quickly been greatly challenged by the SARS outbreak, and after initial fumbling, made a strong comeback. The assessments of the effects of this new team on Hong Kong affairs, however, were less optimistic, as Table 136 shows. Only about a third at that time (June) thought the new team would make direct election of Legco and the CE more likely in 2007 and 2008 respectively.

**Table 136 Do you think the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao will increase or decrease likelihood of: (June 2003)**

	Much more likely	More likely	No change	Less likely	Much less likely	DK
Improved accountability of mainland officials	12	46	13	9	5	16
Improved accountability of Hong Kong POs	6	30	24	15	10	15
Direct election of all Legco members in 2008	6	26	24	16	10	19
Direct election of the CE in 2007	5	27	26	14	7	20

However, after the march and the PRCG's reaction to it, assessments changed, with those on the mainland dropping while those assessing the impact of the new team on the likelihood of constitutional reforms and PO accountability being improved rising, as Table 137 shows.

**Table 137 Do you think the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao will increase or decrease likelihood of: (November 2003)**

	<b>Much more likely</b>	<b>More likely</b>	<b>No change</b>	<b>Less likely</b>	<b>Much less likely</b>	<b>DK</b>
Improved accountability of mainland officials	<b>11</b>	<b>41</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>20</b>
Improved accountability of Hong Kong POs	<b>5</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>18</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>19</b>
Direct election of all Legco members in 2008	<b>6</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>20</b>
Direct election of the CE in 2007	<b>6</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>20</b>

While the new PRCG officials and the experiences of SARS and the July demonstrations and resignations of POs Antony Leung and Regina Ip have clearly raised hopes that the President and Premier will permit, if not actually encourage, direct elections for Legco and the CE in 2007 and 2008, the demonstrations also changed attitudes of Hong Kong people themselves toward consultation processes for constitutional reform. It must not be forgotten that the historic march of 1 July was triggered by the HKG and CE railroading of legislation for Article 23 on sedition, subversion, secession, treason, theft of state secrets and consorting with foreign political bodies. Table 138 shows that in mid-June 2003 a referendum on constitutional reforms was the most supported means of approaching constitutional reforms. By November, university conducted public opinion surveys narrowly piped referendums for first place (Table 139). And Central Policy Unit surveys, last in June, sank even more in support by November.

**Table 138 Do you support or oppose the following ways for the government to handle the constitution reform issues of 2007? (10-17 June 2003 N = 735) Rank order**

	<b>% Support</b>	<b>% Oppose</b>	<b>% Don't Know</b>
1 Hold referendum on direct election of CE and Legco	<b>85</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>7</b>
2 Commission university-conducted public opinion surveys	<b>85</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>8</b>
3 Involve NGOs and parties in public forums	<b>81</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>9</b>
4 Hold public forums on reforms	<b>81</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>10</b>
5 Policy Address style meetings of principal officials with public	<b>79</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>9</b>
6 Hold Legco public hearings after 2004 elections	<b>76</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>
7 Setup public opinion assessment office as in 1984 Joint Declaration	<b>74</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>16</b>
8 Central Policy Unit conduct public opinion surveys	<b>60</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>11</b>

**Table 139: Do you support or oppose the following ways for the government to handle the constitution reform issues of 2007? (4-12 November 2003 N = 835)**

	<b>% Support</b>	<b>% Oppose</b>	<b>% Don't Know</b>
1 Commission university-conducted public opinion surveys	<b>88</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>7</b>
2 Hold referendum on direct election of CE and Legco	<b>83</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>8</b>
3 Policy Address style meetings of principal officials with public	<b>82</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>11</b>
4 Hold public forums on reforms	<b>83</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>12</b>
Involve NGOs and parties in public forums	<b>80</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>11</b>
6 Hold Legco public hearings after 204 elections	<b>77</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>17</b>
7 Setup public opinion assessment office as in 1984 Joint Declaration	<b>63</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>24</b>
8 Central Policy Unit conduct public opinion surveys	<b>55</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>14</b>

Hong Kongers strongly prefer means which are neutral, non-government or direct when it comes to how they want the constitutional reform consultations conducted. The experiences of 2003 have changed many Hong Kong people's sense of their power to affect HKG policies, as the final table in this report demonstrates. In the colonial period only between a third and fourth felt that if many Hong Kongers disagreed with a policy of the HKG, the government would or might change or modify the policy, and even less, under one in five, thought the SAR government would be even as amenable as rule by foreigners, despite the promise that 1997 would bring about "Hong Kong people ruling Hong Kong."

**Table 140 If many HK people disagree with certain policies of the HK government, (SAR government) do you think they would change or modify those policies? (Two separate questions asked, one currently, one prospectively)**

	<b>HK colonial Gov't</b>		<b>SAR incoming</b>		<b>SAR 1<sup>st</sup> 5yrs</b>	<b>SAR new system</b>	
	Sept 95	July 96	Sept 95	July 96	April 02	Nov 2002	Nov 2003
<b>Yes</b>	15	17	8	9	18	<b>15</b>	<b>16</b>
<b>Maybe yes</b>	10	14	11	9	19	<b>16</b>	<b>29</b>
<b>Can't say</b>	7	13	9	15	16	<b>15</b>	<b>23</b>
<b>Maybe not</b>	8	5	7	6	10	<b>10</b>	<b>8</b>
<b>No</b>	52	43	51	50	30	<b>38</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>DK</b>	9	8	13	11	6	<b>6</b>	<b>8</b>

In April 2002, near the end of the first five years of the SAR, and in prospect of a new POAS ministerial system of accountability, 37 percent felt government might listen and those saying outright that it would not change or modify policies dropped from half to 30 percent. But by November 2002, doubts had started to rise again, with those saying no rising to 38 percent and those saying yes or it might dropping to 31 percent. However,

after July 2003, 45 percent thought the HKG would or might change or modify policies if many disagreed, and only 17 percent said it would not. But this change is not so much the result of government becoming more transparent and more accommodating; it is instead reflective of a sense of empowerment, a new sense that Hong Kong people can, indeed they will, rule Hong Kong, and that they will force, if need be, the government to listen.

The provisions in the Basic Law regarding constitutional reform speak of making such changes in light of the actual situation. The actual situation is clear from this report: Hong Kongers in overwhelming numbers want to directly elect their Chief Executive in 2007 and all members of Legco in 2008. They want government to develop and implement policies fairly and effectively. They want their officials to be accountable, to themselves as voters. And they will, if necessary, insist on being heard.

Clearly, if the “wisdom of the masses” is heeded by the government that gave that advice to the CE, and if the CE follows that wise advice by taking to heart the results of this survey of the people’s wishes, there is without any doubt a repeatedly expressed and deeply felt “need to change the method” of electing the CE and the legislature in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The questions facing the CE, the HKG and the PRCG in 2004 are will that advice to heed the wisdom of the masses carry the day? If not, what more besides massive demonstrations and voting against those who stand in the way will the masses do in response? Are the authorities, local and central, willing to test the Hong Kong people’s patience by obstruction rather than lead them in construction of a fairer, more effective system of governance for Hong Kong?

## Demographics

### Sex

Group	Count	%
Males	417	50
Females	419	50

### Age group (sociological analysis by decade)

Group	Count	%
18-19	58	7
20-29	117	14
30-39	195	24
40-49	243	30
50-59	107	13
60-69	54	7
70-85	42	5

### Age group (census comparison classifications)

Group	Nov 2003 sample	*HK 2001 Census
18-24	14	12
25-34	17	21
35-44	32	26
45-54	20	18
55-64	8	9
65+	9	12

All telephone surveys tend to over-sample younger, better educated groups and under-sample more aged groups, particularly those 65 and above. Difficulties in interviewing older respondents lead some surveys to exclude those 65 and up, but this distorts the results considerably since those aged 65 and up make up 12 percent of the population aged 18 and above, and who are usually disproportionately supportive of the government.

### Education (not reclassified)

Group	Count	%
None	46	6
Primary 1	14	2
Primary 2	3	0.3
Primary 3	3	0.3
Primary 4	4	0.5
Primary 5	8	1
Primary 6	29	3.5
7 Form 1	17	2
8 Form 2	16	2
9 Form 3	101	12
10 Form 4 /Tech F3 first year	14	2
11 Form 5/Tech F3 graduate	211	26
12 Form 6/Tech F5 first year	16	2
13 Form7/Tech F5 grad/Overseas univ. freshman	102	12
14 Univ. yr 1/overseas yr 2	31	4
15 Univ yr 2/overseas yr 3	10	1
16 Univ. grad local/overseas	184	22
17 Masters	16	2
18 Ph.D/other terminal (JD)	1	0.1

The table above are the classifications developed by the Hong Kong Transition Project. The years of education approach allows regression tests (each category represents a year of education, though the Masters and Ph.D. may take more than a year to complete. However the numbers of Masters and Ph.D.s are so small as to make little significant effect on the overall results. The table below is reclassified to match the census categories. This survey, as nearly all surveys, tends to oversample the better educated groups. This is particularly the case for university graduates. The census data understates the education levels of permanent residents since it includes domestic helpers and recent emigrants from the mainland, most of whom are less educated than the Hong Kong norm. Inclusion of other expatriates tends to counteract these figures, but only marginally. The overall result is that the survey better represents education levels of permanent residents, citizens, than the census.

### Education, reclassified

Group	Count	%	2001 census
0	46	5.6	8.4
Primary 1-6	61	7.4	20.5
7-9 Form 1-3	134	16.2	18.9
10-11 Form 4-5	225	27.2	26.3
12-13 Form 6-7	118	14.3	9.4
14-16 University	225	27.2	16.4
17-18 Post-graduate	17	2	

### Education (summary statistics)

Count	<b>826</b>
Mean	<b>11.16</b>
Median	<b>11</b>
StdDev	<b>4.33</b>

Education is measured by years from zero (none) to 18 (Ph.D. degree). The average length of education for the overall survey is 11 years, or equivalent to Form 5 graduate.

### Education by Age group (census categories)

	18-24	25-34	35-44	45-54	55-64	65+	total
0	0	0	1	8	13	36	6
Primary 1-6	1	1	6	11	13	25	7
7-9 Form 1-3	7	11	17	26	28	10	17
10-11 Form 4-5	27	21	36	28	20	3	27
12-13 Form 6-7	30	13	14	10	13	5	14
14-16 University	36	48	25	17	12	20	27
17-18 Post-graduate	0	5	2	1	2	2	2
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 298.0 with 30 df  $p \leq 0.0001$



**Education by Age groups (sociological analysis)**

	18-19	20-29	30-39	40-49	50-59	60-69	70-85	total
0	0	0	1	2	11	19	46	6
Primary 1-6	0	2	3	8	14	19	23	7
7-9 Form 1-3	3	7	16	22	26	19	10	17
10-11 Form 4-5	28	23	33	31	24	11	5	27
12-13 Form 6-7	48	12	14	11	12	13	3	14
14-16 University	21	54	30	25	12	20	10	27
17-18 Post-graduate	0	3	4	2	1	0	3	2
total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

table contents: Percent of Column Total

Chi-square = 347.1 with 36 df  $p \leq 0.0001$

**Occupation (survey)**

Group	Count	%
Managers/Administrators	106	13
Professionals	65	8
Assoc. Professionals	22	3
Clerks/secretaries	108	13
Service & sales	45	6
Ag and fisheries	1	0.1
Craft & related	31	4
Plant & machine operators	45	6
Elementary occupations	30	4
Housewives	127	16
Retired	77	9
Unemployed	46	6
Students	79	10
Educators	19	2
Other	16	2

**Work Sector**

Group	Count	%	Total % in labour force	2001 Census % in labour force
Public sector	82	9.9	60.3	61.4
Private sector	417	50.4		
Not in labour force	328	39.6		

**Recoded Workforce Occupation**

Group	Count	%	2001 census
Managers/Administrators	106	22.5	10.7
Professionals	65	13.7	5.5
Assoc. Professionals	41	8.7	15.3
Clerks/secretaries	108	22.8	16.3
Service & sales	45	9.5	15
Ag & fisheries	1	0.2	0.3
Craft & related	31	6.6	9.9
Plant & machine operators	45	9.5	7.3
Elementary occupations	30	6.4	19.5

Analysis by: Michael E. DeGolyer, Assoc. Prof. Government & International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University and Director, Hong Kong Transition Project

Survey questionnaire developed by Christine Loh, Executive Director Civic Exchange, Y. Y. Yip of Civic Exchange, Michael DeGolyer and P. K. Cheung, Research Assistant, Hong Kong Transition Project.

Survey conducted and supervised by P. K. Cheung.

Civic Exchange, an independent Hong Kong based policy research think tank directed by Christine Loh and the Hong Kong Transition Project, a long term multi-university research project directed by Michael DeGolyer, collaborated in this survey on constitutional reform issues and process, funded by an anonymous donation to Civic Exchange.

At the 95% confidence level, range of error is plus or minus 4 points. Completion rate for the November 2003 survey was 28% of those contacted by telephone. Since the project uses the Kish table to randomly identify the correspondents desired and then schedules a callback if that respondent is not at home, the completion rate tends to be lower but the randomization of responses (needed for accurate statistics) tends to be higher than surveys which interview readily available respondents. Respondents are interviewed in Cantonese, Mandarin, English, Hakka and other languages dialects as they prefer and as interviewers with the language skills needed are available. Other surveys referred to above are Hong Kong Transition Project surveys. The details of those surveys and reports of same may be found on the Hong Kong Transition Project website at <http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~hktp> Further details about Civic Exchange may be found at <http://www.civic-exchange.org>

The number of respondents in the HKTP surveys:

N=	Month	Year	Count	Month	Year	Count	Month	Year	Count	Month	Year	Count
	Nov	91	902									
	Feb	93	615	Aug	93	609						
	Feb	94	636	Aug	94	640						
	Feb	95	647	Aug	95	645						
	Feb	96	627	July	96	928	Dec	96	326			
	Feb	97	546	June	97	1,129						
	Jan	98	700	April	98	852	June 98	625	July 98	647	Oct 98	811
	Apr	99	838	July	99	815	Nov 99	813				
	Apr	00	704	Aug	00	625;	Aug 00	1059	Oct 00	721	Nov 00	801
	Apr	01	830	June	01	808	July (media )	831	July (party)	1029	Nov 01	759
	Apr	02	751	Aug	02	721	Nov 02	814				
	June	03	776	Nov	03	835						

All Figures are in percentages unless otherwise stated All references should be to Civic Exchange and the Hong Kong Transition Project, which has project members at Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong University, University of Macau and Lingnan University. The Hong Kong Transition Project is funded via a competitive grant from the Research Grants Council of the University Grants Committee of the Hong Kong Government (HKBU 2033/01H) and is a participating research project with the David C. Lam Institute of East-West Studies. None of the institutions mentioned above is responsible for any of the views expressed herein.